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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this research report is to understand the relation between bonuses and 
motivation through answering the following problem statement: 
 
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
This relation is explored by applying “Bank & Financial Corporation” as a case study. 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” is a major organization in the Scandinavian bank and 
finance sector and they are operating with a management model much inspired by the 
Beyond Budgeting principles. Within this new management model they have adopted a 
new bonus system that consists of one team based bonus scheme, one corporate-wide 
profit-sharing scheme as well as an individual bonus scheme for corporate managers. 
Through the use of qualitative and quantitative research, this study takes a holistic view 
of analyzing the motivational impact of the three different bonus schemes on employees 
across the whole organization. By taking this holistic approach, the report also explores 
if the team based bonus scheme has any different motivational impact on managers 
compared to non-managers in the organization. 
 
Our findings prove that there is little overall enthusiasm for the bonus systems at “Bank 
& Financial Corporation”. The higher-level managers find very little motivation from the 
individual bonus scheme, although they find the goal setting process and the 
achievement of the goals that comprise the bonus to be very motivating. The overall 
perception of the team bonus is that it does not function as a good tool for rewarding or 
motivating employees. Firstly, because the employees struggle to see how their work 
influences the targets that trigger the team bonuses. Secondly, a large share of the 
employees also find it difficult to understand how the overall bonus system works, as it 
is perceived to be rather complex and is little communicated. The research also suggests 
that a large part of the company anticipates receiving annual bonuses. This has led to a 
view of the bonus as an entitlement which causes frustration and demotivation when it 
is not given. The research report also finds that non-managers are significantly more 
motivated from the team bonus than managers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the report background, the problem statement and the research 
questions addressed by this study. The chapter also portrays this study’s intent and 
relevance in today’s business environment. Finally, the chapter provides a brief 
explanation to the empirics of “Bank & Financial Corporation” and a short explanation to 
how the report is structured. 
1.1 Report background 
There is generally no question about the importance of employee engagement for work 
performance. According to a survey conducted by ACCOR, 90% of leaders believe that 
engaging employees is essential for the success of their business (Lupfer, 2011). A study 
conducted by Gallup proved that companies in the top ten percentile on employee 
engagement outperformed their competitors by 72 percent in earnings per share 
between 2007 and 2008 (Fox, 2010). Another survey by Gallup further emphasizes the 
importance of employee engagement by showing that disengaged workers cost the US 
economy as much as 370 billion USD every year (Lupfer, 2011).  
 
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) the lack of motivation among workers 
is one of the major problems of management control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
A common approach to increase work motivation is by designing and implementing 
pecuniary incentives and rewards systems. Here, bonuses are the most widely used tool 
(Lazear & Gibbs, 2009), with individual bonuses utilized three times more frequently 
than group- or team based bonuses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). The most common 
rationale behind implementing bonus systems in a firm is to create an incentive to 
motivate employees (Treanor et al., 2013). This rationale originates from the era of 
traditional management control systems, where organizations pursued to effectively 
utilize their resources by controlling and directing the employees’ behavior through a 
widespread use of bonuses and other extrinsic motivators. These views were 
predominant in the business society for large parts of the beginning of the 19th century. 
It was not until the 1950s that the view of money as the only source of work motivation 
was challenged. Through the need-theories of Abraham Maslow and David McClelland, 
and later theories by the behavioral scientists Douglas McGregor and Frederick 
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Herzberg, motivation was viewed from a different perspective. These men argued that 
motivation was intrinsic, and that money does not work as a tool to encourage and 
stimulate motivation. Instead, they argued that humans are motivated through other 
factors that are intrinsic to the job, including the needs of personal growth, the work 
itself and recognition. These views conflicted with the traditional view of management 
control at that time. But since the emergence of these theories, there has been an 
evolution where managers have made more use of more informal and soft management 
tools. Within these tools lies a belief in line with McGregor’s theory Y that employees are 
best motivated through intrinsic motivators relating to autonomy, mastery and purpose 
(Pink, 2009). Still we observe reluctance from organizations to let go of bonuses and 
extrinsic motivators as tools to motivate employees (Bogsnes, 2009). 
 
Through the emergence of Hope and Fraser’s Beyond Budgeting-philosophy in the 
beginning of the new millennia, the view of using traditional management tools to 
stimulate higher performance was criticized even further (Hope and Fraser, 2003). As 
the name suggest, the Beyond Budgeting philosophy aims to eliminate the budgeting 
process as a management tool. Instead it is built on the notion that organizations 
operating in today’s highly complex business society need to be agile and quickly adapt 
to unexpected changes in the market to stay competitive. The Beyond Budgeting 
philosophy argues that the budgeting process undermines this agility. Elimination of the 
budgeting process is thus seen as an important step in becoming more adaptive to the 
business society in which today’s firms are operating. As a management philosophy, 
Beyond Budgeting was made famous through the Swedish bank Handelsbanken. Two 
years after abolishing the budgeting process in 1970, Handelsbanken started to 
outperform their competitors by being more profitable than industry average, and they 
have continued to do so ever since (Bogsnes, 2009). Many companies have looked to 
Handelsbanken’s example of abandoning the budgeting process for inspiration since, 
where a large share of these companies has been Scandinavian. Along with the 
abandonment of budgets, Handelsbanken also abandoned individual bonuses as an 
important feature of their new management model. Instead of individual bonuses, 
Handelsbanken adopted a companywide profit-sharing system where they allocate parts 
of the profits equally to all employees. The payout is triggered if the bank achieves a 
higher return on shareholders’ equity after standard tax than their average competitor 
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(Hope and Fraser, 2003). In line with Handelsbanken’s approach, the Beyond Budgeting 
philosophy criticizes traditional methods of rewarding employees, such as individual 
bonuses. They claim that individual bonuses do not have a major motivational effect and 
believe that they are in fact counterproductive, preventing the fostering of high 
performance instead of facilitating it (Hope and Fraser, 2003; Hope and Player, 2011; 
Bogsnes, 2009). Accompanying the elimination of budgets, Hope and Fraser (2003) call 
for a wider use of recognition and sharing team-based success collectively.  
 
This research report will employ “Bank & Financial Corporation” as a case study. Within 
the adoption of the new management model inspired by the Beyond Budgeting theories, 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” has also adopted a new bonus system. Additional to the 
new bonus structure including two bonus schemes that revolve around rewarding team 
performance, the company also operates with an individual bonus scheme for their 
corporate managers. The organization is currently also experimenting with a system of 
allocating the bonus from their profit-sharing scheme based on individual performance 
within teams. These structures may be argued to conflict with the Beyond Budgeting 
principles of sharing success collectively and by viewing individual bonuses as a poor 
source of motivation. So what might “Bank & Financial Corporation” gain from adopting 
these individual bonuses? Could it be that bonuses indeed are important motivational 
factors, and contribute to high performance, and that the Beyond Budgeting philosophy 
has underestimated their potential motivational effect?  
1.2 Problem statement and research question 
Based on the report background and by employing “Bank & Financial Corporation” as a 
case study, we have formed the following problem statement: 
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
In order to answer this problem statement we have defined four research questions: 
 
1. What is Beyond Budgeting and why is it so critical of individual bonuses? 
2. What contextual factors within a dynamic management model influence motivation 
from bonuses? 
3. What factors within a bonus system motivate employees? 
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4. Do team bonuses impact motivation differently between managers and employees in 
non-managerial roles? 
1.3 The study’s purpose and intent  
The research questions will help to answer the overall problem statement. Firstly, they 
do so by understanding what Beyond Budgeting is and why this philosophy is so critical 
of financial incentives and individual bonuses. Secondly, they do so by understanding 
the importance of the context. This is done by exploring which contextual factors within 
a dynamic management model that may enhance or reduce work motivation stemming 
from bonuses. Thirdly, by exploring which factors within a bonus scheme that affect 
work motivation. And finally, by understanding if bonuses do impact the motivation of 
managers and non-managers differently. These answers will ultimately help us 
understand if bonus systems motivate in a dynamic management model, and which 
factors within the researched bonus system that contribute to this. 
The study is built on a former master thesis by Vilde Målsnes (2011) from the Beyond 
Budgeting research program at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). In her thesis, 
Målsnes (2011) analyzes how the motivation of managers is affected by the 
management control system as a whole. Målsnes’ thesis suggests that further studies 
should analyze the potential motivational effects of particular parts of the management 
control system and specifically singles out bonus systems as a potential research area. In 
her research, Målsnes (2011) finds that bonus systems are not a source of motivation. 
Based on these suggestions, we wanted to further research whether bonus systems are 
motivating or not, as numerous text books on incentive compensation argue that they 
are. We found it particularly interesting to apply this question to a dynamic 
management control system much inspired by the Beyond Budgeting philosophy and its 
principles, as the Beyond Budgeting philosophy is very critical of individual bonus 
systems and financial incentives in general. “Bank & Financial Corporation” was 
therefore chosen as a case study based on their adoption and implementation of their 
dynamic management model. Since “Bank & Financial Corporation” also incorporates 
individual bonuses in their bonus system, through individual bonuses for their 
corporate management, this makes the organization an interesting case objective, as the 
Beyond Budgeting principles state how bonuses are best shared collectively. The 
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research report therefore seeks to understand how “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” 
adopted bonus system of both individual and team bonuses impacts employees’ work 
motivation, and if the bonus system motivates managers and non-managers differently.  
1.4 Relevance  
Beyond Budgeting and dynamic management models have become increasingly relevant 
over the last few years. The relevance of this study comes from combining a new mind-
set of managing organizations with theories on incentives and motivation. There are 
numerous studies on the use of Beyond Budgeting and dynamic management as a 
foundation for management control and leadership. However, there is very little 
research and literature that links dynamic management models to the motivational 
effect from incentive and bonus systems. As the Beyond Budgeting movement continues 
to draw attention among leaders worldwide (BBRT, 2013), it becomes increasingly 
relevant to view bonus systems in the light of firms that operate with dynamic 
management models, instead of those that rely on budgets or traditional management 
control. As no organizations are identical, a management model based on the principles 
of Beyond Budgeting is not generally applicable to other organizations. The findings of 
this study is thus to a large extent dependent on situational factors. By conducting a case 
study, where we only study one firm, the applicability and generalizability of this 
research report is limited. However, the research may still be relevant for organizations 
operating within a similar context as “Bank & Financial Corporation”.  
1.5 Empirics  
The methodology used in this research is a combination of qualitative, in-depth 
interviews and a quantitative survey. These were conducted as part of a case study on 
“Bank & Financial Corporation”. The qualitative interviews were done with six higher 
level managers across different sub-divisions of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, while 
the survey was conducted on a representative population across the whole organization 
including all levels of the hierarchy, from top managers to lower level employees. The 
reason for choosing to include employees from all levels of the hierarchical structure 
was to analyze differences as to how team bonuses may motivate differently depending 
on an employees’ role in the organization.  
The qualitative interviews were used to provide the researchers with insight on the 
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design, purpose and use of “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” bonus system. The 
interviews also served to identify important attitudes and opinions about the current 
system, as well as potential drawbacks. The discussion and analysis of the bonus system 
are done in the light of various theories on motivation, incentive theories and the 
principles of Beyond Budgeting. The survey builds on the information gathered from 
theoretical research and from the qualitative interviews, and was developed to analyze 
the motivational effect of the bonus system across the whole organization of “Bank & 
Financial Corporation”. The research report has also made use of available reports, plans 
and procedures on how the management control system of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” has been structured and implemented. 
1.6 Structure 
This thesis is structured in three main parts, consisting of a total of six chapters. The 
first part presents the theoretical foundation of the research paper. The theory is mainly 
built from understanding what work motivation is and how work motivation is 
promoted through the use of bonuses as a tool in management control systems.  
The second main part of this thesis includes a chapter explaining the applied 
methodology for the master’s thesis. This chapter seeks to give a more in-depth 
reasoning to our choices of research methods, as well as explaining how the research 
was conducted. Further, we present the empirics of this paper through a presentation of 
the case company, “Bank & Financial Corporation”. This part also seeks to detail and 
explain the bonus structures used in this organization today.  
The third main part consists of the analysis of the results from the qualitative interviews 
and the quantitative survey conducted at “Bank & Financial Corporation”. This analysis 
lays the foundation for the conclusions presented in chapter six, where we answer the 
problem statement and the underlying research questions. The conclusions are followed 
by a short overview of this report’s strengths and weaknesses, and suggestions for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical perspectives 
The purpose of the following chapter is to provide theoretical perspectives needed to 
answer and address the problem statement of this research paper: 
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
Firstly, this chapter explores theories for fully understanding what motivation is and 
how motivation is fostered in an organization through the use of management control. 
Secondly, the chapter explores the purposes of incentive systems and bonuses. Thirdly, 
it investigates how bonuses may impact work motivation by applying four process 
theories of motivation. Then, the chapter explains the Beyond Budgeting philosophy and 
examines why Beyond Budgeting is so critical of individual bonus systems. Lastly, the 
chapter is concluded with a summary and a presentation of our analytical framework.  
2.1 What is motivation? 
An organization’s most valuable resource is its human capital represented by its 
workforce (Langeland, 1999). The best way to ensure high productivity and 
performance in the firm is by having highly motivated employees who want to do well 
and serve the organization in its best interest. Yet, this is not a straightforward 
relationship. Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) claim that the lack of motivation is one 
of the major problems of management control. This has made them view lacking 
motivation as a significant factor to low business performance. This makes it vital for 
organizations to understand how their employees are and can be better motivated.  
The word motivation stems from the Latin word “movere”, which can be translated into 
“what causes change” (Pinder, 1998). Motivation is therefore seen as an inner process 
that directs us to do what we do, and behave in the way we behave. From an 
organizational behavioral point of view, work motivation can be defined as the 
psychological process that causes the initiation, excitement, intensity, persistence, and 
direction of behavior (Klein, 1989; Pinder, 1988; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976). In order 
for organizations to ensure high performance and productivity, there is consequently a 
need to align the employees’ behavior with the goals and the overall strategy of the firm. 
Yet, this is not possible unless the organization know what really motivates its 
employees (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2010). 
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Work motivation can be broadly categorized into two different theoretical perspectives; 
content theories and cognitive process theories (Borkowski, 2009). Content theories of 
work motivation, or more commonly known as needs theories, are associated with 
determining and explaining what factors motivates employees and what drives their 
behavior (Borkowski, 2009). Process theories on motivation focus on the cognitive 
processes behind an individual’s level of motivation (Borkowski, 2009). These theories 
look to explain how an individual’s employee motivation is aroused, directed and 
sustained, and how it may be halted (Borkowski, 2009; Nelson & Quick, 2003). While 
this research paper will mainly look to analyze the motivational impact of bonuses 
based on process theories, exploring the content theories on motivation is vital to fully 
understand work motivation.  
2.1.1 Content theories on motivation 
At the turn of the 19th century, the global business world was largely ruled by the ideals 
of the father of scientific management, Frederick Winslow Taylor. He stated that a 
person’s motivation to work was purely based on monetary rewards (Porter et al., 
2003). With his book ‹‹The Human Side of Enterprise››, Douglas McGregor (1960) 
presented one of the first content theories on work motivation. In it McGregor 
challenged Taylor’s presumption that humans were fundamentally inert and that we 
would not do much without extrinsic rewards and punishments. McGregor (1960) 
presented his two opposing views on how employees were motivated, labeled theory X, 
and theory Y. Theory X was built on the beliefs of Taylor, that people largely disliked 
work and responsibility, had low ambitions and preferred to be under control with clear 
directions. In stark contrast, he also presented theory Y that was built from a belief that 
motivation was intrinsic to people. This theory suggests that employees want to be 
involved, take responsibility and develop their skills and capacity. McGregor’s personal 
views favored theory Y, and he argued that work was something that stems from within 
a human’s nature, and that we are indeed creative and self-motivated.  
In line with McGregor’s arguments, Herzberg et al. (1959) also argued that motivation 
was something intrinsic to the job, and that it was the content of the work that 
motivated people, not financial incentives. In an attempt to theorize that job satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction act independently of each other, Herzberg presented his two-factor 
theory (Herzberg, 1966). These factors were split into motivational factors and hygienic 
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factors. The motivational factors (motivators) included achievement, recognition, work 
itself, responsibility, personal growth and advancement, while the hygienic factors 
included working conditions, company policy and administration, status, relationships 
with peers, relationships with supervisors, personal life, security, and salary (Mawoli & 
Babandako, 2011). With the two-factor theory, Herzberg (1966) argues that the hygienic 
factors in themselves cannot motivate, but need to be present to avoid dissatisfaction. 
However, in order for the motivator factors to be motivating, the hygienic factors also 
have to be satisfied. Herzberg (1966) further explains that solely stimulating the 
hygienic factors in themselves will not lead to increased motivation.  
2.1.2 Process theories of motivation 
With the fundamental understanding of the content theories of motivation, the report 
now looks to explore how an individual’s motivation may be influenced by cognitive 
processes. Through analyzing process theories of motivation, managers may get better 
at predicting behavior and understand how employees can be influenced to stimulate 
high business performance (Borkowski, 2009). 
Expectancy theory  
Expectancy theories on motivation try to explain employee behavior as something that 
is guided by the expectation of a desired outcome, often in the form of a reward. From 
his research, Victor Vroom (1964), developed and defined the first expectancy theory 
based on the three principles of; 1) expectancy, 2) instrumentality and 3) valence. 
According to Vroom (1964) people will act according to expectations that their behavior 
will lead to goals that are specific and desirable. The variable of expectancy is explained 
as an individual’s belief that for a given level of effort, this will result in an outcome of 
achieving a desired goal, while the instrumentality relates to the belief that if a 
performance expectation is met, the employee will receive the promised reward. Lastly, 
valence refers to the value, or the depth of the want, that the employee holds for the 
reward. In order for the valence to be high, the reward needs to be substantial or 
meaningful to the employee. According to Vroom (1964), these three factors are 
multiplicative. This way, it is the sum of all three factors that decides a person’s 
motivation, meaning that all factors have to be present in order for an employee to be 
motivated. According to Porter and Lawler (1968), if you repeat rewarding high 
performance, this is doomed to create an expectancy of being rewarded again. Lawler 
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(1971) further argues that the belief in the link between efforts and rewards is crucial 
for employee motivation, and the stronger the belief is, the higher is the motivation.  
Goal setting theory 
According to Edvin Locke’s (1968) goal setting theory, performance is largely 
determined by the nature of a set goal. Locke (1968) argues that higher goals lead to 
greater effort and persistence, compared to goals that are moderately difficult, easy or 
vague. Locke (1968) further argues that employees will be motivated by goals that are 
clear and challenging, given that the employees have the belief in the ability to reach the 
goal and that the feedback is present. 
From these arguments, the goal setting theory has proved that there are four 
mechanisms that determine the relationship between goals and performance (Locke & 
Latham, 2006). These key mechanisms are 1) the feedback, 2) the commitment to the 
goal, 3) the task complexity, and 4) the situational constraints. First of all, the feedback is 
important to track progress, while commitment to the goal is also crucial for the goal to 
have an impact on behavior. This commitment may be strengthened by self-efficacy and 
viewing the goal as important. Task complexity refers to how hard it is to obtain task 
knowledge for complex tasks. By being dependent on having the right task knowledge or 
skills, goals may motivate by putting existing knowledge into use, or by motivating to 
search for new knowledge (Locke & Latham, 2006). Situational constraints may for 
instance imply how an overload of tasks or the lack of resources to accomplish them, 
will moderate the effect of the goal (Locke & Latham, 2006).  
Goals in which people set for themselves with the purpose of attaining mastery are 
usually healthy (Locke & Latham, 2006). Additionally, goals have a tendency to narrow 
focus, which makes them effective in guiding direction. For the same reason they are 
also restrictive in looking beyond the intended area of focus to a broader and perhaps 
more holistic picture. This may limit the creativity of an employee. It is thus important 
that goals are not too narrow and focused. Goals imposed by others may also limit the 
personal commitment to the goals (Ordonez et al., 2009). In line with the goal-setting 
theory, Doran (1981) argues how goals need to adhere to the SMART principles, in 
which they need to be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time bound. 
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Equity theory 
The equity theory on motivation was first developed by behavioral psychologist John 
Adams in 1963. This theory is based on how an employee’s motivation is related to his 
or her perception of the equity, fairness and justice that the management in the 
organization practices. According to Adams (1963), an employee evaluates fairness from 
comparing his effort to his own compensation. The employee will then observe his 
peers’ compensation based on their efforts, and compare the effort/compensation ratio 
with his own (Adams, 1963). These comparisons can be made with peers working in the 
same company or with peers working in similar positions in other firms. From these 
comparisons, an employee can feel both over and under-rewarded. Both these situations 
may lead to a negative state where the employees feel a lack of motivation. If an 
employee’s effort is not observable and measurable, it does not adhere to the principles 
of equity and fairness. Then the employees might become demotivated, which may lead 
to organizational inefficiency and lower performance. Based on this, one can argue that 
the equity theory is more useful in describing what factors that contribute to a lack of 
motivation, rather than describing factors that increase motivation (Adams, 1963). 
Self-determination- and cognitive evaluation theory 
Another important theoretical aspect of motivation is the self-determination theories. 
These theories were developed in the 1970’s and 80’s, evolving from the understanding 
that motivation is dominantly intrinsic, similar to the views of Herzberg and McGregor. 
The self-determination theory that was developed from Deci and Ryan’s (1985) research 
focuses on how individuals’ goal-directed behavior is self-motivated and self-
determined. Deci and Ryan (1985) argue how performance-contingent rewards reduce 
self-determination compared to when being asked to achieve the same standard without 
being promised a reward. This is perfectly in line with Porter and Lawler’s (1968) views 
of how repeatedly rewarding high performance will create performance-reward 
expectancies. On the other hand, Eisenberger et al. (1999) argue that performance-
reward expectancy conveys a message to the employees that the organization has little 
control over the employee’s daily performance. By offering a reward it thus increases the 
worker self-determination to do well, as the organization needs to ensure that the 
potential reward recipient will cooperate (Eisenberger et al., 1999).  
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Deci and Ryan (1987) also developed the cognitive evaluation theory. This is a sub 
theory from the self-determination theory. The cognitive evaluation theory proposes 
how tangible and extrinsic rewards are assumed to be a form of social control that 
reduces an employee’s perceived self-determination. Thereby it also reduces intrinsic 
motivation. This theory focuses on the perception that employees have needs of 
competence and autonomy in order to be motivated. The self-determination theory is 
often discussed with relation to rewards, which Deci and Ryan (1987) regard as 
extrinsic motivational tools that may harm employees’ intrinsic motivation.  
2.1.3 Motivation - a mismatch between what science knows and what businesses do 
When it comes to motivation in today’s business world, Pink (2009) states that there is a 
mismatch between what earlier behavioral scientists like Herzberg and McGregor say, 
and what businesses actually do. Pink (2009) argues that business systems are still built 
on the views of Taylor where there exists a strong belief among organizations that 
employees need to be motivated through financial incentives (Pink, 2009). Similar to the 
Beyond Budgeting-literature (Bogsnes (2009); Hope & Player (2012); Hope & Fraser 
(2003)) which this report examines in greater depth in chapter 2.5, Pink (2009) 
questions the unreliability of motivating through a carrot-and-stick mentality and 
argues that financial incentives do more harm than good.  
In order to understand the criticism of extrinsic motivators better, we need to better 
understand what a management control system is, and examine how the management 
control system can be used to motivate employees. Through this we can understand 
what role bonuses naturally have within a management control system. This is useful 
when exploring how bonuses are used as a tool to motivate employees. 
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2.2 Management control systems and motivation 
In an increasingly changing business environment with a high level of complexity in 
structure and tasks, companies require well-behaved management control systems to 
accomplish their goals (Otley, 1999; Bergstrand, 2009). According to Bergstrand (2009) 
companies rely on management control systems to make sure that employees are doing 
entrusted tasks and strive towards reaching the firm’s overall targets. However, the 
main reason for having a management control system is to facilitate for efficient 
management and control of the company (Nyland & Østergren, 2008). 
2.2.1 What is a management control system? 
The classical definition of management control was given by Robert Anthony (1965, p. 
27) as 
“the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's objective.”  
 
Based on this classical definition, Robert Anthony and David Young (2003) described 
traditional management control as a continuous process encompassing four different 
control processes: 1) Strategic planning, 2) budget preparation, 3) operation & 
measurement, and 4) reporting & evaluation. This process can be illustrated as a closed 
and continuous loop as seen in figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: The Management Control Process by Anthony and Young (2003) 
 
The purpose of incorporating all these elements into one system was to provide 
managers with the relevant information in decision-making, planning and evaluation 
(Merchant & Otley, 2007). The idea of management control is thus to create a seamless 
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and continuous process that links strategic planning to operational control, and in this 
way, help managers to carry out the intended strategy (Otley, Broadbent, & Berry, 
1995). In more recent times, Malmi and Brown (2008) further state that management 
control systems not only revolve around one form of management control alone, but on 
multiple control systems working together in a symbiotic fashion. 
 
Although history has provided us with a large set of definitions to what management 
control is, the extent of needed control versus encouragement to align employee 
behavior with company goals differs. According to Flamholtz (1983), controlling 
employee actions is a necessity for every firm. This requires having well-functioning 
management control systems in place, which encourages and ultimately compels 
employees to consider and pursue company goals instead of their own interests. 
Additionally, Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) add that management control systems 
are also needed to make the employees behave in accordance with the firm’s long-term 
goals. Their rationale was that only if you could trust your employees at any given time, 
the need for management control would be redundant (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2003). These views originate from traditional management control systems of the past, 
and it seems evident that such views were built on a notion of human distrust (Bogsnes, 
2009). As previously mentioned, traditional management control systems were built in 
an era when Frederick Winslow Taylor’s views were held in high regard and motivation 
was still viewed as extrinsic to employees. For that reason, people needed to be 
controlled and directed. From this view, management control systems were designed to 
control and reward employees based on fixed targets related to budgets. As the times 
changed, these beliefs were challenged, most notably through the content theories of 
Maslow, McClelland and Herzberg (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2003). This resulted in a more 
widespread adoption of McGregor’s (1960) theory Y, and the belief that motivation was 
something intrinsic. Theory Y further argued that more employee responsibility and 
better feedback would increase the individual’s work motivation and eventually 
increase overall firm performance. Leaders eventually came to realize that the world 
was not as black and white as Winslow Taylor had pointed out in 1911, and so the 
management control systems gradually moved away from only incorporating strict 
financial controls and budgets to more holistic systems, where a company’s culture and 
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values receive a stronger focus. And it is through the different parts of a management 
control system that organizations can facilitate and nurture employee’s motivation.  
2.2.2 Instruments of control 
Not so different from the management control systems package-theory of Malmi and 
Brown (2008), Lars Samuelson (2004) claimed that management control in a firm is 
composed by formal and informal instruments of control. By adding organizational 
structure as another instrument of control, Ax et al. (2010) built further on the 
framework. Formal control systems incorporate all planning and control systems such 
as budgets, balanced scorecards and benchmarking, and is therefore categorized as 
“hard controls” (Ax et. al, 2010). On the other side are the “soft controls”, such as the 
company culture, types of leadership and ways to increase learning and empowerment 
in the firm. These soft control mechanisms compose the informal control system. The 
organizational structure includes the degree of responsibility and the level of 
decentralization in the firm, the firm’s reward system and personnel economics (HR). 
The whole management control system is illustrated in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Instruments of Control Framework based on Samuelson (2004) 
In order to understand how the different components of a management control system 
motivate employees, they need to be studied as a whole (Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
However, such a study would be very complex and require large resources. This report 
will therefore look at motivation through only some parts of the management control 
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system. More specifically, the report looks to analyze how bonuses can motivate 
employees as a control mechanism relating to the organizational structure in 
Samuelson’s (2004) expanded instruments of control model. Analyzing the motivational 
aspects of bonus systems separately can however provide a skewed picture of what 
really motivates. The study of the motivational effect of bonuses is therefore done in 
relation to both the formal and the informal components of management control 
systems. In this report, we will use the formal components of budgeting and 
benchmarks, and the informal components of company culture and empowerment.   
Formal control systems 
Formal control systems include all planning and control systems implemented in the 
firm (Samuelson, 2004). With continuously changing business environments, firms have 
sought to adjust their formal systems accordingly. Yet, how organizations adjust their 
management control systems to dynamic environments has altered throughout history 
of time (Bjørnenak & Kaarbøe, 2011). Throughout this apparent evolution within 
management accounting, traditional budgeting has played a key role. During the 1970s, 
budgets were regarded as the cornerstone of any firm’s management control system 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007). In times of great turbulence, like the oil crises of 1973 
and 1979, the argument was that more budgeting and more rigid planning was the 
remedy to, and not the cause of, financial distress (Bjørnenak & Kaarbøe, 2011).  
 
Hope and Fraser (2003, p. 4) define budgeting as: 
“… a performance management process (…) about agreeing upon and coordinating 
targets, rewards, action plans and resources for the year ahead, and then 
measuring and controlling performance against that agreement.” 
 
Due to its widespread use and the fact that smaller firms typically implement budgets as 
a primary type of management control (King, Clarkson, & Wallace, 2010), the budget has 
traditionally been the main source of work motivation in the firm (Bergstrand, 2009). By 
defining clear-cut goals, budgets reduce the potential uncertainty regarding operational 
activities in the organization. This makes it easier for employees to understand how to 
perform and to see the impacts of their contributions in a greater picture (Bergstrand, 
Boye, & Bjørnenak, 1999). By carving out explicit goals, budgets have also been used to 
form the basis for firms’ bonus systems (Marginson & Ogden, 2005). How budgets affect 
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the bonus is, however, not universal. In European companies, employees typically 
redeem a bonus by «hitting the budget» which is in contrast to American organizations, 
where bonuses are typically paid out by outperforming the budget (Bergstrand, 2009). 
 
However, although budgeting became more established in the latter part of the 1990’s, 
criticism that drew on the theory X/Y dichotomy began to be voiced (Bergstrand, 2009). 
Some of the titles for these critical research papers include: [Budgets are] An 
unnecessary evil (Wallander, 1999), Budgets: The hidden barrier to success (Hope & 
Fraser, 1999a), [Budgets] Take it away (Hope & Fraser, 1999b) and Figures of hate 
(Hope & Fraser, 2001).  
 
The criticism of budgeting can be categorized into two main branches (Libby & Lindsay, 
2010). The first branch originates from academia and the classic Relevance Lost-debate 
initiated by Kaplan and Johnson (1987). Most of this criticism aims at the apparent lack 
of connection between budgets and strategy (Niven, 2006), which undermines the very 
nature of implementing management control systems. Here, Kaplan and Norton claim 
that as much as 60 percent of organizations have not linked their budgets to strategy, 
resulting in a vicious circle of repeating demeanor where short-term financial goals are 
always prioritized and long-term strategy neglected (Niven, 2006). Kaplan and Norton 
argue how budgets are misused and how they ultimately can be improved by adapting 
other management practices and/or management accounting tools. This discussion gave 
rise to a whole new set of management accounting tools, tying accounting information 
closer to strategic decisions (Bjørnenak, 2003). Activity Based Costing (ABC), Strategic 
Management Accounting (SMA), Economic Value Added (EVA), the Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC) and Value Based Management (VMA) are among the most renowned management 
accounting tools from this era.  
 
The second branch of criticism is the Beyond Budgeting philosophy fronted by Jeremy 
Hope and Robin Fraser (2003). This philosophy views the budget and the process of 
budgeting itself as inherently flawed and dysfunctional, and calls for its immediate 
elimination. The Beyond Budgeting philosophy is further explained in chapter 2.5. Jan 
Wallander, former CEO of the Swedish bank Handelsbanken was among this 
movement’s pioneers. Instead of relying on absolute budgetary targets, Wallander 
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(1999) claimed that firms should embrace relative performance measurements through 
benchmarking. Benchmarking is defined by Elnathan, Lin and Young (1996, p.40) as: 
“a process by which an organization targets key areas of improvement, studies the 
best practices of others and implements processes and systems to enhance its own 
performance.” 
 
As Niven (2006) explains, basing budgetary targets on the past year’s performance is 
much like driving by solely looking in the rear-view mirror. Little improvement is made. 
Relative performance measures, however, promote a firm-wide consciousness of 
striving for continuous improvement (Wallander, 1999), as the company and its 
employees are always evaluated against their closest peers. According to research by 
Bain & Company, this will in time improve performance, create a better understanding 
of costs, enhance strategic advantages and increase organizational learning (Rigby & 
Biloudeau, 2011). It may also encourage intraprenuership and allow for more 
reasonable goal setting (Hope & Player, 2012).  
 
Benchmarking may be conducted through both financial and non-financial Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are to represent the most critical factors for both 
short-term and long-term success for the company. In line with theory Y, Kaplan and 
Norton propose using a balanced set of non-financial and financial KPIs (Kaplan & 
Norton, 2008), in contrast to the traditional management control systems, to evaluate 
employees. Together with benchmarking they stipulate employees with a larger extent 
of freedom and encouragement, and may provide stretch-targets that motivate and 
improve performance. 
Informal control system 
While “hard” controls have traditionally been the only instrument of control in large 
corporations, the additional use of soft controls have increased in significance in recent 
times (Ax et. al, 2010). These controls include the company culture, learning and 
empowerment (Ax et. al, 2010). According to Ax et al. (2010), the company culture is 
highly influential in communication within and out of the firm, how decisions are being 
made and in understanding what is desirable for the firm. Building a great company 
culture is often viewed as the most important aspect of a company’s success, and a great 
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company culture ensures a work environment where employees are motivated through 
seeking engagement and responsibility.  
 
Empowerment is organizational arrangements that give employees more autonomy, 
discretion and decision-making responsibility (Buchanan et al., 1988). It is a way of 
treating employees on a more equal level, like partners rather than subordinates 
(Goldsmith, 2010). Empowerment is achievable by encouraging and supporting a 
decision-making environment, through provision of knowledge and resources to all 
employees, and by allowing people to take their own actions and accomplish results on 
behalf of the firm (Goldsmith, 2010). In terms of organizational design, decentralization 
often goes hand in hand with empowerment (Buchanan et al., 1988), as the formal 
boundaries between units and individuals in different levels of the hierarchy are 
decreased. This implies less bureaucracy and gives room to innovation and collaborative 
work. It also provides employees with a greater sense of ownership to their work, which 
will result in increased motivation (Buchanan et al., 1988). 
Control through organizational structure 
According to Ax et al. (2010), control through organizational structure is achieved 
through the physical design of the firm, the distribution of responsibility, the firm’s 
reward systems and the process of decision-making. The design of the company denotes 
the company’s physical operating structures, such as if the company has a functional, 
divisional, network based, or matrix structure. Whether the company tends to lean 
towards a vertical or horizontal integration is also of significance (Ax et. al, 2010). The 
distribution of responsibility in a company implies whether the different units of the 
company are economically responsible for their performance throughout the firm. This 
can be based on costs, revenues, contribution margins or net profits. Basically, what the 
units are responsible for and the extent of authority they have to influence their results 
are the two most critical factors of responsibility that must be addressed (Ax et al, 
2010). The process of decision-making usually follows the design of the company, but 
may vary if decisions are made in groups or by certain individuals (Ax et. al, 2010).  
 
In the instruments of control framework of Samuelson (2004), reward and incentive 
systems are defined as a control mechanism relating to the organizational structure. 
Reward- and incentive systems are designed to motivate employees to “walk the extra 
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mile”, and can be both financial and non-financial (Ax et. al, 2010). This report will now 
explain what financial incentives or bonuses are, and explore how they may impact 
employees’ work motivation.  
2.3 Incentives and rewards 
Organizations seek to influence and direct employee behavior through designing 
incentives schemes that act as motivators. Incentives can be defined as rewards that 
change behavior. They are contracts that are meant to increase organizational efficiency 
by getting the employees to work harder and smarter (Bragelien, 2011). Lazear and 
Gibbs (2009) specifically state how they believe that “incentives are at the heart of 
effective economies, as well as effective organizations.” (p. 262). Rewards can be both 
tangible and intangible. Tangible rewards include pay raises, bonuses and benefits, and 
are external to the work itself. Intangible rewards are rewards that are intrinsic to the 
work and includes praise and recognition (Thomas, 2009). According to the research of 
behavioral scientists like Herzberg and McGregor presented earlier in this chapter, 
tangible rewards are extrinsic to motivation. This makes them more of a hygienic factor 
than well-suited as motivators. Still, we observe a large amount of firms who continues 
to use financial rewards as a source of motivation (Bogsnes, 2009). 
2.3.1 Bonuses as financial incentives 
Pre 1980, financial and monetary incentives did not hold a significant role in the 
management of larger corporations (Bragelien, 2011). Variable pay first became popular 
amongst top leaders in the USA in the 1980’s and 1990’s as an answer to leaders’ lack of 
incentives to do a good job for the shareholders (Bragelien, 2011). The use of incentives 
then spread to middle-level employees and regular employees all over the world. 
According to Lunde and Grini (2007, as cited in Bragelien, 2011) the share of employees 
that received bonuses in the private sector in Norway rose from 18 to 28 percent from 
1997 to 2005. The share of higher-level managers that received bonuses in the private 
sector in Norway in 2002 was 34 percent, while the number in 2011 was thought to be 
around 50% or higher (Bragelien, 2011).  
The greatest challenge with variable pay is how challenging it is to design and use as an 
incentive scheme in organizations (Bragelien, 2011). There are numerous possible 
approaches to how to design compensation and reward systems, and they range from 
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individually based systems, to systems that reward teams, departments, or even whole 
organizations (Bragelien, 2011). The large number of different approaches that 
companies use when designing their bonus systems can be partly explained through the 
context in which they are given, adjusted to different management systems and 
organizational differences. But these differences may also reflect a general trend of 
organizations experimenting with bonuses and the fact that there exists an overall 
insecurity towards how to design a well-behaved bonus system, due to its ambiguous 
effects (Bragelien, 2011). A survey conducted in 2007 revealed that over 40 percent of 
the respondents from the 637 companies of the study were not satisfied with their 
current payment structure (TowersPerrin, 2007, as cited in Bragelien, 2011). With the 
widespread insecurity towards how to design well-behaved bonus schemes, and an 
apparent dissatisfaction with such bonuses, why are they still being used so extensively? 
2.3.2 Purposes of bonuses 
There are various argued purposes as to why firms choose to offer bonuses to their 
employees. Before exploring the different purposes, we need to differentiate on how 
bonuses are being given. According to Pink (2009) there are two methods of rewarding. 
First, there are the contingent rewards or what he names as the “if-then”-rewards which 
promise an up-front reward if a given level of performance is met. On the other hand, 
there are what Pink (2009) refers to as the “now-that”-rewards. These kinds of rewards 
are given in hindsight of the effort or evaluated performance. 
 
One common argued purpose as to why organizations operate with bonus schemes of 
different kinds is that organizations view them as a good tool to attract and retain talent 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This purpose is often justified by organizations as a result of 
bonuses being an industry standard. In order to attract the best workers, the 
organization designs bonus schemes to offer competitive terms and conditions. Another 
argument is that bonuses provide the organization with a flexible pay option. Since the 
employer is not making a permanent financial commitment, the risk of using bonus 
payments as a part of the compensation package is deemed lower than increasing the 
base pay. This provides the firm with a certain cost-flexibility (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). 
 
The most apparent purpose of bonuses however, and the one that this report will closely 
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examine, is the organizations’ effort in trying to increase work effort by using bonuses as 
motivational tool (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). According to Lazear and Gibbs (2009), the 
most important reason to tie pay to performance is to increase employee’s work effort. 
This is built on a presumption that extrinsic incentives will lead to higher performance. 
Bonuses are therefore most often used as a contingent reward to stimulate increased 
efforts by the employees. The purpose of motivating through bonuses is also closely 
linked to the purpose of aligning the employees’ interests with the ones of the 
organization (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009).  
2.3.3 Different types of bonus systems 
With understanding why bonuses are used, we need to explore and understand different 
theoretical perspectives of how bonuses can be designed. This will ease the 
understanding of under what circumstances different bonuses may be advantageous 
and disadvantageous, and when they are likely to motivate or not.  
Individual bonuses 
Individual-based pay plans are the most common pay-for-performance plans (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011). Of the individual pay plans; merit pay is by far the most common, 
where employees receive an annual raise in their base pay. Individual bonuses are 
somewhat similar to merit pay programs, but are rather given as one-time payments 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) an important 
advantage of individual bonuses could be explained by the fact that higher pay leads to 
higher performance, as employees tend to do those things that are rewarded. This view 
is in line with Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, and according to Lazear and Gibbs 
(2009) a further argument for individual bonuses is that when there exists a strong link 
between performance and pay, this will make individuals improve their work 
performance through increased effort.  
 
But even though there are certain advantages of individual bonuses, there are also some 
pitfalls. A common effect of tying financial incentives to the achievement of goals is that 
it narrows focus (Pink, 2009). A too narrow focus could be perceived as a straitjacket 
and block an employee’s ability to see the larger picture of what effort is needed. 
Another disadvantage of individual bonuses can arise if the employees feel their effort 
and performance have a weak link to the reward. Surveys have discovered that up to 80 
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percent of employees do not see a connection between their personal contributions and 
the pay they receive (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This will in turn make the motivational 
effect of the bonus very limited. The Beyond Budgeting principles extensively criticize 
individual bonuses, which is further discussed in chapter 2.5.  
 
According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), individual-based pay-for-performance plans 
need to be used with great care and there are very limited circumstances in which they 
are successful. When the contribution of employees is easy to measure and accurately 
isolated, it is easy to assess their performance and reward them accordingly. The more 
independently one work, the easier it thus is to justify individual rewards. Using 
individual bonuses is also better suited to environments where cooperation is less 
critical to successful performance or when competition amongst employees is 
encouraged. Pink (2009) argues that individual bonuses only should be used for simple, 
routine tasks that require little creativity.   
Group based bonuses 
There is a common agreement that workers in today’s complex organizations need to 
work smarter, and not just harder. Therefore, group incentives that are based on wider 
and more general indicators are believed to foster smarter efforts (Langeland, 1999). A 
team-based approach to the compensation system can provide vital support for effective 
team arrangements (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Such plans normally reward team-
members equally, based on the performance and outcome of the group. One advantage 
with the use of group bonuses is how they foster group cohesiveness. Having pre-set 
goals and targets as a group will encourage and motivate group members to think and 
act as a unit, instead of competing individually (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Studies have 
also shown that it can be easier to accurately and reliably measure performance as a 
group (Deresky, 2011). This is because measuring group performances lowers the 
requirement for precise measurements compared to when singling out individuals and 
evaluating them in relation to their peers.  
 
According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), individually based incentives are used three 
times more frequent than group-based incentives. In this relation, there are some 
important pitfalls organizations need to avoid. First of all, team-based incentives may 
possibly clinch with the cultural values of the organization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
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Another disadvantage is the possible free-rider effect in large groups, which may result 
in conflict rather than the intended cooperation that the team bonus looks to foster 
(Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). Adjusting the pay incentives to encourage individual 
performance within teams and base the payout on individual levels of performance 
within the group can reduce the free-rider effect (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
 
Even with the possible disadvantages of team-based bonuses, there are certain 
conditions that make such plans successful. For instance, when work tasks and effort are 
difficult to separate, and the performance is a result of group effort, a team-bonus may 
seem the most sensible option. Also, group-based bonuses are easier to implement in 
organizations with few levels of hierarchy and where teams consist of individuals from 
the same level, with little dependence on upper management (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
Corporate wide bonuses 
Corporate wide pay-for-performance plans or bonuses are the most macro type of 
incentive plans. These reward employees based on the entire corporation’s 
performance. The most commonly used program is known as profit-sharing (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011). Another possibility is to establish employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs) where the employees are issued company stocks, either through grants or 
offered at a favorable price (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Corporate-wide plans are argued 
to offer financial flexibility to the firm, as the firm’s cost is automatically adjusted 
downward during economic downturns. Additionally, profit sharing or ESOPs may also 
result in a stronger sense of ownership and commitment to the organization among the 
employees (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
 
However, there are disadvantages to such corporate-wide plans as well. The connection 
between an individual’s performance, goal achievement and the firm performance is 
small, and may be difficult to measure (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). This limits a corporate-
wide plan’s ability to motivate and affect behavior to increase performance, as the 
influence of each individual on the overall target is likely to be small (Lazear & Gibbs, 
2009). Because of this, corporate wide plans are best used together with other 
incentives or pay-for-performance plans to motivate employees. Such a combination can 
contribute to greater commitment to the firm by creating common goals and a sense of 
partnership across the hierarchical levels of the organization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).   
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2.3.4 Summary on bonus and financial incentives 
Despite its prevalence, and the number of various designs, Hope and Player (2012) 
argue that it is hard to find any evidence that financial incentives motivate. Other 
researchers share the same view, where William Mercer argues that incentive 
compensation is dysfunctional and “makes everybody unhappy” (Pfeffer, 1998). 
Similarly, Bruno Frey (1997) finds it puzzling that organizations even think people are 
largely motivated by external financial incentives. According to Rynes et al. (2004) 
however, there are discrepancies between what people say and what their behavior tells 
us when employees report what is motivating to them. Rynes et.al (2004) backs this 
argument by stating that people are likely to underreport the importance of pay on 
motivation and that pay indeed is a motivating factor. According to Pink (2009) 
however, and in line with Herzberg’s two factor theory, money is seen as a hygienic 
factor. Pink (2009) agrees that organizations need to pay the employees fairly in order 
for pay not to be demotivating. He states that by paying employees a fair base salary, 
money should be taken out of the equation, and not be given variably as pay-incentives, 
as they do not drive performance.  
2.4 Process theories of motivation and bonuses  
The theoretical part of this research report has so far provided an understanding of 
what motivation is, and how there seems to be a discrepancy as to what businesses do 
and what earlier social scientists argue to have proved. In the following we revisit the 
four process theories we presented in chapter 2.1 and explain how these theories relate 
to bonuses. This will provide an understanding of how bonuses can, and under what 
circumstances they are likely to work as a good tool for motivating employees. The 
theories are to a large extent complementary and should thus be interpreted as a whole. 
2.4.1 Expectancy theory and bonus 
According to the expectancy theory of Vroom (1964), an employee’s motivation for high 
performance is determined by expectancy, instrumentality and valence. When an 
organization designs a bonus system as a part of its performance management system, it 
is therefore important that the organization understands what is of importance to their 
employees and what motivates them (Målsnes, 2011). Consequently they must make 
their employees understand the level of effort needed for them to achieve a desired level 
of performance through clear communication and feedback. If the reward does not meet 
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the expectations of the employees, this can have a negative effect on motivation. We use 
the following three criteria in assessing a bonus scheme’s motivation: 
 
Valence: In line with the research of Vroom (1964), management control systems need 
to reward employees for the effort they put in the firm. Organizations therefore need 
deep insight to what their employees desire. A wrong perception of what is valued as 
rewards by the workforce may thus provide a bonus scheme with little or no 
motivational effect. If the reward is undesirable, the valence may even be negative. 
 
Expectancy: The expectancy-criterion relates to the link between effort and performance 
(Vroom, 1964). In short, this means that the bonus scheme needs to be based on factors 
that the employees are able to affect and control. The bonus also needs to be tied to 
achievable goals which will increase an employee’s self-efficacy. These factors underline 
the importance of the bonus system being clearly communicated. That way the 
employees are better equipped to see the link between individual effort and the targets 
that trigger the rewards.  
 
Instrumentality: In order to ensure a high instrumentality, the employees must be able 
to expect that a given level of performance will lead to a given level of rewards. Clearly 
defined targets and goals will therefore be motivating by providing a clear picture of 
what is needed to reach those targets. If the targets are met and the employees for some 
reason do not get the expected reward, it is likely to have a negative impact on work 
motivation.  
2.4.2 Goal setting theory and bonuses 
When combining Doran’s (1981) SMART-principles and Locke and Latham’s (1990, 
2006) key mechanisms between goals and performance, there are four classifications 
that are considered important when setting goals to motivate employees: 
Specific and clear: First of all, the goals need to be specific and clear. This means that 
goals are well-defined, measureable and unambiguous (Whetten & Cameron, 2002). The 
employees must be able to understand the goals and understand what the organization 
expects from them in order to reach the goals. The specific goals also need to be clearly 
communicated in order for the employees to understand what is expected from them. 
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Having a transparent bonus system, where information is easily available, eases the 
communication of the goals. If the goals are unspecific and vague, it is difficult for any 
employee to understand what is expected from him or her, and there might be 
misunderstandings about what behaviors that are rewarded (Locke & Latham, 2006). At 
the same time, the goals should not be too specific as they could narrow the focus too 
much, and be perceived as a straitjacket that discourages creativity and empowerment.  
Challenging and complex, yet achievable: The goals must challenge the employee, and 
give them something to aim for. The goal setting theory argues that the higher the goal, 
the better the expected performance (Locke, 1968). However, this must be applied with 
caution, as setting the bar too high might make the employees feel that it is too long of a 
stretch. Having too challenging and complex tasks may simply be overwhelming. This 
can create demotivation or frustration which will inhibit employees from successfully 
accomplishing their goals (Whetten & Cameron, 2002). In order for the goal to be 
achievable, the employee must therefore be given sufficient time and resources to meet 
it. Additionally, if an employee does achieve his or her goals one year, organizations 
need to be cautious of automatically raising the bar and assume that the employee will 
do even better the following year. This may in fact create what is named the ratcheting 
effect which makes the employees feel punished for good behavior instead of rewarded.  
Committing and relevant: Understanding and agreeing upon goals may lead to greater 
commitment among the employees (Locke & Latham, 2006). By being a part of the goal 
setting process, the goals are also likely to feel more relevant to the employees. If the 
goals are not relevant, they might be perceived as too difficult, as the employees feel that 
they do not have the required knowledge to achieve it. This also implies that the goals 
are consistent to the goals of the company. The more relevant and harder a goal is, the 
more commitment and effort is expected from the employee to reach the target.  
Feedback: A good and effective goal also includes the process of feedback. Having 
measurable goals is likely to help firms to provide better feedback to their employees. 
Feedback also provides an opportunity to clarify anything that might be unclear about 
the goals, adjust them, as well as giving the employee recognition and encouragement 
for his work along the way.    
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2.4.3 Equity theory and bonuses 
According to Adams (1963), the equity theory on motivation relates to an employee’s 
perception of equity, fairness and justice. An employee perceives a bonus system to be 
fair by comparing own work effort (input) and bonus (outcome) with peers both within 
and external to the company. There are some moderating factors that are taking into 
account when employees evaluate fairness however, which often involves moderations 
based on gender, base salary, education and experience level.  
For an organization it may be easier to control what is deemed unfair to the employees 
by using individual bonuses instead of larger group- or corporation-wide bonuses. 
Group bonuses may for instance be based on the overall achievement of several smaller 
departments or divisions. If one department within a company delivers poor results 
compared to another department within the same bonus scheme, this may decrease 
motivation among employees in the department that performed well, as they may feel 
they deserved a higher bonus. Similarly, this reasoning can also be applied to individuals 
within a group. The more independent the divisions or the employees are in terms of 
tasks and results, the more likely it is that the collective bonus is perceived unfair. With 
highly interdependent tasks, collective bonus schemes may also be perceived as fair. 
Finally, the bonus system may be perceived as unfair if it is based on criteria that the 
employee cannot control. This may lead to demotivation and in the extreme case foster 
improper or dysfunctional focus and behavior among employees (Langeland, 1999). For 
instance, if the bonus is affected by external factors like input prices or larger economic 
trends, this can deemed unfair by the employees, as they have little possibility to affect 
or influence these factors. When basing bonuses on benchmarks, the organization needs 
to use comparable factors that are perceived fair and just by the employees. External 
benchmarks where benchmarking towards competitors or internal benchmarks where 
organizations compare similar processes within their own organization can be 
perceived as fair (Bogsnes, 2009).  
2.4.4 Self-determination theory and bonuses 
In line with Herzberg (1966), who defined money as a hygienic, extrinsic motivator, the 
self-determination theory focuses on intrinsic motivation. According to the self-
determination theory an individual’s self-determination, and thus also motivation, is 
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decided by the need for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci, 1975). An 
organization’s management control system, including its bonus systems, must therefore 
support and accommodate these needs. In bonus systems, the use of financial incentives 
may undermine an employee’s self-determination. The design of the bonus scheme is 
thus important to consider in avoiding any damage from reduced intrinsic motivation. 
 
Autonomy: Autonomy refers to an employee’s freedom of choice, and organizations need 
to promote autonomy through their management control system. By using budgets as 
measurement criteria in the bonus structure, employees are likely to feel controlled, as 
the fixed target of staying within budget in order to receive a bonus limits an employee’s 
autonomy (Pink, 2009). By strongly focusing on and communicating bonuses, extrinsic 
motivators may negatively impact the employee’s perceived autonomy. A way for the 
organization to accommodate for autonomy through bonuses is to adopt corporate wide 
profit sharing schemes that avoid rewarding individual performance. 
Competence: As rewards may be perceived controlling and inhibiting an employee’s 
intrinsic motivation, a strong focus on rewards may discourage the utilization of the 
workforce’s abilities and competence. By providing the employee with constructive 
feedback, recognition and positive reinforcements, the firm can contribute to the 
employee feeling valued and believing in their own competence. In turn, this will 
enhance the employee’s intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975).   
Relatedness: In order to get the employees to feel an increased relatedness to the 
organization, external benchmarking may be an effective tool as basis for evaluating 
performance in group-bonuses (Bogsnes, 2009). Internal benchmarking, where 
individuals are compared to each other may also lead to increased relatedness to the 
firm. Yet, organizations must be aware that a too strong competitive culture might have 
the opposite effect and reduce an employee’s relatedness to the firm (Målsnes, 2011).  
Using empowerment in structuring the organization may facilitate increased levels of 
trust and relatedness. Consequently the reward structure should support 
empowerment. One way of empowering employees is by letting them take part in the 
success of the company through profit-sharing schemes or stock ownership (Kinlaw, 
1995). Also, the decisions about rewards for either individuals or teams must be made 
by people that have the competence and the employee’s trust to do so (Kinlaw, 1995).    
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2.5 Beyond Budgeting 
The theoretical chapters have so far established an understanding of what motivation is 
and how management control systems are used to motivate employees. We have also 
established an understanding that there is a separation in the views of how financial 
incentives work. The following subchapter explains the Beyond Budgeting framework 
and explores why it is so critical of individual bonuses and financial incentives. 
 
2.5.1 What is Beyond Budgeting? 
The front-runners of the Beyond Budgeting movement, Jeremy Hope and Robin Fraser 
(2003) define Beyond Budgeting as follows: 
“Beyond Budgeting is a set of guiding principles that, if followed, will enable an 
organization to manage its performance and decentralize its decision-making 
process without the need for traditional budgets.” (2003, p. 212).  
 
As this definition implies, Beyond Budgeting is not just an idea that bashes budgeting for 
being the work of the devil. It is rather an idea that is built on improving the 
management control processes, where abandoning the budgeting process is a triggering 
factor (BBRT, 2013). The Beyond Budgeting theories argue that by abandoning the 
process of budgeting, an organization will make its first step in changing how it could be 
managed to the better. Rather than being a set of tools designed as a whole new 
management control system, Beyond Budgeting is a mind-set of how to manage 
organizations. Consequently, it is more than just an abandonment of budgets as a formal 
control mechanism, and touches upon all the three different aspects of the expanded 
management control model of Samuelson. This becomes evident through the twelve 
leadership and process principles that Beyond Budgeting is based upon: 
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The 6 Leadership Principles 
Customers.  
Focus everyone on improving customer outcomes, not on hierarchical relationships. 
Organization.  
Organize as a network of lean, accountable teams, not around centralized functions.  
Responsibility.  
Enable everyone to act and think like a leader, not merely follow the plan. 
Autonomy.  
Give teams the freedom and capability to act; do not micromanage them. 
Values.  
Govern through a few clear values, goals and boundaries, not detailed rules and budgets. 
Transparency.  
Promote open information for self-management; do not restrict it hierarchically. 
Figure 3: The leadership principles of Beyond Budgeting (Bogsnes, 2009) 
 
The 6 Process principles 
Goals.  
Set relative goals for continuous improvement; not fixed performance contracts. 
Rewards.  
Reward shared success based on relative performance, not on meeting fixed targets.  
Planning.  
Make planning a continuous and inclusive progress, not a top-down annual event. 
Controls.  
Base controls on relative indicators and trends, not on variances against plan. 
Resources.  
Make resources available as needed, not through annual budget allocations. 
Coordination.  
Coordinate interactions dynamically, not through annual planning cycles. 
Figure 4: The process principles of Beyond Budgeting (Bogsnes, 2009) 
 
These twelve principles compose what Hope and Fraser define as «The Twin Peaks of 
Beyond Budgeting» (Hope & Fraser, 2003). By applying all the process principles, the 
theory implies that the organization will start climbing the first peak, and ultimately 
become what Hope and Fraser (2003) describe as an adaptive organization. Reaching 
this peak has several positive impacts. This includes cost savings, faster response and 
retrieving more value from finance people, enabling them to support front-line 
managers with operational decision making instead of just «counting beans». As Bjarte 
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Bogsnes, chairman of the Beyond Budgeting Round Table, puts it in his book 
‹‹Implementing Beyond Budgeting: Unlocking the Performance Potential››: 
“Abolishing budgets [in Borealis] turned out to be an even more positive experience 
for the finance function than we had expected. (…) we also enjoyed less number 
crunching and much more interesting work” (2009, s. 91).  
 
In order to make the results sustainable, and thus achieve a significant competitive 
advantage, Hope and Fraser claim the firm must also climb the second peak of Beyond 
Budgeting, as seen in figure 5 on the next page. This is only possible by applying the six 
leadership principles. By empowering front-line managers with the possibilities of 
making swift and effective decisions, a firm will achieve even higher profits, more 
motivated employees and a higher degree of innovation (Hope & Fraser, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 5: The Twin Peaks of Beyond Budgeting by Hope and Fraser (2003) 
2.5.2 The Beyond Budgeting Round Table 
With a view of budgeting as a flawed process, and a want for building an alternative 
management model, the Beyond Budgeting Round Table (BBRT) was set up in the 
United Kingdom in late 1997 in collaboration with CAM-I (Consortium of Advanced 
Management, International), an international research consortium (Hope & Fraser, 
2003). The BBRT was established as a response to an increased dissatisfaction with the 
budgets as a traditional management tool, and being perceived as a time consuming and 
frustrating process. 
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The BBRT is an independent, international research- and shared learning network of 
member organizations that all have an interest in transforming their management 
models to enable sustained and superior performance (BBRT, 2013). The BBRT’s 
mission is seen as “transforming management models to enable sustained high 
performance in turbulent conditions” (BBRT, 2013). Today, there are more than 100 
companies, funding and contributing to the research by sharing their experiences 
(Bogsnes, 2009). The companies cover a wide variety of industries, large and small, and 
come from all over the world. The BBRT functions as a meeting place for the member 
companies, where they meet to share experiences and learn from each other through 
case studies, presentations, and discussions (Bogsnes, 2009).  
2.5.3 Rewards and incentives in Beyond Budgeting 
Principle number eight of the 12 principles of Beyond Budgeting states the following:  
“Reward shared success based on relative performance, not on meeting fixed 
targets.” (Bogsnes, 2009).  
 
According to two of the leading members of the BBRT, Jeremy Hope and Steve Player 
(2012), incentive compensation is almost without exception dysfunctional to some 
degree or another. Based from the views of behavioral scientists like McGregor (1959), 
Herzberg (1966), and Deci and Ryan (1985) among others, the Beyond Budgeting-
framework believes that motivation is something intrinsic to people, and criticizes the 
use of bonuses and financial incentives as a motivational tool. The criticism mainly 
relates to basing bonuses on individual performance, but less so of those related to team 
performance (Hope & Player, 2012). Building from this, this chapter will examine how 
bonuses are viewed in a Beyond Budgeting context. 
The criticism of individual bonuses 
The Beyond Budgeting philosophies and those who developed it firmly believe that 
bonuses are best based on group effort (Hope and Fraser, 2003). Bogsnes (2009) states 
how he has lost his belief in individual bonus systems, and argues that they do more 
harm than good. In accordance with Pink (2009), Bogsnes (2009) argue that individual 
bonuses may have a positive motivational effect on work that is more routine and 
transaction-oriented, where the work itself is not so motivating and the results are 
easily measured. But in today’s highly complex and interlinked business society where a 
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lot of jobs involve a high level of creativity, individual bonuses are not a good 
motivational tool (Bogsnes, 2009). Bogsnes (2009) further argues that since an 
employees’ performance is highly dependent on how his co-workers perform, there are 
always co-workers that will contribute to another individual’s success (Bogsnes, 2009). 
In line with this Simons (1995) believes it is impossible to separate the marginal 
contributions of individuals from each other. Also, by offering an individual bonus, the 
message the employer sends is that they do not believe that the employee is sufficiently 
motivated from the job itself, and that he or she needs to be motivated by a financial 
incentive (Bogsnes, 2009). An individual bonus may therefore undermine teamwork and 
organizational performance, and encourages short-term focus (Pfeffer, 1998).  
Reward group performance 
A better way of rewarding good performance is therefore to reward group performance. 
Bogsnes (2009) argues that since the majority of businesses recruiting nowadays 
already list teamwork as an important skill needed to qualify for a job, group bonuses 
are a better reward mechanism. Also, with more and more businesses acknowledging 
teamwork as an important part of their core business, there are few reasons to why 
organizations should base their bonuses on individual effort (Bogsnes, 2009).  
However, by turning the bonus system away from individual performance, the risk of a 
free-rider problem may increase. According to Bogsnes (2009) and Hope and Fraser 
(2003), evidence suggests that this problem is highly exaggerated and that it can be 
easily handled by adding subjective evaluations. One way of doing so is by appointing a 
team leader who ensures that individual performance appraisals are done within the 
team, leaving those who have contributed little or nothing very exposed (Hope & Player, 
2012). In a team-based organization driven by peer pressure, the free-riders are likely to 
become obvious to others. If they do not increase their contribution, they are then likely 
to be replaced by people that are more willing to commit themselves to the organization 
and its performance challenges (Hope & Fraser, 2003).  
Base group bonuses on relative performance and share success collectively 
In line with the abandonment of budgeting as a management control tool, Hope and 
Fraser (2003) argue that rewards should be based on relative performance contracts 
(Hope & Fraser, 2003). They argue that fixed targets will lead to a mentality of “if you 
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met your target, you have done your job”, which can contribute to promoting lazy 
thinking. Relative performance contracts will instead lead to a focus on continuous 
improvement. These can for instance be based on external benchmarking against 
competitors or internal benchmarks where organizations compare similar processes 
within their own organization (Bogsnes, 2009). According to Hope and Fraser (2003) 
there are three developed ways of rewarding based on relative performance contracts: 
 
Base rewards on the relative success of operating teams: 
The most common approach is to agree on a relative improvement contract that 
involves a whole team, and not the individual. This includes meeting a set of pre-set 
performance benchmarks. The performance is then, in hindsight, evaluated by a peer 
group. Even though the employees know what key performance indicators (KPIs) they 
are measured on, they do not know until the end of the year how they have performed. 
In this setting, it is the uncertainty that drives success, and it will focus business 
managers on continuously maximizing profits, instead of gaming with numbers, as there 
are no fixed targets leading to irrational behavior (Hope & Fraser, 2003). 
 
Base rewards on multi-level performance:  
Basing rewards on performance in multiple levels in the organization is an option that is 
used at companies such as Rhodia and Borealis. In this system, an individual’s bonus 
payout is calculated from several levels of performance in the company. The bonus can 
for instance be calculated by weighting the performance for each manager, for his or her 
business unit as well as for the company as a whole. This has led to a reduction in 
gaming behavior at Rhodia and Borealis, and these organizations firmly believe they 
recognize and reward the best performers (Bogsnes, 2009).  
 
Base rewards on the relative success of the group:  
The third option on how to base rewards from Hope and Fraser’s (2003) research is 
much inspired by the reward system used by the Swedish bank Handelsbanken. After 
abandoning individual bonuses, Handelsbanken adopted a companywide profit-sharing 
system where they allocate a part of its profits to their employees. In order for the 
‘bonus’ to come into effect, the bank needs to have a higher return on shareholders’ 
equity after taxes than the average of its competitors (Hope & Fraser, 2003). Through 
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abandoning all individual bonuses, the system is in no way intended to function as an 
incentive for individual employees to pursue any financial targets. It is rather seen as a 
reward for the company’s overall success, which is shared collectively and equally (Hope 
& Fraser, 2003). A profit-sharing scheme is about recognizing employees’ contributions 
to the organizations’ success, and through sharing the fruits of collective success; the 
organization can provide their employees with a stake in this success. A profit-sharing 
scheme will also avoid the problem of the rewards becoming entitlements. The 
disaffection and demoralization, defined as the entitlement creep by Hope and Player 
(2012) that may arise if it the bonus is not paid out one year, is therefore minimized.  
2.6 Summarizing the theoretical perspectives 
The theoretical perspectives presented in this chapter has showed that financial 
incentive and bonuses have been, and still are, common tools for organizations to try to 
influence employee behavior and motivation. This prevalence of bonuses is engrained in 
a belief that extrinsic rewards, like bonuses, may have a positive impact on work 
motivation. This view has been challenged, mainly through the needs theories of 
behavioral scientists and psychologists like Maslow, McClelland, Herzberg and 
McGregor, but also in more recent times through the Beyond Budgeting philosophies. 
The Beyond Budgeting movement has gathered pace as organizations look to move 
away from traditional management control to better adapt to a more unpredictable 
business environment. However, organizations still seem reluctant to let go of the more 
traditional bonus systems, and this theoretical chapter has presented arguments that 
there exists a mismatch of what science knows, and what businesses do. According to 
the Beyond Budgeting philosophies and other critics of financial incentives, individual 
bonuses are not a good tool to motivate employees, and the negative effects of having 
them outweigh the potential positive effects. However, the critics acknowledge that 
individual bonuses may work in a job setting where the tasks are straightforward, with 
little creativity and the output is easy to measure. The Beyond Budgeting principles 
(Hope and Player, 2011; Bogsnes, 2009) argue that a better way to design bonuses is to 
collectively reward employees through team bonuses. Group bonuses have an indirect 
motivational effect, especially if the reward is given in hindsight and in a fair way 
(Bogsnes, 2009).  
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2.7 Analytical framework 
Based on the theories presented in this chapter we have developed an analytical 
framework presented in figure 6. This framework is used as a base for our research and 
analysis in order to answer the problem statement of the study. 
 
Figure 6: Analytical Framework 
 
Management control systems are highly contextual (Malmi & Brown, 2008). This creates 
a need to assess bonus systems in relation to other parts of an organization’s 
management control system to get a holistic picture of what influences the employees 
work motivation in a given context. This includes analyzing the bonus systems’ fit with 
all the three instruments of control. From this understanding we further assess how a 
bonus system impacts employees’ motivation by applying the four process theories. As 
the last part of our analytical framework, we will test if, and to what extent, there exists 
differences in how motivation from bonuses affects managers and non-managers.  
 
We note that it should be in an organization’s interest to motivate employees through 
the management control system, as productivity is highly dependent on a motivated and 
engaged workforce. As the theoretical perspectives state, bonuses are a widely used tool 
to try to impact employee behavior and motivation. Rooted in Herzberg’s two-factor 
theory and McGregor’s Theory Y, the Beyond Budgeting philosophies dismisses the 
potential positive motivational impact of financial incentives. On that behalf, we seek to 
understand why an organization adopting a dynamic management model based on the 
Beyond Budgeting principles has chosen to adopt various bonus schemes to motivate 
their employees. Can the reason be that bonuses in fact are something that drives 
behavior, and is an important factor of increased work motivation and high 
performance?  
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Chapter 3: Research methodology  
This chapter explains the methodology used in this research. This includes explanations 
of chosen research design, research approach and the techniques for collecting and 
analyzing data. It also depicts the validity, reliability and ethics of the research. 
3.1 Research design 
The research design is the general plan of how the report looks to answer the problem 
statement and the defined research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). It contains the 
objectives of the study and clarifies the sources used for data collection. As an integral 
part of the planning process, the design of the research takes place before any actual 
research is conducted. Deciding on a research design is important ensure that the 
research questions are answered in a credible and crystal-clear way (Saunders et al., 
2009). It is therefore essential to bear in mind the problem statement when deciding on 
research design. As written in section 1.2, the problem statement of this study is: 
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
In the following two sections, this report will detail the research design of this thesis. In 
line with the findings of Saunders et al. (2009), we will also seek to justify all decisions 
leading to the research design based on the research question, objectives and the 
general philosophy of the research project. 
3.1.1 Purpose of the research 
Firstly, this sub-chapter will present the aim of this study. According to Saunders et al. 
(2009), the research purpose can be split into three different classifications. These are 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies. Categorizing the purpose of the study 
is important, as the different classifications may entail different choices of research 
design (Saunders et al, 2009). 
 
The purpose of an exploratory study is to find out “what is happening; to seek new 
insights, ask questions and to assess different phenomena in a new light” (Robson, 
2002:59, as cited in Saunders et al., 2009). An exploratory study is useful to clarify the 
understanding of a problem. This is achieved through exploratory research such as 
reviewing literature, interviewing experts in the subject or by conducting focus group 
SNF Report No. 05/13 
39 
 
interviews (Saunders et al., 2009). New insights and ideas originating from the research 
may also require the researcher(s) to change the direction of the project along the way.  
 
In comparison, descriptive research looks “to portray an accurate profile of persons, 
events or situations” (Robson, 2002:59, as cited in Saunders et al., 2009). Descriptive 
research may be combined with either exploratory or explanatory studies. An 
explanatory study on the other hand looks to establish casual relationships between 
variables. The purpose of explanatory research is to study a situation or a problem in 
order to explain the relationship between the variables (Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, Ryan et al. (2002) note that the distinction between exploratory and 
explanatory studies at times can be quite ambiguous. 
 
This research study is explanatory in the way that it seeks to understand the 
relationships between an implemented bonus system and work motivation. More 
importantly, it aims to find out if the bonus system at place contributes to increase work 
motivation. However, the study is also exploratory, as it seeks to explore, assess and 
seek new insights to how bonus systems impact motivation in a Beyond Budgeting 
context. In this sense, the bonus system is the phenomena researched. As a result, this 
study is best described as a combination of explanatory and exploratory research. 
 
Another important distinction for the choice of research design is through the research 
approach. Based on how explicit the theory is applied in the research stages, the 
approach can be classified as either inductive, deductive or both (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
An inductive research approach is defined as “the development of theory as a result of the 
observation of empirical data” (Saunders et al, 2009 p. 593). Inductive research normally 
utilizes qualitative data to provide a deep understanding of the research context. It also 
provides the researchers with a flexible structure, as it allows them to adapt the 
emphasis of the study as the research progresses. In addition, inductive research is 
usually less concerned with the need to generalize answers (Saunders et al., 2009). In 
contrast, deductive research notes the “testing of a theoretical proposition by the 
employment of a research strategy specifically designed for the purpose of its testing” 
(Saunders et al, 2009, p 590). This approach is far more structured and requires the 
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researchers to carefully select large enough sample sizes in order to answer pre-defined 
hypotheses and make generalized conclusions. Deductive research is normally based on 
quantitative data (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
The research approach for this study can be split into three different stages. These are 
illustrated in figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Stages of research 
The initial research stage was conducted to get an overview of the empirics of the 
research object. It also served to gain a better understanding of the management control 
systems and bonus system in place within the research object. The second research 
stage served to assess the bonus system and the motivational effects in-depth. This stage 
sought to address general attitudes, opinions, strengths and potential weaknesses with 
the assessed bonus system. The third stage sought to test the motivational effects of the 
bonus system on a larger population in the case object, in order to generalize data. As 
the information harvested from the first and second research phase served to narrow 
down the focus for the study and to adjust the theoretical models to better address the 
issues in place, the research approach can be described as being inductive. However, 
with the testing of theory in stage three to identify the motivational impact of the bonus 
system within the research object, the research also applied a deductive approach in 
order to generalize data. Consequently, we can say that this study makes use of both an 
inductive and a deductive research approach. 
3.1.2 Research strategy 
The choice of research strategy is guided by the research questions and objectives, the 
researchers’ existing knowledge, the amount of time and resources available, as well as 
the philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
 
Understand 
empirics and 
context 
Understand 
motivational 
effects 
Test  
motivational 
theories 
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Choosing a case study 
There are various possibilities to empirically investigate the motivational effect of a 
bonus system in a dynamic management model. According to Saunders et al. (2009), 
these are experiments, surveys, case studies, action research, ethnography and archival 
research. Each of these strategies is characterized by distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. 
In order to answer how bonus may affect work motivation in a dynamic management 
model or a Beyond Budgeting setting, this report applied a case study strategy. A case 
study is described in Robson (2002:78, as cited in Saunders et al., 2009) as “a strategy 
for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.” Here, the 
bonus system serves as the particular contemporary phenomenon with a Beyond 
Budgeting-influenced management control system, which serves as the real life context. 
As both management control systems and bonus structures are firm-specific, typically 
varying to social structures and day-to-day operations, a case study seemed fitting 
(Robson, 2002). This application is also in line with the findings of Yin (2003), who 
notes that case studies are especially suited for those research questions that asks how 
and why, and that are based on existing theories. Case studies are also commonly used 
in exploratory or explanatory research (Johannesen et al., 2005).  
Choosing a single, holistic case 
According to Yin (2003), there are four different types of case study strategies 
applicable through two different dimensions. The first dimension is defined by the 
number of case studies conducted, being either single or multiple. According to Yin 
(2003), a single-case study is sensible when the research at hand studies a phenomenon 
few have considered before. As mentioned in section 1.3, there exists little research on 
the combination of the motivational effects of bonuses and Beyond Budgeting. As the 
management control systems and incentive schemes are likely to differ greatly between 
firms, a single-case study in one social context was deemed as the most appropriate 
strategy for achieving the research objective of this thesis. Limited time and resources 
also favored adopting a single case study approach.  
The second dimension of the case study strategy according to Yin (2003) differentiates 
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between being embedded or holistic. Seeking to understand the motivational effect of an 
implemented bonus system in a Beyond Budgeting setting, which is a management 
model affecting an entire organization, the study is also necessarily holistic. In order to 
minimize the risk of presenting inaccurate data, this entailed targeting a large 
population of employees within the research object, ranging from different levels of the 
hierarchy and within all involved departments.  
“Bank & Financial Corporation”  as a case study objective 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the link between bonus systems and work 
motivation in a Beyond Budgeting setting. Having decided on applying a holistic single 
case-study as the research strategy, the research required a research object that had: 1) 
a bonus system 2) a well-developed management control systems largely influenced by 
the Beyond Budgeting philosophies and 3) a large number of employees. 
With numerous regulations, constant changes in company policies and on-going debates 
on bonuses within the financial industry; it was also desirable to conduct the research 
within a financial institution, to increase the relevance of the study. 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” was an organization that fit well into all the defined 
criteria. The company adopted a new and more dynamic management control system in 
2009, largely based on the principles of Beyond Budgeting. They operate within the 
financial sector and pay bonuses to their employees through group-wide and company-
wide schemes. There are also more than 1000 employees within the company, making it 
sufficiently large for research purposes (“Bank & Financial Corporation”, 2012). 
Combining the case study with a survey 
As Saunders et al. note (2009), the different research strategies should not be viewed as 
mutually exclusive. Having decided on a deductive approach for the third research phase 
and a holistic case-study strategy, this report accompanies the case study with a survey, 
conducted amongst employees within “Bank & Financial Corporation”. The purpose of 
the survey was to identify general impacts of bonus systems on work motivation within 
“Bank & Financial Corporation”. For that reason, the survey was built from the theory 
and information gathered from the previous research stages. Surveys are typically used 
to answer who, what, where, how much and how many-questions. Survey results are 
often obtained by using standardized questionnaires that are easy to sample, explain 
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and compare. This approached allowed for collection of large amounts of data in an 
efficient and economical manner. 
3.2 Collecting the data 
Saunders et al. (2009) distinguishes between two different types of data collection. If the 
research generates and makes use of numerical data, it can be described as quantitative. 
If one is to make use of non-numerical data, such as visuals and narratives, then it is 
called qualitative research. Bloomberg et al. (2008) note that qualitative research is the 
most appropriate to promote an advanced understanding of social settings or actions 
from the viewpoints of the researchers. It emphasizes exploratory and descriptive 
research, and it is commonly applied with an inductive approach. This responded well 
with the two first research stages in this study, both being exploratory and inductive.  
 
With a need to understand the management control systems of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, their bonus systems, and how this may affect work motivation, we decided 
to apply a qualitative approach to collecting data. For the final stage, which has been 
defined as explanatory and deductive, we depended on harvesting data from a large 
population in order to generalize answers. This required standardization, tending 
towards the use of quantitative data. Consequently, we utilized what Saunders et al. 
(2009) refer to as a sequentially mixed method of research. This combination of 
methods helps in leveling out the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods used 
(Smith, 2003) and strengthening the confidence in conclusions (Saunders, 2009).  
 
In order to ensure validity and reliability, it is important to make use of multiple sources 
of evidence (Yin, 2003). An important distinction in source of evidence is made between 
primary and secondary data. Primary data relates to data gathered by the researcher for 
that specific purpose, while secondary data are data that already exists (Saunders, 
2009). For a case study, the most common sources include interviews, documents, 
archival records, participant observation, direct observation and physical artifacts (Yin, 
2003). This study made use of interviews and surveys as sources of primary data to 
increase the understanding of how bonuses affect work motivation in “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. Documentary information, annual reports and archival records were used 
as secondary data to gain knowledge of the systems and structures at hand and the 
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empirics of the organization. Most of the documents and annual reports were gathered 
from the website of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, although some information was 
also gathered from independent sources such as prior research studies and master 
theses on the company. Some documents on the bonus system and other information 
about the company or its systems were received through e-mail correspondence with 
the gatekeeper in “Bank & Financial Corporation”. 
 
According to Yin (2003), interviews serve as one of the most important sources of 
information in case studies. These may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured 
(Saunders et al., 2009) depending on the extent of guidance implied by the researchers.   
Structured interviews use predetermined questionnaires and are often referred to as 
interviewer-administered interviews. This type of interview allows for little social 
interaction and typically generates pre-coded answers. Semi-structured interviews on 
the other hand are non-standardized. Here, the interviewer prepares a list of topics he 
or she wants to cover, setting the tone for a dialogue. These topics may vary from 
interview to interview (Saunders et al., 2009). Lastly, there are unstructured interviews. 
These are particularly suited for exploratory studies when wanting to “find out what is 
happening and seek new insights” (Robson, 2002:59, as cited in Saunders et al., 2009). 
Unstructured or in-depth interviews have no predetermined list of questions, but the 
interviewer needs to have an idea of what areas to explore. Here it is the interviewee’s 
perceptions that guide the interview.  
 
In order to get an initial feel for the context and the empirics of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, including how their management control systems are influenced by 
Beyond Budgeting-theories and what their bonus structure looks like, an unstructured 
interview was set up as part of the first research phase. This informal, in-depth 
interview was conducted with the CFO, by one of the researchers at the company’s 
headquarters. Meeting with the CFO of the company made sure that the respondent had 
the required knowledge of both the management control systems and bonus structures 
in place in “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Having established contact with the CFO, this 
also facilitated formal consent and physical access to other divisions of the company. It 
also helped provide a holistic overview and understanding of the firm, as well as adding 
credibility during interviews with other employees in “Bank & Financial Corporation”.  
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For the second part of the research stage, with the main purpose of better 
understanding the underlying motivational effects of the bonus system in a Beyond 
Budgeting setting, the study uses semi-structured interviews. As Robson (2002) notes, 
this research stage cannot be clearly defined as either exploratory or explanatory. On 
one hand, it seeks new insights to the use of bonus in a Beyond Budgeting setting. This 
way the research phase harvests general attitudes and opinions on the use of bonuses as 
part of an exploratory study. On the other hand, and perhaps most importantly, it also 
seeks to relate the implemented bonus systems in “Bank & Financial Corporation” to 
work motivation as an explanatory study. According to Saunders et al. (2009), semi-
structured interviews are used for both these types of research, although it is more 
frequent in explanatory studies. For selecting respondents for the semi-structured 
interviews, we employed a non-probability sampling approach. For this research stage, 
we wanted to contact higher-level managers from various divisions and parts of the 
organization, as these were likely to be well informed about the bonus system. 
Interviewing managers from different divisions was also important in order to achieve 
diversity in personal backgrounds and perspectives.  
 
Six different higher-level managers were interviewed in this research stage. The 
interviews were conducted one-on-one and face-to-face in “Bank & Financial 
Corporation’s” headquarters and lasted between 40 and 70 minutes. All the qualitative 
interviews in research stage one and two were conducted in the mother tongue of both 
the respondents and the researchers. This was done to ensure better understanding and 
to not limit the respondents with any potential problems or barriers resulting from 
answering in a foreign language. Appendix II shows an example of the interview 
guideline provided during the interviews. For this stage, some topics were emphasized 
differently depending on the personal background and functional area of the 
respondents. Interviews were documented with the use of notes and an audio recorder, 
with the consent of the respondents. The audio recorder helped to ensure that data was 
accurately documented and to facilitate for the use of direct quotations in the thesis. The 
characteristics of the respondents are summarized in table 1: 
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Table 1: Interview characteristics 
Stage Date Type Aim Mode Informant Position 
1 22.01.13 
Informal & 
in-depth 
Understand MCS 
and bonus system 
Face-to-
face 
Gatekeeper CFO 
2 
25.02.13 
-26.02.13 
Semi-
structured 
qualitative 
interviews 
Understand how 
bonus motivates 
in the case 
company. 
Face-to-
face 
1-6 
Corporate 
managers 
3 09.05.13 Survey 
Test motivational 
effect of a bonus  
Online Anonymous 
All 
employees 
 
Analysis of research stage 1 and 2  
The interviews in research stage 1 and 2 were transcribed immediately after the second 
phase had ended, in line with standard practices as noted by Yin (2003). Data from the 
transcripts were later assessed closely by both researchers and mapped into different 
explanatory patterns and topics. This made the basis for categorization in line with the 
theoretical framework, as well as constituting a solid foundation for the deductive, 
survey approach undertaken in research stage 3.  
 
Questionnaire 
Although qualitative semi-structured interviews are appropriate in answering complex 
questions, they are typically not suited for generalizing data (Yin, 2003). In order to 
identify the motivational effects of the bonus system for the entire organization, we 
therefore complemented the research by using a questionnaire. Surveys have been 
deemed as an efficient strategy to understand opinions and attitudes among the 
respondents and to explain certain phenomena. For that reason, they are commonly 
used in identifying underlying causal relationships (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010) 
 
Before creating a survey, it is vital to know its exact purpose. The questions and 
alternatives given should be as precise as possible and be grounded in the research 
questions (Johannesen et al., 2011) As Ghauri and Grønhaug (2010) note, the structure 
of the questions should be kept simple, consistent and unambiguous. The questionnaire 
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for this study built on the findings from research stage 1 and 2. It was further structured 
with pre-set alternatives given in a specific order as recommended by Saunders et al 
(2009). We used the online survey tool ‹‹Questback›› to design the questionnaire. As 
part of a holistic case study, the survey was distributed to 1037 employees within all 
different divisions of the firm. The questionnaires were self-administered and 
distributed online through work e-mails. This helped facilitate a large sample of 
respondents in a quick and cost-effective manner (Saunders et al., 2009). It also 
provided anonymity and flexibility as to when respondents could answer the form, 
without the need for the researchers to be physically present (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 
2010). Self-administered online questionnaires also put little pressure on the 
respondents to give an immediate response. Another benefit of using these 
questionnaires is that the risk of human error in registering data is eliminated. Finally, 
results of closed questions are easy to compare (Gilham, 2000).  
 
One drawback of using self-administered questionnaires is that the completion rate is 
often low. It may also be hard to motivate respondents to participate in the research. 
Answers may also be imprecise or largely affected by the design of the questions. It is 
also impossible to verify the validity of the answers and it is impracticable to amend 
misunderstandings once the questionnaire has been introduced. It is also necessary to 
create brief and relatively simple questions (Gilham, 2000). However, the swiftness, 
cost-effectiveness and possibility of reaching a large sample size when using an online 
questionnaire was deemed to outweigh the disadvantages for our research purpose.  
 
Developing the questionnaire 
Questions in a questionnaire can be either open or closed (Saunders et al. 2009). In open 
questions respondents have to fill in the responses themselves. For closed questions, 
they are handed pre-set alternatives. Closed questions are simpler and quicker to 
answer and require minimal writing effort by the respondent. They also facilitate easy 
comparison of answers. However, there is a risk that none of the answers suit the 
respondent’s preferences (Saunders et al, 2009). Our questionnaire consisted of three 
parts, and can be viewed in its whole in Appendix III. The first part was purely 
descriptive and differentiated the respondents based on gender, division, years 
employed in the company, salary level, and leadership responsibility. These distinctions 
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enabled us to compare results between respondents (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010). Part 
one was composed by five list questions, where the gender (male/female) and 
leadership responsibility (yes/no) questions where dichotomous.  
 
The second part of the questionnaire was set up to explain the potential relationship 
between the bonus system and work motivation. One common approach to extract this 
information is by the use of rating questions (Saunders et al., 2009), something we also 
employed for our research. One key success factor in facilitating a high completion rate 
for the questionnaire lies in its length (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010). In order to keep it 
short and not ask any redundant questions, we constructed 11 different statements 
about the bonus system linked with the theoretical framework and findings from the 
previous research stages. The respondent was here asked to rate each statement on a 
numeric rating scale from 1 to 7, where 1 meant that they fully disagreed and 7 meant 
that they fully agreed. 4 referred to neither agreeing nor disagreeing. A shortcoming in 
using mid-point alternatives is that they give the respondents the possibility to be on the 
fence about the statement at hand, even if they do have an opinion about it (Saunders et 
al, 2009). On the other hand, the mid-points also avoid forcing opinions from 
respondents that are truly indifferent, which may prove just as insightful. We also 
provided the respondents the option «I do not know» if they lacked the required 
knowledge to answer a statement. This also aimed to limit the use of the mid-point scale.  
 
The questions were made as simple and clear as possible. The order was also carefully 
selected to avoid influencing following answers. Saunders et al (2009) note that rating 
questions should be both positive and negative to ensure that respondents carefully 
read each statement However, to minimize the time needed to understand and answer 
each statement and to attain a satisfactory response rate, we decided to make all 
questions one dimensional and positive. The trade-off resulted in a survey that took 
between three and four minutes to complete for all compulsory questions. We therefore 
deem the risk of the respondent to lose concentration throughout the survey to be low. 
 
The third part of the survey was voluntary and provided three open-ended questions. 
These were designed in order to identify other potential weaknesses about the 
corporate-wide and company bonus system and to pick up on alternative views of the 
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complete bonus structure. These questions were analyzed in the same manner as the 
transcripts from the qualitative interviews. This was done to make a basis for 
categorization of answers in line with the theoretical framework.  
 
All questions were written in the required working language at “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. We further assumed that all respondents knew what a bonus is. Since the 
understanding of the company bonus structure itself and its underlying parameters 
were identified as vital factors for the behavioral effects of a bonus scheme, we did not 
explain the company bonus structure in detail in the questionnaire.  
 
Since it is not possible to amend a questionnaire after it has been launched, it can be 
wise to conduct a trial run (Saunders et al., 2009). The questionnaire was approved 
internally at “Bank & Financial Corporation”. It was also properly tested on two fellow 
students in order to identify misspellings, see if they properly understood all the 
questions asked and to check if the order of questions was appropriate. The final version 
was further tested on one employee in “Bank & Financial Corporation” before it was 
distributed. The trial runs and the feedback from these were used to enhance the 
questionnaire and its face validity (Saunders et al., 2009).  
3.3 Evaluating the chosen methodology 
To establish the credibility of this study, it is necessary to evaluate the chosen research 
methods. In this regard, there are two dominating factors in evaluating the study: 
reliability and validity.  
3.3.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to whether the data collection techniques and analysis yield consistent 
findings, if similar observations could be produced by other researchers, and if there is 
transparency in interpretations of the raw data (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Robson (2002) presents four threats to reliability; 1) subject error, 2) subject bias, 3) 
observer error, and 4) observer bias. Subject error is apparent if the research is likely to 
generate different results at different times. The interviews for this study were 
voluntary for all participants involved. The interviews were further scheduled weeks in 
advance with a high degree of flexibility to find an appropriate time. Lastly, they were all 
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conducted within the headquarters of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. This limited the 
interference with normal work duties to an absolute minimum. The subject error for this 
research should therefore be low. However, as “Bank & Financial Corporation” is a large 
enterprise constantly adapting to its business environment, there is bound to be a 
certain turnover of employees. In time, this may alter the values and attitudes within the 
company. The research gathered in this study will therefore only present a mere 
snapshot of what the situation is like in “Bank & Financial Corporation” today.  
 
Subject bias refers to the risk that respondents may provide inaccurate responses to 
distort the results of the research instead of giving their heartfelt opinions (Robson, 
2002). The subject bias may be reduced by ensuring anonymity (Saunders et al., 2009). 
In this study, all subjects were informed that participation was voluntary and answers 
were treated with full anonymity. The interviews were also conducted face to face in 
order to build trust and make the participants perfectly aware of their rights. However, 
since the CFO served as the gatekeeper of “Bank & Financial Corporation” in the initial 
stages of the research and helped facilitate the semi-structured interviews, the 
handpicked participants for this phase may have chosen to focus on particular issues 
and ignored others. We can therefore not exclude the possibility that there might be 
some subject bias in the interviews. For the online questionnaire, respondents could 
answer in private without being traced. This ensured a high level of anonymity. The 
questionnaire was also distributed through personal work e-mails. The subject bias for 
the questionnaire is therefore deemed as low. However, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that discussions between employees who had taken the survey and those 
who had not may have influenced some of the answers given. 
 
Observer error relates to errors made by the researchers in gathering, interpreting or 
analyzing data (Robson, 2002). Observer error may be reduced by a high degree of 
structure and recording data (Saunders et al., 2009). To deal with this, all interviews 
were recorded and transcribed before the analysis. The interviews were also conducted 
physically face-to-face. This facilitated complementary observations such as facial and 
other non-verbal expressions to strengthen the interpretations of data. The six semi-
structured interviews also followed the same interview structure, although some minor 
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topics were skipped for certain departments, as the link to these departments was not 
deemed as clear or relevant.  
 
Finally, there is observer bias, relating to the researchers themselves and if they are 
accurately analyzing and presenting data (Saunders et al., 2009). To start off, none of the 
researchers have any affiliations with “Bank & Financial Corporation” outside of this 
study. This entailed an impartial approach towards the research object. Yet, our 
interpretations of the qualitative interviews are subjective by nature. This may have had 
an impact on the reliability of this study. 
3.3.2 Validity 
Validity refers to the generalizability of findings. It is the extent of which the research 
process and the results present a precise picture of what they are supposed to describe 
(Saunders et al., 2009). One typically distinguishes between internal and external 
validity. 
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity represents the applicability of research to the research object. In this 
study, the internal validity relates to whether the findings in motivational behavior, 
attitudes and opinions regarding the bonus system in “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
are applicable to the entity as a whole. As all six qualitative interviews were conducted 
for higher level-managerial positions, the knowledge of the use and implications of the 
bonus system within the company should be high. As the second round interviews all 
followed the same structure, several voices addressing the same issues would also 
increase the extent of internal validity in their answers. Yet, six interviews for more than 
1000 employees cannot be claimed as representable for the organization as a whole. 
Important opinions from other employees may therefore have provided us with 
valuable information in respect to motivational effects and general opinions about the 
bonus system. This makes triangulation of answers perilous (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
Then again, triangulation does provide the research with extra flexibility and may 
provide valuable insight not otherwise recognized (Saunders et al., 2009). This approach 
has therefore been used with caution in order to not amplify opinions. 
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For the internal validity of the questionnaires, Foddy (1994, as cited by Saunders et al., 
2009 p. 372) mentions four necessities: 1) Researchers must be clear about the data and 
designs of a question, 2) respondents must decode the questions as the researchers 
intended, 3) respondents must answer the questions, and 4) the researchers must 
decode the answers as the respondents intended. Consequently, the design and 
structure of the questionnaire have severe implications for the internal validity.  
 
For our research, all questions were thoroughly assessed with respect to if they 
contributed to answer the research questions, if they were easy to understand and if 
they gave new insight. It is also common that questions about attitudes and opinions are 
less distinct than questions about specific actions (Grønmo, 2004). To compensate for 
this, we designed all questions as simple statements. This contributed to increasing the 
precision and the internal validity of the questionnaire. By using rating questions, the 
interpretation of results should be quite universal. The three open-ended questions on 
the final page of the questionnaire also gave the respondents the possibility to 
complement their opinions if important information was left out. The statements were 
also designed to be as neutral as possible, in order to not skew the answers in a positive 
or negative direction. Lastly, the validity may deteriorate if respondents do not answer 
the questionnaire seriously or avoid answering (Grønmo, 2004). As the survey was 
distributed internally and on behalf of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, we assume that 
the respondents took it seriously. 671 responses of 1037 invited with between 201 and 
259 personalized answers to the three voluntary and open-ended questions also 
indicate that the test was taken seriously. Lastly, the questionnaire was modified, tested 
and approved through three different trial runs on managers, employees and students. 
This also served to increase the internal validity. 
 
External validity 
External validity relates to whether the research results are generalizable or 
transferable to other research settings or organizations (Saunders et al., 2009). For this 
study, the external validity relates to whether the results presented are transferable to 
other organizations following the principles of Beyond Budgeting.  
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Qualitative research methods are normally badly suited for generalization of results 
(Yin, 2003), as they represent a small and unrepresentative number of cases (Saunders 
et al., 2009). We conducted six interviews among higher-level managers from different 
departments in “Bank & Financial Corporation” to attain a diverse set of opinions and 
attitudes about the bonus system applied. This ensured a representative sample for the 
higher-level managers of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, as they were considered to be 
well educated on the implementation of team bonus in the firm. Yet, we cannot claim 
that these opinions are transferrable to other firms, as they are subject to both personal 
and firm values. Quantitative data are better suited for generalization, if the data is 
collected from a large and representative population (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
questionnaire was sent out to a total of 1037 employees in “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, regardless of position and hierarchical level. This was done, as all 
employees at “Bank & Financial Corporation” are part of the corporate-wide and 
company bonus schemes. 671 of the invited employees completed the survey. This gave 
a response rate of 65 percent. Respondents were given ten days to complete the 
questionnaire, where four of these days were weekends or national holidays. The 
respondents were also reminded to answer the survey on the two final days before 
expiration. This increased the response rate from 45 to 65 percent. However, as 366 
employees did not answer the questionnaire, we cannot claim that the results of the 
research are perfectly balanced. This is particular if the employees who did not answer 
shared similar opinions (Johannesen et al., 2011).  
 
With the purpose of relating team bonus to work motivation within a Beyond Budgeting 
context, this study has focused on one particular company that practices such a 
combination, namely “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Being a single case study, we can 
therefore not claim external validity for the data of the research. That is not to say that 
the findings are irrelevant. The findings may indeed be useful in similar research 
settings, for instance for other financial firms pursuing the philosophies of Beyond 
Budgeting and/or practicing team bonuses. We also do not exclude the possibility that 
the findings may be valid for other firms. 
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3.4 Statistical tests 
The questionnaire was designed and distributed with the online survey-tool Questback. 
We further used Microsoft Excel, SPSS and Questback to analyze and portray the data. 
For the 11 statements on the second page of the questionnaire, the resulting data can be 
defined as ordinal. These values cannot be measured numerically, but they can be placed 
in a specific order (Saunders et al., 2009). Each value is also mutually exclusive in terms 
of establishing the quality, extent or position of what is being questioned (Johannesen et 
al., 2011). For our purposes, these values represent to which extent the respondents 
agree with each statement on a scale from 1 to 7, were 1 being fully disagree and 7 fully 
agree. This is not to say that a respondent who answers 6 agrees twice as much as one 
who replies 3, or three times as much as one who responds 2. Such interpretations 
require interval data (Johannesen et al., 2011). Yet, one can still analyze ordinal data as 
if they are numerical interval data if one assumes that the values have similar gaps 
between them (Bloomberg et al., 2008). 
 
Being interested in the central tendency of the responses, this study has utilized mode, 
median and mean. These are the three most used ways of measuring central tendencies 
in business research (Saunders et al., 2009). As each of them has its specific advantages 
and disadvantages, we decided to make use of all of them. 
 
The mean is commonly known as the average of the population and includes all 
observations (Saunders et al., 2009). The drawback of using mean is that it is also 
influenced by extreme observations (Johannesen et al., 2011). The median represents 
the middle value of the population when data is placed in an ascending order. For this 
reason it is also known as the 50th percentile. The advantage of the median is that it is 
not as affected by extremes in the distribution as the mean. If data is evenly distributed, 
the median will be exactly halfway (Saunders et al., 2009). The mode represents the 
value that occurs most frequently. The mode is practical in interpreting descriptive data. 
It is also possible to have several modes within a population (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
raw data has further been adjusted for those who answered «I do not know». The 
calculations are therefore purely based on the values ranging from 1 to 7. The 
descriptions of central tendencies of data should also be accompanied with the 
dispersion of results around the central tendency (Saunders et al., 2009). This study 
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makes use of standard deviation to accomplish this. This is one of the most frequent 
dispersion measures (Saunders et al., 2009). A low standard deviation implies that there 
is little dispersion of results around the mean. In contrast, a higher standard deviation 
would imply that answers are spread out over a larger range (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
To check if managers and non-managers were motivated differently by bonuses, the 
results were further analyzed by an independent group’s t-test. Here, the null hypothesis 
stated that the means of two populations were similar while the alternative hypothesis 
stated dissimilarity. The null hypothesis would be disproved for p-values lower than 
0.05. In such cases we can conclude with a statistical significant difference between 
managers and non-managers (Saunders et al., 2009). Significant differences on a 5 
percent level are noted by (*).   
 
Adjusting the raw data 
Data checking is necessary to avoid generating wrong results from which false 
conclusions are drawn (Saunders et al., 2009). This includes checking for illogical 
relationships. Two respondents had rated all 11 given statements with a 7. This is 
conflicting, given that one statement suggests moderating the current company bonus 
structure more towards departmental performance. These respondents had also left 
comments for the voluntary open-ended questions, which were largely contradictory to 
the answers they had given in the rating scales. These two responses were therefore 
removed from the data material. One respondent also left a comment about just having 
been employed in “Bank & Financial Corporation” and not yet having grasped full insight 
of the organization. This respondent was also removed from the data material. The 
analysis was therefore conducted on 668 respondents.  
3.5 Research ethics 
Research ethics is defined as “the appropriateness of the researcher’s behavior in relation 
to the rights of those who become the subject of the research or are affected by it” 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p. 600).  
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Easterby-Smith (2008, p. 134) summarize key principles in research ethics: 
1. Ensure that no harm comes to the participants 
2. Respect the dignity of research participants 
3. Ensure a fully informed consent of research participants 
4. Protect the privacy of research subjects 
5. Ensure confidentiality of research data 
6. Protect the anonymity of individuals or organizations 
7. Avoid deception about the nature or aims of the research 
8. Declare affiliations, funding source and conflicts of interests 
9. Honesty and transparency in communicating about the research 
10. Avoid any misleading or false reporting of research findings 
The researchers of this thesis are confident that the research has been produced in 
accordance with these key ethical principles. Affiliations of the researchers and funding 
sources have been thoroughly communicated and all data have been treated with the 
utmost care. There have not been any deceptions about the purpose or nature of the 
study, and all participation has been completely voluntary. 
 
The findings and conclusions drawn are eventually based on the understandings and 
interpretations of the researchers. This study does therefore not represent “Bank & 
Financial Corporation”, the respondents of the research, or the institutions of NHH or 
LSM. 
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Chapter 4: Empirics 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly present and explain the current management control 
system at “Bank & Financial Corporation” where the bonus system plays an important 
role. The chapter will be an important step in the understanding of how the bonus 
system is incorporated into the management control system of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, and serve as a background for our analysis and conclusions.  
4.1 Company background  
After being established in the mid 1990’s, “Bank & Financial Corporation” is a large 
provider of financial products and services in the Scandinavian market (“Bank & 
Financial Corporation”, 2013a). As of January 1 2013, more than 1000 employees were 
employed by the holding company of “Bank & Financial Corporation” and its 
subsidiaries (“Bank & Financial Corporation”, 2012), and over the last few years the 
corporation’s brand awareness has increased significantly. 
4.2 Management control systems at “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
In 2008, “Bank & Financial Corporation” had come to the conclusion of changing the 
management structure of the company. The new management control system was built 
on and inspired by the Beyond Budgeting principles, and would through its 
implementation also seek inspiration from the principles of lean management. Prior to 
the decision to change the management model, “Bank & Financial Corporation” started a 
project of examining a more dynamic model of corporate governance. An important part 
of any new management model was to decentralize decisions and ensure that they were 
made closer to the customers, as well as making the firm more ambitious.   
In 2009, “Bank & Financial Corporation” started the process of implementing a new and 
more dynamic management model through four sub-projects; 1) culture and 
organization, 2) rolling forecasts, 3) benchmarking and scorecards and 4) bonus and 
incentives. Through adopting the new model, “Bank & Financial Corporation” were 
looking to achieve a stronger customer position, achieve better financial results as well 
as making sure the corporation is an interesting, developing and fun place to work. In 
the next few paragraphs, the three first projects of the new management model are 
explained in brief, before we take a closer look at the project of implementing a new 
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bonus- and incentive system in chapter 4.3.  
4.2.1 Culture and organization 
Probably the most important piece of the puzzle in implementing a new management 
control system is the one regarding culture and organization (CFO, 2009). Through the 
new dynamic management model “Bank & Financial Corporation” has defined a new 
management policy through three words; responsibility, involvement and business 
insight (CFO, 2009). This new leadership philosophy is based on asking questions and 
guiding the employees instead of telling people what to achieve or do (CFO, 2010).  
As a foundation for the new leadership philosophy, “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
wants to foster an improved business insight amongst its employees. This business 
insight does for instance include understanding business models, competitive conditions 
and value drivers. Through more transparent strategic information and by discussing 
strategic questions on lower management levels, “Bank & Financial Corporation” hopes 
to stimulate increased employee knowledge and business insight. Ultimately this may 
lead employees to being involved at higher levels in the organization and take an active 
part in decision-making processes (CFO, 2010). The employees are further given more 
responsibility through delegation, the new leadership philosophy, and dynamic 
management in general, which promotes a high level of autonomy, freedom of action 
and trust for its employees.  
4.2.2 Rolling forecasts 
As an important part of the dynamic management model, “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” has implemented quarterly rolling forecasts, forecasting 12 months ahead 
in time (CFO, 2009). The rolling forecasts are developed bottom-up in the organization 
and are a one-way process that helps managing the organization in the desired 
direction. The forecasting promotes a higher level of autonomy and responsibility, as 
every manager is responsible for the forecast as it is sent up a level in the company.  In 
this new model, forecasts are benchmarked against each other, instead of comparing the 
forecast against the actual result for that quarter, like it would be done in a budgeting 
process. Through rolling forecasts, “Bank & Financial Corporation” is able to quickly and 
effectively respond to any sudden market changes. An example is illustrated in figure 8. 
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4.2.3 Benchmarking and scorecards 
Inspired by the Beyond Budgeting principles of measuring performance relatively, 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” has implemented league tables where they can 
benchmark their performance on their competitors. By having league tables with 
comparable competitors, “Bank & Financial Corporation” is able to better assess 
whether their performance really is good or bad. 
The organization has moved from having plenty of goals, targets and activities, to a 
model that consists of fewer and more ambitious goals (CFO, 2010). “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” has an overall long-term goal of being ‹‹the most successful bank›› and aim 
to reach this goal through more defined short-term targets or key performance 
indicators (KPIs) defined for each subsidiary in the corporation. These targets are 
benchmarked against where “Bank & Financial Corporation” is situated in the league 
tables based on objective measurement criteria for each target or KPI. This is illustrated 
in figure 9 below.  
Figure 8: An example of rolling forecasts (CFO, 2010) 
Figure 9: Breaking down a long-term goal (CFO, 2010) 
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The league tables and the targets attached to them play an important role when we 
discuss how “Bank & Financial Corporation” has designed and implemented the new 
bonus- and incentive structure. 
4.3 Bonus and incentive systems at “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
One of the four projects in the process of introducing and implementing the new 
management model in “Bank & Financial Corporation”, was to develop and implement a 
whole new bonus- and incentive system.  
4.3.1 Purpose of bonuses and incentives at “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
Through the human resource (HR) strategy, “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to 
support its vision and values. The group’s target is to ensure that it is able to 1) attract 
the right employees through focusing on their company values, 2) retain the best 
employees through giving them responsibilities, communicating with them and 
rewarding them for good performance, and 3) develop the employees by involving them, 
giving them clear objectives and provide feedback (“Bank & Financial Corporation”, 
2011). “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants its compensation- and reward structure to 
support this HR strategy, and in addition to a base salary, the group has an incentive 
scheme to reward relative performance (“Bank & Financial Corporation”, 2013). 
Through the HR-strategy “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to ensure that the group 
can offer compensation packages at a competitive market level, without being the wage 
leader in their industry. 
As a part of a larger compensation package, the bonus- and incentive scheme’s main 
purposes are therefore to attract and retain employees, in addition to motivating the 
employees and being able to affect behavior. “Bank & Financial Corporation” reiterates 
that the motivational aspect is to motivate the employees to deliver better performance 
through assessing not only what the employees deliver, but also how they deliver it, 
especially with a view to how they deliver it in line with the company values. Another 
purpose of the bonus system is to better emphasize the elimination of budgets by 
incorporating relative targets and league tables into the bonus structure.  
4.3.2 Structure of the general bonus system 
Prior to 2005, “Bank & Financial Corporation” did not have any general bonus scheme. 
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The executive management however wanted that the employees should be able to take 
part in a good result. This resulted in a bonus structure that combined a corporate wide 
profit sharing scheme and a team bonus for each subsidiary, and was calculated 
dependent on how they performed according to budgets. In the period from 2005 to 
2007 the company delivered strong results and managed to stay within the budgets, 
which in turn activated the bonus payments. However, the results did not say much 
whether “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” result was a good result or not, as the general 
economic upturn in the market was strong for that particular period. Along with the 
introduction of the new dynamic management model, a shift in focusing on external 
benchmarking and scorecards, and evaluating performance through league tables, “Bank 
& Financial Corporation” wanted the bonus system to follow a similar structure. 
Consequently, the group implemented a whole new bonus structure in 2008. Today, the 
general bonus structure for employees in “Bank & Financial Corporation” is a two-faced 
structure, consisting of a team based company bonus and a corporate wide bonus, or 
profit sharing scheme, that both are based on relative performance and league tables. 
The maximum amount each employee can receive each year is 50.000 NOK. 
Part 1: Company bonus – maximum payout 34000 NOK: 
For any given year, the ‹‹company bonus›› accounts for 2/3 of an employee’s maximum 
bonus payout of maximum 50.000 NOK. Every year, each of the subsidiaries of “Bank & 
Financial Corporation” set short-term targets or KPIs that are based on a broader long-
term goal. Each employee’s ‹‹company bonus›› is calculated based on how well the 
company performs in the different league tables for each of the pre-set KPI.  
In order to explain how this would work in real life, the structure of a possible company 
bonus is presented in figure 10 below. The subsidiary the example is taken from, has 
defined profitability, growth and customer satisfaction as three KPIs from which there 
are league tables where the company is assessed relatively to other comparable 
companies. In general, “Bank & Financial Corporation” has a minimum goal of being 
among the top three companies for each KPI. Yet, dependent on the number of 
comparable companies, the target can also be set as having to be number two or one. In 
the example below, the target for each KPI is at being number one, which will result in 
full bonus payout. Each position in each of the league tables represents a percentage of 
maximum payout. Each KPI is weighted differently and decided by the board of each 
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subsidiary. In the example below profitability is weighted 50 percent, growth is 
weighted 17 percent and customer satisfaction is weighted at 33 percent. With the 
company placing itself according to the green squares, the total actual payout is given at 
19 362 NOK or approximately 57 percent of maximum company bonus.    
 
Given that there are objective measurement criteria to benchmark on, the subsidiaries 
will calculate the company bonus from league tables, but for some companies there are 
no objective measurement criteria available for assessing the company’s performance, 
and the bonus is then calculated from company scorecards (CFO, 2013).   
Part 2: Corporate wide bonus – maximum 16000 NOK 
In addition to the company bonus, “Bank & Financial Corporation” decided to operate 
with a corporate wide bonus, much like a profit sharing scheme. Each employee’s payout 
is given by how “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” return on equity (ROE) after tax 
compares in a league table of the best mixed financial groups in the Nordic countries. 
From the profit sharing schemes’ inception in 2008, a payment of 16.000 is granted to 
each employee if “Bank & Financial Corporation” is among the top three groups in the 
league table. 
Figure 10: Example of company bonus (Modified example from CFO, 2013) 
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In late 2011, individual performance was introduced in the profit sharing scheme, after 
a proposal was made by the administration. This proposal was made after discussions if 
the profit sharing scheme had any effect in motivating the employees, and that the 
company potentially could get more out of what this type of bonus actually cost the 
group. “Bank & Financial Corporation” therefore decided to change the profit sharing 
scheme to be tied to individual performances to a larger extent. The new structure was 
put in to temporary effect in 2012, as “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to evaluate 
this new structure before implementing it on a permanent basis. The new scheme works 
much like the old structure where the bonus payout is activated if “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” is ranked in the top three of the corporations in the league table on return 
on equity after tax. But instead of awarding an equal amount to each employee, the 
16.000 NOK per employee is put in to a larger pot. It is then up to each manager on 
every level to allocate the desired amount to each of the employees the manager 
manages. The allocation is done based on how the manager views the employee’s 
individual performance in the previous year. The scheme works like a build-up 
structure, where the manager at the lowest level allocates to his or her team first, and 
this allocation must be approved by the manager on the next level, before being sent up 
the hierarchy, all the way up to the CEO.   
The modification of the profit sharing scheme was adopted based on a wish to 
incentivize and motivate the employees further. “Bank & Financial Corporation” also 
wanted to assess not only what the employees delivered, but also how they delivered it 
in line with the values and attitude the group wants to promote with the adoption of the 
new management model. One concern that the employee representatives raised with the 
new bonus scheme was that they required managers to be properly trained to be able to 
allocate the bonus fairly and that the managers needed refer to a proper documentation 
for how the allocation is given. This is one of the reasons why this bonus scheme is not 
yet permanent, and that “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to thoroughly test the 
implications of it before implementation. The scheme could not be tested for the bonus 
payment for year 2012, as “Bank & Financial Corporation” did not rank among the top 
three based on the return on equity. A testing of the new scheme will then first be 
possible for the bonus payment for 2013. 
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4.3.3 Individual bonus scheme for corporate managers 
As an addition to the general bonus structure, “Bank & Financial Corporation” also 
adopted an own bonus scheme for corporate managers in 2011. By corporate managers, 
this is defined as managers in the five highest levels of the hierarchy (“Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, 2011). This structure is similar to the general structure for all other 
employees, but in addition to the company bonus and the corporate wide bonus, the 
managers’ bonuses also include an assessment of how well they do relating to individual 
scorecards with personal goals. These individual goals are set and agreed upon by the 
corporate manager and his or her superior (CFO, 2013). Including the individual bonus, 
corporate managers may receive from one to three months’ worth of base salary if the 
bonus is paid out in full.  
In general, “Bank & Financial Corporation” has an open dialogue with the board on the 
incentive and bonus system, as there are different views on whether bonuses have the 
desired effect. As a safety precaution, the board must approve all bonus payments and 
has the right to stop any payments. So far this option has not been used (CFO, 2013).   
4.4 Summary 
In 2008, “Bank & Financial Corporation” decided to change the management control 
system to a more dynamic management structure inspired by the likes of 
Handelsbanken, Statoil and the principles of Beyond Budgeting. As one of four projects 
in implementing the new management model, “Bank & Financial Corporation” wanted to 
implement a whole new bonus and incentive structure. As a part of a larger 
compensation and reward structure following the organization’s HR-strategy, the 
purpose of the bonus structure is to attract and retain talent, and act as an incentive to 
motivate the employees to align their behavior with the overall strategy of the group. 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” also wanted the implementation of the bonus structure 
to reinforce the adoption of a new management structure that was based on rewarding 
relative performance through benchmarking against competitors. Today, the bonus 
structure is two-faced, with one part of it being a bonus based on the achievement of the 
subsidiary each employee is employed in, and the other being a profit sharing scheme, 
where the employees are paid on individual performance within this structure. In 
addition, “Bank & Financial Corporation” operates with an individual bonus structure 
for its corporate managers.   
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
The following chapter contains our analysis on how the bonus system in “Bank & 
Financial Corporation” impacts work motivation. In order to answer the problem 
statement and the research questions properly, the analysis is divided into three parts, 
as presented in our analytical framework. 
 
 
Figure 11: Analytical framework 
 
5.1 Using bonuses in a dynamic management model  
To not give a skewed picture of the potential motivational effects, the bonus system 
must be evaluated as part of a larger management control system (Malmi & Brown, 
2008). To be able to analyze the potential motivational effects from the bonus system of 
“Bank & Financial Corporation”, we will initially evaluate it as an integrated part of their 
management model. This includes explaining 1) the current context, 2) the perceived 
purpose of the bonus system and 3) its fit with the dynamic management model of 
“Bank & Financial Corporation”. 
5.1.1 A top-heavy implementation 
This section seeks to explain the context of the bonus system.  
 
By moving from budgets to rolling forecasts and benchmarking in 2009, “Bank & 
Financial Corporation” has operated with their new management model for more than 
three years. From the qualitative interviews it became evident that five out of six 
informants believed that this management control system was better linked with the 
strategy of the organization.  
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“The goal [of the management model] is to get every employee to understand what 
the organization wants, where we are going and how everyone can contribute. This 
definitely gives a better fit with the strategy.” Informant #5 
 
Yet, the perceived extent of influence from the management model varied greatly among 
the higher-level managers. The three informants who had been contributing to the 
implementation of the model believed it to have increased their knowledge about 
competitors and made them more outward-looking. As one of them stated: 
“The new management gives you a completely different understanding and 
knowledge of the market you operate in. This makes it easier to look for potential 
improvements.” Informant #4 
 
For the three informants who had not participated in the design and implementation of 
the management model, it was harder to pinpoint its impact. They believed the 
intentions behind the model to be good, but they struggled to see its actual influence, 
especially on lower levels of the company. The majority of the six informants believed 
the implementation to still be in an early stage. One of the responsible informants stated 
that the model had been very well received in 2009, but that both the enthusiasm and 
implementation had lost some of its momentum.  
“There are still leaders who challenge the basic philosophies of the management 
model and Beyond Budgeting. This slows us down. The real test is to not give up and 
continue to communicate what dynamic management is and what it is not, until 
that mindset is a natural part of the company culture. Only then can we fully see 
what the model brings.” Informant #3 
 
This statement witnesses that “Bank & Financial Corporation” still has a long way to go 
before dynamic management is at the backbone of the organization. Yet the general 
attitude of the informants seemed to be largely positive toward the new management 
model. 
5.1.2 A bonus system to motivate and direct behavior  
This section seeks to explain the perceived purpose of the bonus system. 
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The current bonus system of “Bank & Financial Corporation” was one of four building 
blocks that were transformed to make the management control system more seamless 
and dynamic.  As described by one of the implementing managers, its purpose is to 
“motivate employees and align their behavior with the overall strategy of the 
organization”. This statement seems to go hand in hand with the defined HR-strategy 
and compensation policy of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, as mentioned in section 
4.3.1. The bonus system seeks to both retain talents by rewarding them for great 
performance, as well as providing direction through clear objectives. The next question 
in line was to see whether or not this understanding was shared by all informants. When 
asked what they thought the purpose of the bonus system to be, the responses varied 
greatly. Two out of six informants had no good answer to its desired purpose. Another 
informant stated: 
“I think we [“Bank & Financial Corporation”] justify the bonuses simply because 
‘everyone else is doing it’. It might also be important to attract talent. But as a tool 
to ‘get the job done’ I think bonuses add little value.” Informant #6 
 
Overall, only three out of six informants recognized that the purpose of the current 
bonus system is to motivate employees. Of the same three managers, two also believed it 
to direct behavior as stated in the HR-strategy.  Yet these higher level managers were 
also the ones that had been designing and implementing the dynamic management 
model at “Bank & Financial Corporation”. For those who had not, the responses were 
more or less speculative. This seems to back up the notion that the dynamic 
management model is still very much in an early phase of the implementation process. It 
may also indicate a lack of communication in terms of explaining why the bonus system 
exists and what the organization hopes to achieve from it. Another possibility is that 
higher level managers on a general note put little emphasis on bonuses in their daily life, 
not making it a topic for debate and reflection. 
 
It is however important to note that the intent of the two general bonus schemes is 
somewhat different: 
“With the corporate-wide bonus we wanted to create a culture that permeates all 
the independent companies by sharing our success. The link between individual 
effort and the paycheck may therefore be hard to see for each employee. With the 
SNF Report No. 05/13 
68 
 
company bonus, the motivational effect is stronger. Here, they are more able to see 
their contribution to the results presented in the league tables.” Informant #3 
  
By allocating the corporate-wide bonuses based on individual performances, the 
informant stated that “Bank & Financial Corporation” want to send a “strong signal to 
free-riders”.  
 
In addition to the general structure, “Bank & Financial Corporation” also operates with 
individual bonuses for their corporate managers. According to one of the implementing 
informants, this bonus scheme is designed for “individuals who presumably are able to 
affect the result of the company and the group”. By adding personalized goals, the 
individual bonus scheme is supposed to further increase motivation and direct behavior 
among these managers. The justification to why some individuals are treated with an 
additional bonus scheme is grounded in the wish to differentiate on competence. As one 
informant said: “These managers have a higher market value as an employee. It is only 
reasonable to differentiate on bonus.”  
 
To summarize, the intended purpose of “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” overall bonus 
system is to motivate and align behavior. The corporate-wide bonus seeks to create a 
collective culture across the different companies. The company-bonus is to serve more 
as a motivational tool and guide behavior. Finally, the individual bonus seeks to 
motivate and direct behavior for managers on the top-level to increase their 
performance. This bonus scheme is also supposed to better reward competence. For the 
different informants, this knowledge was not clear-cut. Only the informants who had 
implemented the bonus system seemed to understand their intended purpose.  
5.1.3 An unclear fit with the dynamic management model 
This section seeks to explain the fit between the bonus system of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” and their dynamic management model. The analysis will be conducted by 
utilizing the instruments of control framework built on the theories of Samuelson (2004, 
as noted in Ax et al., 2010) presented in 2.2.2. This implies viewing the bonus system’s 
link to the formal, informal and organizational structure controls. 
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Formal control: Bonus and benchmarking  
In the management model of “Bank & Financial Corporation”, benchmarking and rolling 
forecasts constitute a large part of the formal controls. These management tools reflect a 
natural first step in going beyond budgeting, where continuous planning based on 
relative indicators and trends make up the heart of formal controls (Bogsnes, 2009). To 
fit with the same mindset, one should also base rewards on relative performance 
(Bogsnes, 2009). In “Bank & Financial Corporation”, this connection is made explicit.  
Both the corporate-wide and the company bonuses are based on external benchmarking 
and relative targets through league tables. This was also viewed as a logical connection 
to most of the informants: 
“By basing rewards on relative targets, the bonus system fits well with the 
comparative mindset of dynamic management.” Informant #2 
 
The relationship between the individual bonuses and formal controls is not as 
straightforward. The individual bonuses are based on the achievement of goals stated in 
the corporate managers’ personalized scorecards. These goals can be made up by both 
financial and non-financial indicators, which again can be either objective or subjective. 
The research of Kaplan and Norton finds that combining individual scorecards with 
benchmarking may encourage employees to increase performance, if they are designed 
right (2008). When asked about the balance in the personal goals, five out of six 
informants believed these to be long-term, reasonable and to align with the strategy of 
“Bank & Financial Corporation”. This seems to indicate a perceived fit between the 
personal goals and formal controls. 
 
As both the formal controls and the bonus system have changed in recent years, we 
asked how the higher level managers found the current fit in comparison to the old. 
Prior to adopting the dynamic management model, the bonus structure in “Bank & 
Financial Corporation” built on fixed targets. The consensus among the informants 
believed the prior formal controls to be insufficient in reflecting relative performance. 
Adding bonuses to the mix was not found to make the system any better.  
“Operating with budgets becomes more of a game where you nearly develop 
strategies in order to stay within the budget. To base a bonus on that kind of 
behavior can do more damage than good.” Informant #4  
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Overall, it was relatively undisputed that the current fit between the bonus system and 
formal controls was deemed good. It was also perceived far superior to the old. 
Informal control: Bonus and company culture  
To evaluate the fit of the bonus system in relation to the informal controls, the 
informants were asked to which extent the thought the current bonus system fits with 
the company culture of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Here, the opinions among the 
informants differed. One manager believed the bonus system to have become a natural 
part of the company culture, rather than it being in line with an already existing one. 
Another informant reminded that the bonuses only make up a small part of the total 
compensation package:  
“[In “Bank & Financial Corporation”], we are fostering a culture based on 
moderation, not on extravagance. Striving toward equality is at the very core. Yet 
we realize that we need to differentiate on competence as well. So we do it under 
controlled circumstances”.  Informant #2 
 
Yet, the remaining four informants did not see a clear link between the company culture 
and the bonus system. Two informants voiced strong opinions for removing the entire 
bonus system, as they did not believe it to reflect their personal or the firm’s values. 
“I did not join “Bank & Financial Corporation” for the bonuses. It was rather the 
opposite.” Informant #5 
 
The strongest voices, however, were raised in terms of the link between bonuses and 
empowerment. When the informants were asked what they thought motivates an 
employee to work, no one mentioned pay. Instead, the answers largely reflected the 
views presented by theory Y (McGregor, 1960) or by the motivators in Herzberg’s two-
factor theory (1966). Among the most frequently mentioned were task complexity, 
personal development, variation in tasks, recognition, responsibility, trust, professional 
challenges and a likable culture. These answers also largely reflect the basic 
philosophies of Beyond Budgeting, on which the dynamic management model is built 
(Bogsnes, 2009). When asked if they thought other employees were motivated by 
bonuses, three of the informants replied no. Two informants believed they did while one 
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thought them only to be a temporary source of motivation. Two of the informants 
fronted a view that the bonuses may even undermine other sources of motivation: 
“I believe work is about intrinsic motivation. By having a bonus system, we signal 
the opposite. Even though we provide the employees with trust and responsibilities, 
we still communicate that bonuses are necessary to make them work better. 
Informant #3 
 
Overall the majority of the informants did not see a link between the bonus system and 
the company culture of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Most informants also believed 
that using bonus as a motivator was likely to conflict with other empowerment methods.  
Organizational control: Bonus and teams 
In terms of fit with organizational controls, the bonus structure mostly follows the 
physical structure of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. The corporate-wide bonus scheme 
is naturally linked with the relative performance of the group, while the company 
bonuses are linked with the relative results of each subsidiary. These relations largely 
also mirror the ideas of Beyond Budgeting, proclaiming that bonuses should be based on 
team performance rather than the individual (Hope & Fraser, 2003). Yet, “Bank & 
Financial Corporation” also base bonuses on individual efforts. This is visible through 
the individual allocations of the corporate-wide bonus and the individual bonus scheme 
for leaders. This section will see to which extent individual bonuses fit into the dynamic 
management model of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. 
 
Being weighted equally on individual, company and group performance, the bonus 
structure for corporate managers much resembles that of multi-level performance used 
in Rhodia and Borealis (Bogsnes, 2009). However, an important distinction is made in 
the size of compensation. While the general bonus system aggregates a total of 50,000 
NOK per employee, the total bonus for leaders may be up to three months base salary. 
Building on the view of Mintzberg (2009) in scrapping executive bonuses, Hope and 
Player (2012) assert that dissimilarity in bonus schemes may send out wrong signals to 
the employees of the firm. When the informants were asked if they thought the 
individual bonus scheme to be in line with dynamic management, the informants were 
rather split. Three mentioned it to be important to differentiate corporate managers as 
the expectations and responsibilities for these are higher than for lower-level 
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employees. Two of these further iterated that the bonus structure should incorporate 
personal contributions more strongly. They believed the influence on the company and 
corporate-wide bonus to be so small that it was more regarded as a “Christmas bonus” 
rather than a reward for good performance. The remaining three informants did not see 
any good reason to have a separate bonus system for higher level managers. One 
informant also questioned why the total bonus made up a different percentage of the 
total compensation package.  
 
By allocating the corporate-wide bonus based on individual performance, this bonus 
scheme resembles a combination of a corporate-wide profit-sharing plan as used in 
Handelsbanken (Hope & Fraser, 2003) combined with a relative bonus for operating 
teams (Bogsnes, 2009). As the corporate-wide bonus is based on the performance of the 
whole corporation with more than 1000 employees, some of the informants believed the 
problem of free riding to be “inevitable”. In the example of operating teams, Hope and 
Player (2012) mention that managers can reduce free riding by allowing the team 
members to allocate differently within the team. In such a case, they propose that 
evaluations must be properly agreed upon and justified before an objection to a bonus is 
made (Hope & Player, 2011). The main difference with “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” 
corporate-wide bonus is that the allocation is done by the middle managers themselves. 
Interestingly, only one informant believed this bonus scheme to create value. Another 
manager mentioned that the success of this bonus scheme very much relied on the 
middle managers’ communication of allocating the bonus pool. Three informants 
believed it to be neutral at best and more likely to be detrimental. 
“You can easily imagine that an individual allocation makes employees conspire 
about the corporate-wide bonus. «If I help him out, he might get a higher reward 
etc. ».  In worst case this reduces the level of team-work in the group” Informant #1 
 
Although individual allocation of rewards has been mentioned in the Beyond Budgeting 
literature as a way to limit free riding, it must still be viewed as an exception to the rule. 
In this exception, fairness in evaluation is alpha and omega (Hope & Player, 2011). Since 
the employees of “Bank & Financial Corporation” are operating in a corporation 
requiring a high degree of teamwork, it can be questioned whether a separation (and 
justification) of results for more than 1000 employees is plausible. As most individual 
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results are a natural outcome of teamwork or influences by other colleagues, Simons 
(1995) states it to be impossible to separate the marginal contributions of individuals 
from another. A separation of results also contradicts the main foundation in the Beyond 
Budgeting philosophy, where collective success is to be shared (Hope & Player, 2012). 
One of the designers of the bonus system said “Bank & Financial Corporation” had taken 
this into account by making the team-based company bonus relatively larger in size than 
the corporate-wide bonus. 
 
The subjective allocation of the corporate-wide bonus is also in stark contrast to the 
profit-sharing plan used in Handelsbanken, which serves as the main inspiration for 
most of the authors within the Beyond Budgeting movement (Bogsnes, 2009). One 
manager fronted this view as a better fit with dynamic management: 
“The profit-sharing plan of Handelsbanken is simple and it rewards every employee 
equally. I believe that allocation is easier to live with. The more you break bonuses 
down on teams and individual levels, the more challenging it gets.” Informant #3 
 
Overall, there seemed to be a large sense of disagreement among the informants to 
which extent the bonus should be broken down further to department or personal 
levels, or aggregated to the corporate level. Two informants also called for a complete 
removal of bonuses. The perceived fit with the organizational structure was therefore 
largely divided. 
5.1.4 Summary on fit of the bonuses and dynamic management 
The higher-level managers of “Bank & Financial Corporation” generally held the new 
dynamic management model of the firm in high regard. Most of the informants also 
pointed to a better fit with the overall strategy of “Bank & Financial Corporation” as it 
was more outward looking than prior systems. Some informants pointed to the 
implementation still being in an early phase and still very much in the top levels of the 
organization. Regarding the bonus system, all informants believed it to complement the 
formal controls of the dynamic management model by being based on relative targets 
and benchmarking. Yet the managers who did not participate in the implementation 
process struggled to see what “Bank & Financial Corporation” hoped to achieve from the 
bonus system, which may indicate a communication problem. For those who had, it was 
evident that the bonus generally served to align behavior, reward competency and to 
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motivate employees. The informants also questioned the bonus structure’s link with the 
company culture. Most of the disagreement, however, lied in the balance between 
individual and team-performance. Some of the higher-level managers believed the 
bonuses to be too vaguely linked with their performance to be motivating and called for 
more individual performance appraisals. Other informants believed the bonuses to do 
more harm than good and called for a complete elimination of the bonus system. The 
informants were also split in the view of having a separate bonus scheme for corporate 
managers. Overall, only one manager believed the complete bonus system to fit well into 
the dynamic management model.  
5.2 Bonus as a motivational tool in “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
This part of the analysis will seek to explain how the three different bonus schemes at 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” impact work motivation. The analysis will be conducted 
sequentially based on the four process theories on motivation shown in the analytical 
framework in figure 2 in the introduction to this chapter.  
All the three bonus schemes will be analyzed based on qualitative research. The analysis 
for the company bonus scheme will be further strengthened by the results from the 
questionnaire which is both quantitative and qualitative. The individual bonus for 
corporate managers will be dealt with separately if appropriate. 
5.2.1 Are the bonuses in line with goal setting theory? 
This section seeks to explain the motivational effects from the three bonus schemes at 
“Bank & Financial Corporation” in the light of goal setting theory. As mentioned in 
section 2.8, there are four principles for a goal to be motivating. They need to be 1) 
specific and clear, 2) challenging and complex, yet achievable 3) committing and 
relevant, and 4) assisted by feedback. These four principles will serve as the following 
subsections.  
 
1) Specific and clear: 
As a pre-requisite for evaluating the separate bonus schemes, all informants in the 
qualitative interviews were asked if they could detail the bonus structure at “Bank & 
Financial Corporation”. This included detailing the corporate-wide, company and the 
individualized bonus for leaders. As Locke and Latham (2006) propose, understanding 
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how a bonus works is a key for it to change behavior. This test would also serve as an 
indication to whether or not the complete bonus structure is perceived clearly by the 
corporate managers. Five out of six informants could somewhat accurately describe all 
the bonus schemes during our interviews. Yet one manager claimed: 
“I think you need to be educated on the bonus system to properly comprehend it, 
because I have not fully understood it myself”. Informant #6 
 
When the informants were asked whether or not they believed the current bonus 
structures to be too complicated, the opinions varied greatly. The concern was largely 
related to the company bonus. Only one manager believed this structure to be obvious to 
all employees. Two informants believed it could be too complex. 
“I have often thought the entire bonus structure to be a bit puzzling. The targets are 
relatively clear per se, and they should be easy to communicate, but the company 
bonus might be too intricate to understand”. Informant #3 
 
Since the higher-level managers viewed the company bonus structure as the most 
intricate, we decided to test how the employees of “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
perceived its complexity in the quantitative survey: 
 
Table 2: Clarity of company bonus structure 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
6 
It is easy to understand what is 
needed to trigger the company bonus 
664 50% 32% 5 4 4.37 1.77 
 
From table 1 it is evident that half of the respondents find the company bonus structure 
easy to understand, while 32 percent does not. A median of 4 and a mean of 4.37 further 
indicate that the census neither found it easy nor difficult to understand the company 
bonus scheme. Yet, the standard deviation of 1.77 reflects a relatively large dispersion in 
answers. These results largely underline the different opinions among the corporate 
managers.  
 
Another necessity in terms of successful goal setting lies in the interpretation of the 
different parameters. For the corporate-wide bonus, this relates to understanding what 
return on equity implies. For the company bonus scheme, this means understanding the 
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different KPIs used for comparison in the league tables. When asked about the 
specificity of these parameters, there was a consensus between the informants that they 
were all tangible, unambiguous and well defined. The employees were tested on the 
same matter for the company bonus scheme in the questionnaire.   
 
Table 3: Clarity of measurement parameters 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
7 
I understand the parameters that 
constitute the company bonus well 
666 54% 29% 5 5 4.51 1.72 
 
In line with the beliefs of the higher-level managers, the majority (54%) of the 
respondents understood the underlying measurement parameters of the company 
bonus well. The mean, mode and median are also all above 4. Yet the standard deviation 
of 1.72 indicates a substantial spread in answers. 29 percent of the respondents also 
disagreed with the statement. This conflicts with the census from the qualitative 
interviews that the parameters were clear for all employees.  
 
Two informants believed the perceived complexity of the corporate-wide and the 
company bonus structures relied heavily on communication. In line with Locke and 
Latham (2006), clear communication may indeed increase the employees’ 
understanding of what is required of them to perform better. Some informants claimed 
inadequate communication could have been a source of confusion for the corporate-
wide and company bonuses. 
“The information is not always flowing. Some managers are reluctant to 
communicate the bonus structures and in some cases I do not think they fully 
understand them themselves. I think more people would have understood the bonus 
structures if they were better communicated”. Informant #2 
 
One way of improving the communication is through increased transparency (Locke & 
Latham, 2006). When asked about how transparent the corporate-wide and company 
bonus structure is, it became evident that all information on the bonus structure can be 
found at the company’s intranet at any given time.  
“If there are any unresolved questions, all employees are also welcome to ask their 
superior about the bonuses”. Informant #2 
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To see how well the company bonus scheme had been communicated, the clearness in 
communication was tested through a statement in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 4: Communication of company bonus scheme 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
13 
The communication of the company 
bonus scheme has been clear 
660 39% 40% 4 4 3.97 1.79 
 
As some of the informants anticipated, the respondents were quite fragmented in the 
opinions on the communication of the company bonus being clear. This manifests 
through two relatively equal proportions of respondents who agreed and disagreed to 
the statement. In total, 39 percent found the communication clear, while 40 percent did 
not. This may serve as an explanation to why almost one third of the respondents did 
not find the company bonus structure easy to understand.  
 
At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked what they found to be the 
main weaknesses with the current with the general bonus schemes. Out of 671 
respondents, 259 replied to the voluntary open ended question on the company bonus 
scheme and 201 replied to that of the corporate-wide bonus. Communication and 
feedback were the second most frequently mentioned elements. 47 respondents voiced 
out that they believed communication and general feedback to be an issue for the 
company bonus scheme. Some respondents claimed that they did not even know the 
difference between the company and the corporate-wide bonus, let alone the difference 
to the parameters they were built on. One informant argued: 
“There is a need to communicate more clearly before, during and after the targets 
are met. The way the system works today, the employees do not know what they 
need to do to reach a target, or even what the target is.” Respondent # 7 (Survey) 
 
For the corporate-wide bonus, the amount that mentioned communication was 
somewhat less. This could indicate that there are some company-specific issues related 
to the clearness of communication. 
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Individual bonus and goal specificity 
The informants from the interviews were all entitled to the individual bonus scheme for 
leaders. All of them believed the personalized goals in the individual scorecards to be 
specific, clear and very difficult to manipulate. However, the extent of subjective goals 
varied between the managers. For some corporate managers, this could cause trouble in 
terms of measuring the goals objectively: 
“Some of the goals are absolute and easy to measure. Others are subjective, which 
may make it more difficult. My superior and I usually evaluate these subjective 
goals in collaboration by discussing to what extent I have achieved them”. 
Informant #3 
 
The personalized goals are communicated through evaluations and individual 
scorecards. The scorecards are easily accessible for the different managers at any time. 
The new Remuneration Directive by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance also imposes 
strict regulations in terms of transparency of executive bonuses (see Appendix I). 
 
Are the goals specific and clear? 
Based on the qualitative interviews, it seems like the individual bonuses for leaders 
satisfy most of the requirements for the specificity and clearness of the personal goals.  
It is however important to note that the measurability of subjective goals may be a 
source of conflict, although no informants mentioned any problems related to this. 
 
Both the interviews and the questionnaire suggest that a substantial part of the group 
deem the company bonus structure too complex. A somewhat smaller amount of the 
respondents of the questionnaire also found the underlying parameters difficult to 
understand. As understanding the bonus structure is a key principle for it to work as a 
motivational tool, this may prove that a large part of “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” 
employees are likely to find little motivation from the company bonus scheme. Both 
types of research also indicate a great divide in how clearly the communication is 
perceived. This may serve as a possible explanation to why close to 1 out of 3 
respondents did not find the company bonus structure easy to understand. However, it 
may also indicate a lack of interest in the bonus system among these respondents. 
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Overall, it seems likely that the company bonus structure is not understood by a large 
share of the employees. 
 
All informants easily understood the corporate-wide bonus scheme. Yet they noted that 
communication might have been unclear, which the questionnaire somewhat confirmed 
through the open-ended questions. As mentioned in section 5.1.3 there is also a 
potential risk of conflict in the subjective measurability of individual efforts when 
allocating the bonus pool individually. 
 
2) Challenging and complex, yet achievable: 
In order for a goal to be motivating, it needs to be challenging, yet realistic (Locke & 
Latham, 2006). All informants believed the targets of the corporate-wide and the 
company bonuses to be realistic. However, designing achievable stretch targets was not 
regarded as an easy exercise. As one informant said: “It is difficult to design a bonus 
structure that is fair, motivating, gives direction and is understood by all employees”.  
 
As Locke and Latham (2006) state, raising the bar too high may decrease motivation. 
According to the informants, this has traditionally not been an issue in “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. One manager stated that they usually reach the targets set for the 
corporate-wide and company bonuses, although there was no corporate-wide bonus for 
2012. 
“At one point we always seemed to pay out maximum corporate-wide and company 
bonus. We always achieved the corporate-wide targets and the barrier to achieve 
the company bonus has traditionally been low. However, this has changed 
somewhat in recent years”. Informant #2 
 
From the written responses in the survey, 28 out of 251 mentioned the targets of their 
company bonus to be unrealistic. For the corporate-wide bonus, 16 out of 201 
mentioned unrealistic target setting as an issue. This made it the fourth most mentioned 
factor of complaint. As Whetten and Cameron (2002) states, an unachievable goal may 
be demotivating for the employee. One respondent mentioned this being a factor: 
“The weakness lies in the targets being unrealistic, and that this inhibits the desire 
to stretch for greater achievement. Instead of triggering behavior and greater 
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effort, today’s structure has the opposite effect. Ambitions are good, but the goals 
need to be realistic.” Respondent # 8 
 
As explained in section 5.4.2, all the corporate-wide and the company goals are based on 
relative KPIs, which are benchmarked against competitors league tables. These are 
annual goals, which limits the incentive period of the company bonus to one year. One 
manager thought this to only have a temporary effect: 
“The motivational effect of the bonus is probably visible in December [if the goal is 
still achievable]. But if we are falling too far behind say already in September, the 
motivational effect of the bonus is likely to be very small”. Informant #6 
 
Individual bonus and goal achievability 
For the individual goals, the informants mostly perceived them to be challenging. 
“I find the goals very realistic and there is always something to strive for”. 
Informant #5 
 
When asked how often the six corporate managers reached their targets, it became 
evident that they largely achieved their personal goals every year. 
 
Just like the targets for the corporate-wide and company bonuses, the individual bonus 
schemes are based on annual goals. Yet none of the managers believed this to create a 
short-term focus for the firm. One manager estimated that 50 to 80 percent of the 
personal goals typically continue for more than one year. Another manager stated: 
“The personal goals harmonize with the strategy of the firm. Most of them are kept 
for several years, with different targets attached to them”. Informant #6 
 
Are the goals challenging and complex, yet achievable? 
The individual bonus schemes seem to satisfy most of the requirements for the goals 
being challenging and complex, yet achievable. However, with a seemingly high success 
rate in the past, one can question if the goals can be made even more challenging 
without experiencing a ratcheting effect. 
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The company bonus scheme and the corporate wide bonus schemes were also deemed 
as fairly realistic, long term and challenging by the informants, although some written 
responses questioned the level of achievability. This can be a result of a lacking 
understanding of how the bonus system works.  
3) Committing and relevant 
Establishing links between work effort and the goals are important to facilitate 
commitment among employees. One way of doing so is through collectively discussing 
and agreeing on the goals that are set (Locke & Latham, 2006). For the corporate-wide 
and company bonus, the goal setting process has typically been initiated by each 
company’s Board of Directors. Consequently, it is regarded as very top down.  
“There has not been much room for discussing changes to the general bonus 
structure. The parameters are more or less set in stone and they seem hard to 
change. Some departments struggle to see the relevance of the company measures, 
as they are too broad for them to influence. It would be better to identify KPIs 
within each department to make the targets more relevant”. Informant #5 
 
As mentioned in section 6.1.3, there was a general disagreement between the 
informants in balancing individual and group performance in the bonus system. Three of 
the higher level managers believed the relevance of the corporate-wide and the 
company goals to be too small in relation to each individual’s work tasks. As relevance is 
deemed as a key principle for the goal setting theory, the employees were asked if they 
would prefer the company bonus to be more closely linked to department performance.  
 
Table 5: Preference for more influence 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
10 
The company bonus should be linked 
closer to the performance of my 
department, rather than to individual 
or company performance 
623 57% 24% 6 5 4.69 2.10 
 
The results illustrates that 57 percent of the respondents would like the company bonus 
scheme to be linked closer to department performance instead of individual or company 
performance, while 24 percent disagree. A mode of 6 and a median of 5 further 
underline how responses tend to agree with the given statement. The mean is somewhat 
lower, being 4.69. This may have been negatively influenced by extremes, as the 
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standard deviation shows a relatively large spreading of results. The responses indicate 
that the employees want the bonus to be based on targets that they have more control in 
influencing.  It is important to note that some of those who disagreed might have been in 
favor of more individual performance appraisal as well. 
As two of the informants mentioned, tying bonuses more closely to the departments 
may generate additional risks for “Bank & Financial Corporation”. It requires a greater 
extent of horizontal coordination to avoid sub optimization and conflicting interests. 
However, the goals attached to a bonus should also reflect the very nature of work 
needed to achieve it. If the relevance of a goal is deemed too low, the commitment to the 
goal is likely to be low as well (Locke & Latham, 2006).  
 
When asked if the corporate managers had received any complaints or dissatisfaction 
towards the corporate-wide or the company bonus schemes from lower level 
employees, the consensus was mainly negative. Most of the informants claimed the 
enthusiasm for the two common bonus schemes at “Bank & Financial Corporation” to be 
marginal at best. From the written responses in the questionnaire however, there were 
259, 201 and 242 unique replies for the voluntary open ended questions. This seems to 
indicate that the bonus system is likely to be a concern for a large number of the 
employees at “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Of these, nearly half of the respondents 
mentioned personal influence to be an issue. This was either because they did not see 
the link between their efforts and the bonus or because they thought it to be based on 
too many factors beyond their control. One of the respondents mentions: 
“The company bonus, which is the largest part of our total bonus, consists of goals 
we have no chance in influencing. Our work has no longer any effect on the bonus, 
and the motivation is therefore almost non-existent.” Respondent #9 (Survey) 
 
Individual bonus and relevance 
For the individual scorecards, the extent of personal influence on the goal setting was 
regarded as far more satisfactory. All the corporate managers claimed to have relevant 
and reasonable personal goals. The consensus also believed to have a certain degree of 
freedom with respect to the goal setting process, as this typically is done in collaboration 
with their superiors. As one informant said: 
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“I can largely influence the goal setting with my superior by sharing my personal 
opinions. Through discussions we may also decide to lower or increase the goals to 
make them more realistic”. Informant #3 
Are the goals committing and relevant?  
As an active part of the goal setting, the goals that make up the individual bonuses seem 
to be both relevant and committing to the corporate managers.  
 
The inclusivity of employees in the goal setting for the corporate-wide and company 
bonus schemes is deemed low, as the target and goal setting is regarded as a very top-
down process by the informants. As for the relevance, this seems to be the major 
concern for “Bank & Financial Corporation” for both the corporate-wide and company 
bonuses. This was apparent in the interviews, the written responses and in the 
statement about more appraisals based on department performance. In line with goal 
setting theory this is likely to reduce commitment to the goals, being counterproductive 
for motivation. 
 
4) Feedback 
The final factor for successful goal setting theory is related to the provision of feedback 
(Locke & Latham, 2006). As the different corporate-wide and company bonuses are 
largely based on relative performance, the feedback of the company’s current position is 
naturally limited to the publishing of quarterly results. According to the informants, 
there are presentations on the corporate-wide and the different company’s relative 
performances every three months. 
“We get quarterly feedback on how we are performing in relation to the league 
tables, but it is not linked to how we are doing in terms of triggering the bonus”. 
Informant #5 
 
As this statement implies, there is an uncertainty among the employees to how they are 
performing in relation to the corporate-wide and company bonus throughout the year. 
This creates an uncertainty to what size the bonus is at for any time during the year, and 
also how large it eventually will be. Instead, the information about the size of the bonus 
is typically given in hindsight, after the year has passed. According to Hope and Fraser 
(2003), this reward uncertainty is exactly what drives performance in large operating 
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teams when the bonus is based on relative performance. Yet, the feedback of how the 
company is performing may still serve as an important reminder of the potential bonus 
being there, as well as communicating how it is structured. Tracking progress is also 
important to encourage workers throughout the year and to recognize good efforts 
(Locke & Latham, 2006). As continuous feedback is considered a key motivator in the 
goal setting theory, the employees were tested on this in relation to the company bonus. 
 
Table 6: Feedback of the company bonus scheme 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
16 
The feedback on how we are 
performing with respect to the targets 
of the company bonus is good 
664 41% 41% 4 4 4.01 1.77 
 
41 percent of the respondents found the feedback of the KPIs that make up the company 
bonus satisfactory, while 41 percent did not. With a mode and median of 4 and a mean 
of 4.01 the census neither agreed nor disagreed to the statement. Yet a standard 
deviation of 1.77 implies that the opinions were fairly dispersed around the mean. An 
interpretation of these results is that even though a large share found the feedback to be 
good, an equal share believed the opposite. As mentioned earlier, communication and 
feedback were mentioned second most frequently as the largest weakness with the 
current bonus structure.  
 
Individual bonus and feedback 
The opinions about the current level of feedback of the individual scorecards were split 
among the corporate managers. Four of them received personal feedback every quarter. 
One manager received it every month while one received feedback once a year. Most of 
the informants believed this to be unsatisfactory: 
“The feedback is too infrequent. This makes it difficult to know how we are 
performing. Even though we work hard to improve, the feedback is not sufficient 
enough to ensure the bonus to continuously stimulate performance”. Informant #5 
 
However, the extent of feedback needed for each individual must be viewed as highly 
subjective. For instance, the manager who was evaluated once a year did not find this to 
be too seldom. 
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The feedback can also be used to adjust goals that are set too high or too low. Similarly, 
it can be used to add or eliminate goals as the needs of the company changes. Two 
corporate managers noted how the individual goals at times are too static. 
“The year does not always turn out as we have planned. Sometimes we have to 
prioritize differently as we go along or even abandon certain targets. Yet the 
individual scorecards do not always adapt to these changes. In such cases a pursuit 
of personal goals becomes counterproductive for the firm”. Informant #1 
 
This experience clearly conflicts with both the planning and goal setting principles of 
Beyond Budgeting, where the goals should be set for continuous improvement and 
planning a continuous event (Bogsnes, 2009). Yet lowering and eliminating set goals to 
increase motivation do also come with a risk of lowered future commitment to the goals 
that are set. Such changes should therefore not be done too often (Bragelien, 2003). 
 
Is the level of feedback perceived satisfactory?  
Regarding the level of feedback on individual goals, a majority of the informants argue 
that the feedback is too infrequent. Yet this is highly subjective and may not be true for 
all corporate managers. The extent of how dynamic these goals are was also questioned.  
 
The employees were also largely split in how well they deemed the feedback for the 
corporate-wide and the company bonuses. This also manifested in the written responses 
from the questionnaire and the opinions of the different informants. As mentioned 
under relevance, these goals also seem static. 
 
Conclusion on goal setting theory 
 
Table 7: Conclusion goal setting 
Goal setting Corporate-wide Company Individual 
Clear and simple   
Realistic stretch    
Committing    
Feedback    
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Generally it seems as the corporate managers find a great source of motivation in setting 
clear, realistic and achievable goals. By being an active part in the goal setting process, 
the corporate managers are more likely to commit to the goals they set, much as Locke 
and Latham propose (2006). In this setting, continuous feedback is believed to of great 
importance to complement the motivation stemming from the goals. For the corporate-
wide and company bonuses, the relevance to the targets was mostly viewed as too vague 
for the goals to be committing. Combined with a seemingly complex company bonus 
structure and possibly unclear communication, the targets of these two bonus schemes 
seem to have little motivational effect on the employees. 
5.2.2 Are the bonuses in line with the expectancy theory? 
This section seeks to explain the motivational effects of the different parts of the bonus 
system at “Bank & Financial Corporation” in the light of the expectancy theory. This 
theory consists of the three motivational criteria; 1) valence, 2) instrumentality and 3) 
expectancy. All three criteria need to be present in order for a reward to be perceived 
motivating. 
 
1) Level of valence 
While the expectancy and instrumentality together are based on subjective, cognitive 
reflections on the logical relationships between effort, performance and reward, the 
valence is founded from personal values (Vroom, 1964). The valence explains to which 
extent the outcome is desirable. In the bonus schemes of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, this reflects whether or not the monetary rewards attached to the 
corporate-wide (max. 16000 NOK) and company bonuses (max. 34 000 NOK) are 
desirable or not.   
 
During the qualitative interviews it became evident that the large majority of the 
corporate managers viewed the different bonuses as a part of their total salary, and not 
as independent monetary elements. The interviewees further stated that a potentially 
higher salary did not motivate them to increase performance. 
“Total salary is more a hygienic factor than anything else. As long as it is on a 
reasonable level, there are other things that are far more motivating than money”. 
Informant #4 
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As mentioned in section 6.1.3, most of the informants found their work motivation 
similar to that predicted by Herzberg’s two-factor theory (1966). When asked if they 
would have performed worse without the bonus, five said bluntly no. According to these 
statements, it may therefore seem as the informants are rather indifferent to attaining 
the corporate-wide and company bonuses, as long as their salary is on a competitive 
level. However, as long as bonuses make up a part of the remuneration scheme at “Bank 
& Financial Corporation”, all the higher level managers appreciated getting them.  
“I do not find the total bonus to be decisive for my performance, but it is a welcomed 
salary component when it arrives at the beginning of the year”. Informant #5 
 
The extent of how desirable the corporate-wide and the company bonuses were also 
varied among the informants. Three corporate managers did not find the size of the 
company or the corporate-wide bonus to be large enough to have a significant impact: 
“I think we would have demanded far more from the different bonuses if they made 
up a larger share of the total salary. As they are now, they are too small to make a 
difference in motivation.” Informant #6 
 
In the questionnaire, nine and seven employees mentioned the size of the company and 
the corporate-wide bonuses respectively to be the main problems of the bonus schemes. 
 
Valence of individual bonuses 
The size of the individual bonus scheme is not as absolute as the corporate-wide and 
company bonuses. As mentioned in section 6.1.3, the total bonus for leaders may 
constitute a payout up to three months of base salary. As with the two other bonuses, it 
was a welcomed salary component by the corporate managers, but the census also 
stated that the monetary value of the individual bonus scheme is still fairly small. 
“When you combine all the bonuses together, they still make up a relatively small 
part of total salary”. Informant #2 
 
Conclusion for the valence of bonuses 
All informants believed the different bonuses to have a positive value. The extent of 
desire for the bonuses, however, varied. The sizes of the different bonuses were further 
believed to be somewhat low in relation to total salary. 
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2) Level of instrumentality 
Instrumentality refers to the belief that a met expectation will be rewarded. It is the link 
between performance and outcome. The instrumentality is affected by the extent of 
trust, reward control and reward policies (Vroom, 1964).  
 
One manager noted that the different bonus schemes in “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
are all formalized through openly available bonus policies on the company’s intranet. 
The new remuneration directive by the Ministry of Finance further imposes restrictions 
to which extent bonus schemes can be altered and how executive bonuses are to be paid 
out (see Appendix I). In “Bank & Financial Corporation”, the general bonus structure 
needs to be agreed upon by the Board of Directors if any changes are to be made. Thus, 
there is little individual control over the design of the general bonus schemes. However, 
it is important to note that the Board of Directors is allowed to withhold payouts of both 
the corporate-wide and the company bonuses, although this has never occurred. If such 
an action is ever made, this can lower the level of trust to the bonus system.  
 
The greatest risk in instrumentality is likely to rest in the subjective allocations of the 
corporate-wide bonuses. Here, unequal distributions may create a potential danger of 
perceived favoritism or unfairness among employees. If these allocations are not 
thoroughly clarified beforehand and justified after, this can break down the trust to the 
bonus system. As this allocation not yet has been tested, the level of trust to the 
corporate-wide bonus system is very unclear. One informant reflects on this:  
“With the adoption of the new corporate-wide bonus scheme, the employee 
representatives fronted a demand: The managers responsible for allocating the 
bonus needed to be properly trained before we adopted the new practice. This was 
not in place at the time of approval. The fact that the corporate-wide bonus was not 
triggered for 2012 meant that we were kind of saved by the bell.” Informant #3 
 
A lifelong employee mentioned the same problem in the questionnaire: 
 “The change in the corporate-wide bonus scheme was very poorly communicated, 
and we were lucky that there was no bonus in 2012. If it were, it would have been 
total chaos as to how that bonus should have been allocated.” Respondent #10 
(Survey) 
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However, one informant says that “Bank & Financial Corporation” is confident that the 
required training for leaders, together with an improved communication of the system 
will be in place by 2013, in order for the scheme to be tested and evaluated properly. 
 
Instrumentality of individual bonuses 
Since the evaluation of individual bonuses is partly based on subjective goals, the level of 
trust to the superior may have an influence on the instrumentality. For instance could 
favoritism be a potential factor of influence. Yet none of the informants believed this to 
be the case. The extent of perceived control over the reward also relate to the 
subjectivity of goals. Since the extent of achievability is discussed with the supervisor for 
these goals, there may be unequal perceptions to the level of actual accomplishment. 
This can create a feeling that a lower level of performance for these goals not necessarily 
will impact the bonus payout. Obviously, the harder the goal is to measure, the more 
likely this situation is. Lastly we note that the Remuneration Directive of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance requires transparency in executive reward policies. 
 
Conclusion for the instrumentality  
The individual bonus for corporate managers seems to satisfy all the requirements for 
instrumentality. Yet the subjective evaluations can create concern in terms of trust to 
whether or not a met expectation will be paid. When the evaluations of subjective goals 
are conducted in discussion, it may also impact the perceived control the individual has 
over his own payment. Yet we cannot infer anything from the interviews to state that 
this is the case for any of the corporate managers.  
 
For the company bonus, the individual control over the reward is limited. The policies 
are also transparent by being available for all employees on the Intranet. The trust to the 
bonus payout should also be high for the company bonus, considering that the Board of 
Directors has yet to withhold a bonus that has been achieved. However, we cannot claim 
this to be true for all employees.  
 
For the corporate-wide bonus, there are far more uncertainties. Based on information 
from the interviews and the questionnaire, we cannot infer whether or not the outcome 
is perceived to depend on performance or not. 
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3) Level of expectancy 
Expectancy relates to which extent the employees believe they are able to affect the 
goals that make up the bonus (Vroom, 1964). The ability to affect the goal is largely 
influenced by the amount of controllable factors (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009), past 
experiences, self-efficacy and task difficulty. Some parts of the following analysis are 
therefore highly complementary to challenging and complex, yet achievable and 
committing and relevant in the goal setting theory. 
 
The corporate-wide bonus is based on the total return on equity for all companies 
involved in “Bank & Financial Corporation”. This comprises all of the employees in the 
firm, which currently surpasses 1000. For each individual, this results in a large extent 
of uncontrollable factors in terms of achieving the corporate-wide goal. As the company 
bonus is based on the relative results of smaller groups, the extent of uncontrollable 
factors is naturally lower. This should entail a higher degree of expectancy for the goals 
of the company bonus. This was also reflected throughout the qualitative interviews: 
“[With the company bonus] it is easier for the employees to see how their 
contributions affect the results in the league tables. The link between personal 
contribution and the company’s end result is therefore stronger than it is for the 
group”. Informant #3 
 
However, the relative difference does not mean that the level of expectancy for the 
company bonus is high. The employees must still believe that the effort they put in is 
worthwhile to achieve the company’s targets. From the qualitative interviews, only one 
manager thought this to be the case. Three corporate managers considered the link 
between personal efforts and the goals of both the company and corporate-wide bonus 
to be too vague to make an impact on work motivation. Two of the informants found it 
hard to see their actual impact on company performance themselves. The lacking ability 
to affect the goals was a reoccurring topic throughout the qualitative research. One 
informant stated: 
“I do not think the employees see the link between their tasks, the end result and the 
bonus”. Informant #4 
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To see whether or not these beliefs were right, we decided to test this in the 
questionnaire. The respondents were asked to which extent they agreed with 
understanding the relationship between individual effort and outcome of the company 
bonus (EPO). According to the VIE-formula, the same statement can be used to 
extract the level of expectancy (EP) if the instrumentality (PO) is 1. In this case, this 
means that all employees must believe that the outcome depends on performance.  
 
Table 8: Perceived relevance of work in bonus 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
8 
I see how my work contributes to the 
company bonus 
658 44% 37% 4 4 4.09 1.89 
 
The statement explains that 44 percent of the respondents claim to see the link between 
work tasks and the company bonus, while 39 percent do not. With a standard deviation 
of 1.89 from a mean of 4.09, this indicates a rather fragmented range of opinions, where 
the census neither agrees nor disagrees to the statement. This can indicate that a large 
part of the employees in “Bank & Financial Corporation” do not see their contribution in 
relation to the company bonus they receive, even though this is designed to be the most 
motivating bonus scheme for lower level employees. 
 
One way of increasing the understanding of this relationship is through improved 
communication (Vroom, 1964, 1967). One manager fronted a complimentary view: 
“There is nothing wrong with the goals per se. The problem is to make the 
employees understand their significance in the value chain. This mind-set is not 
thoroughly imbued in the company today”. Informant #5 
 
Expectancy of individual bonuses 
For the individual bonuses, most of the factors of expectancy have already been 
mentioned under challenging and complex, yet achievable and committing and relevant in 
the goal setting theory in section 6.2.1. Although some of the personal goals are made up 
of team variables, all informants believed them to be realistic and possible to influence. 
However, the extent of controllable factors must be viewed as a subjective matter of 
opinion and may vary from manager to manager. 
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Conclusion expectancy 
As expectancy relates to the perception of linking one’s own effort to the desired 
performance, this section is highly complementary to challenging and complex, yet 
achievable and committing and relevant as mentioned in section 6.2.3. This includes 
perceived achievability, relevance and if the goal is believed to be challenging. We will 
thus only elaborate on the extent of controllable factors in this section. 
 
The interviews and the qualitative answers from the questionnaire indicate that the 
perception of control over the corporate-wide performance is likely to be low. For the 
company-bonus, these results seem to be somewhat better. This is also to be expected 
given the larger number of employees comprising the corporate-wide bonus. Overall, 
the expectancy seems uncertain for both the corporate-wide and the company bonus. 
Yet it is likely to be relatively higher for the company bonus scheme.  
 
For the personal goals, the extent of controllable factors seems to be high among the 
informants. Together with challenging and achievable goals, this may indicate a 
relatively high level of expectancy for this part of the individual bonus. 
 
Conclusion expectancy theory 
Table 9: Conclusion on expectancy theory 
Expectancy theory Corporate-wide Company Individual 
Expectancy   
Instrumentality ?   
Valence    
 
The employees do not seem to see the link between personal effort and team 
performance when it comes to the corporate-wide or the company bonus. Although 
welcomed, and consequently positive in the eyes of Vroom (1967), the valence can be 
also questioned for being too small to make an impact for all three bonus schemes. This 
is especially the case for the corporate managers. For the corporate-wide bonus scheme, 
there is also a question mark next to the trust to the bonus system as a consequence of 
the new and subjective allocation system. 
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5.2.3 Are the bonuses in line with equity theory? 
According to the equity theory of motivation a bonus scheme needs to be perceived 
fairly by the employees in order to be motivating. In this setting, both over- and under-
rewarding employees may have negative effects on motivation (Adams, 1963). During 
the qualitative interviews, it became evident that five out of six corporate managers 
believed they were entitled to the annual bonus received. 
“I believe I deserve all the annual bonuses I receive. As long as I perform well and 
reach the targets and goals set, I have no reason not to. Generally I think most of my 
co-workers believe they contribute to the success of “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
and feel they deserve the bonuses they get”. Informant #2 
 
In line with the theories of Adams (1963), this observation may indicate that the 
managerial notion of being over-rewarded is likely to be ruled out. Yet we cannot infer 
that this is the case for all corporate managers in “Bank & Financial Corporation”. As a 
potential source of demotivation, it was important to establish if the company bonus 
was regarded in the same manner among the employees of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”: 
 
Table 10: Justification of company bonus grants 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
14 
I feel I deserve the company bonus I 
am granted 
636 87% 5% 7 6 5.93 1.76 
 
As the informant expected, 87 percent of the respondents agreed to the statement that 
they feel they deserved the company bonus when it is granted, while only 5 percent 
disagreed. With a mode of 7 and median of 6 this clearly indicates that most of the 
respondents feel they deserve the company bonus when they receive it.  
 
Adams (1963) explains that the perception of fairness is also a subjective matter of 
comparison between fellow peers. This can be fairness either in inputs (i.e. if it is fair 
with an equal reward based on the inputs) or in outputs (i.e. if the output is fair given 
equal inputs).  In “Bank & Financial Corporation”, all employees within the same 
company receive the same company bonus. This makes it relatively easier for the 
employees to support, as fairness in output is removed from the equation. Yet if 
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individual efforts are perceived differently, then a similar bonus may seem just as unfair. 
For the company bonus, this may be the case with free-riding. Yet only a few employees 
mentioned free-riding to be the biggest weakness of the company bonus scheme. One 
informant said the following: 
“We need to realize that there is a certain share of free-riders at “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”, as with any other organization. This is more of a problem that can be 
dealt with through culture and leadership.” Informant #6 
 
The measurability of inputs and outputs is also an important factor for the perception of 
fairness. In “Bank & Financial Corporation”, the measures that trigger the company 
bonuses are objective. This makes it relatively easier for employees to justify. That being 
said, even objective measures may be perceived unfairly if they are based on too many 
factors the employees cannot control (Langeland, 1999). In the questionnaire, perceived 
unfairness from uncontrollable factors was the third most mentioned complaint from 
the open ended questions. Most of these complaints were aimed towards the corporate-
wide bonus. As an unexpected tax expense prevented the group from achieving top 
three on return on equity in 2012, the bonus was directly affected by factors none of the 
employees could influence. Similar events have also been the case for the company 
bonus. One informant gave the following example: 
“When we merged two debt collection firms some years ago, one of the companies 
had produced very good results while the other had not. With the merger all 
employees received the same company bonus. The employees from the company 
which performed well found this very unfair” Informant #6 
 
To assess if employees perceive the measures of the company bonus as fair, they were 
asked to which extent they agreed with getting a cut or lose this bonus if the company 
did not reach set targets. 
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Table 11: Fairness in company bonus removal 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
15 
It is fair that the company bonus is 
reduced or left out if the company as a 
whole do not reach set targets 
647 58% 24% 6 5 4.84 1.95 
 
58 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, while 24 percent disagreed. A 
median of 5, a mode of 6 and a mean of 4.84 give an indication that the respondents 
generally find the objective measures of the company bonus fair.  
 
The probability of unfairness is also likely to increase when individuals are treated 
unequally (Adams, 1963).  Differentiating between corporate managers and other 
employees in the bonus systems may contribute to such a feeling if it is not properly 
justified. As mentioned in section 6.1.3, the informants were split in the view when it 
came to having separate bonus schemes for certain managers. Three informants claimed 
the system was properly justified by having stated several key factors that moderates 
this bonus scheme. Among the mentioned inputs were education, the employees’ role in 
the organization and extent of responsibility. In line with the equity theory, different 
inputs could justify a different output if communicated well (Adams, 1963). The other 
three informants had opinions in line with that of Hope and Player (2011) who believes 
dissimilarity in bonus schemes possibly sends out wrong signals to the employees of the 
firm. One of these informants also disregarded any justifications to have been made.  
 
Similarly, one could question the perception of fairness stemming from having separate 
company bonus schemes. One respondent in the questionnaire did for instance believe 
that it is relatively easier for some of the companies in “Bank & Financial Corporation” to 
achieve a company bonus than it is for others. Yet this did not seem to cause a major 
source of concern among the respondents. However, it may be that this sense of 
unfairness may amplify with clearer communication of the different bonus schemes. 
Consequently, it should not be neglected. 
 
As mentioned under instrumentality in section 6.2.2, individual allocations of the 
corporate-wide bonuses based on subjective evaluations may also create a feeling of 
unfairness among the employees and break down trust to the bonus system. 
SNF Report No. 05/13 
96 
 
In line with the research of Porter and Lawler (1968), rewarding employees year after 
year might also create an anticipation of being continuously rewarded. If the reward 
should at some point stop, this may also create a feeling of unfairness. Hope and Player 
(2011) refer to this resentful feeling as an entitlement creep. From the qualitative 
interviews it became apparent that “Bank & Financial Corporation” had a tradition of 
paying out large bonuses to its employees some years ago, but that the payments have 
decreased in recent years. On average, total corporate-wide and company bonuses for 
the group comprised approximately 46.000, 45.000, 26.000 and 18.800 per employee 
from 2009 to 2012 (see Appendix V). In line with Hope and Player (2009), this may have 
contributed to an entitlement creep among some of the employees in “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. When the informants were asked, five out of six anticipated to be paid a 
form of bonus every year. The majority of the informants also believed the lower level 
employees to share the same view. To see if this was actually true, the employees were 
asked to which extent they anticipated an annual company bonus. 
 
Table 12: Company bonus expectation 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
12 
I anticipate getting paid the 
company bonus every year 
653 39% 38% 4 4 3.98 1.94 
 
The results were rather split. 39 percent of the respondents agreed to anticipate getting 
the company bonus every year, while 38 percent disagreed. This may indicate that the 
employees of “Bank & Financial Corporation” are fairly fragmented when it comes to 
anticipation of the company bonuses.  
 
A high anticipation of rewards may indicate that the employees view the company bonus 
as a part of base salary. In such a case, the effect of the bonus is likely to hygienic rather 
than motivational. By stopping or reducing the bonus, one is more likely to create a 
negative effect, and it is likely to outweigh the positive effect of getting a reward. A few 
responses from the questionnaire indicated that this might have been the case, where 
the respondents at the time of recruitment had been told that they could practically 
consider the total bonuses of potentially 50.000 as part of base salary. This would 
indeed lower trust and motivation from the bonus system given that the total bonuses 
per employee have dropped in recent years. A high anticipation of rewards may also 
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indicate that the link between effort, performance and outcome is broken. If people 
believe they will receive a reward no matter the efforts they put in, then the 
motivational effects of the bonus is also likely to be marginal. Likewise, a low 
anticipation of bonus will also undermine the motivational effects the bonus is designed 
to create. If the employees do not believe they will receive anything in the end, they are 
also unlikely to increase performance based on the reward.  
 
Conclusion equity theory 
Table 13: Conclusion equity theory 
Equity theory Corporate-wide Company Individual 
Fairness   
 
The individual bonus scheme was not believed to over-compensate any of the 
informants. The anticipation of this bonus was also rather high, given past experiences 
and the subjective perceptions of the informants. When it came to the fairness of the 
individual bonus system, half of the informants questioned whether it could be justified. 
This makes the perception of equity from this bonus scheme somewhat unclear. With 
individually tailored scorecards, the comparison of inputs and outputs is also highly 
subjective. However, none of the informants showed any dissatisfaction in this.  
 
From the questionnaire, it became evident that almost all the respondents felt entitled to 
receiving the company bonus. The anticipation of it was however rather fragmented, yet 
almost half of the respondents anticipated receiving an annual company bonus. The 
fairness in having different bonus schemes for different companies was also questioned. 
These two factors make the perceived equity of the company bonus scheme uncertain. 
As for the free-rider effect, this was not regarded as a big problem in neither the 
questionnaire or through the interviews.  
 
The qualitative interviews replicated much of the same answers for the corporate-wide 
bonus scheme as for the company bonus. With the intention of reducing free-riding, 
some of the informants believed the inputs from each worker to better correlate with 
the bonus they receive. Yet the allocation was questioned by three of the corporate 
managers as possibly unfair. This makes the equity of the corporate-wide bonus scheme 
uncertain. 
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5.2.4 Are the bonuses in line with self-determination theory? 
The self-determination theory originates from a viewpoint that a person’s self-
determination, and thus motivation, is decided by the need for 1) autonomy, 2) 
competence and 3) relatedness (Deci, 1975). The following analysis is done for the 
bonus system as a whole.    
1) Autonomy 
The dynamic management model of “Bank & Financial Corporation” builds on giving 
employees a high degree of autonomy in which employees enjoy freedom of choice. By 
moving away from a bonus system that was based on budgets and fixed targets, “Bank & 
Financial Corporation’s” bonus system may feel less controlling than it used to. The 
question in line is whether or not the current bonus system limits perceived autonomy 
at all.  
 
The view that bonus is very little discussed and that it has a small focus in the 
organization was shared by all the corporate managers in the qualitative interviews. 
This goes to indicate that the leaders do not feel dictated by the bonus system in any 
way, and that it supports the autonomy promoted through the dynamic management-
model. When the informants were asked if they would have achieved the same level of 
performance without any bonus, five out of six informants responded positively, and 
further claimed that the bonus did not have any effect on their behavior. The sixth 
manager believed the potential bonus might have had a small impact on his 
performance, yet not a dominating one. Generally there was a consensus that the 
importance lied in realizing the goals set with their supervisor, not in the attaining the 
bonuses themselves.  
 
When asking about the weaknesses and potential improvements to the current bonus 
system, approximately one in three respondents left comments for the different 
questions. This seems to disprove the statements from the informants that there is a 
lacking enthusiasm around the bonus system. It might also indicate differences in what 
focus the bonus system has among employees on different levels in the organization. For 
instance could it mean that the bonuses have a relatively larger impact on autonomy in 
lower levels of the organization than they do higher up in the hierarchy. Even though the 
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respondents were asked to address the biggest weaknesses, a handful also left answers 
that they were generally content and motivated by the company bonus system. As one 
respondent stated: 
“Everyone I work with are very excited to know if we get a bonus or not. It is a great 
source of inspiration.” Respondent #11 (Survey) 
The fact that two out of three respondents did not leave any message can indicate that 
several employees share the same view. However, it can also indicate that the bonus 
system is not of significance to these employees. This makes it difficult to conclude 
whether or not the autonomy of these employees is limited by the bonus schemes. But 
considering the width of the goals for the company and corporate-wide bonuses are 
fairly broad and that the size of the bonuses have been deemed as relatively low by 
several informants as well as a few respondents in the questionnaire, it seems as neither 
of the bonuses limit autonomy. 
2) Competence: 
According to Deci (1975) it is important that the use of extrinsic motivation does not 
undermine intrinsic motivation. As mentioned in section 6.1.3, the corporate managers 
were split in the view of using bonuses as a motivational tool. Two informants believed 
bonuses to undermine other forms of recognition, while three informants thought 
bonuses to have no impact on work motivation:  
“Instead of a giving them a bonus, give them more autonomy, and interesting work 
tasks. It is the job itself that motivates.” Informant #1 
At the same time, there were three informants who believed bonuses to motivate. One 
informant also believed to possibly strengthen the effects of other extrinsic motivators.   
“By tying money to it, the bonus amplifies the feedback. That way it works well as a 
motivational tool.” Informant #1 
 
To assess whether the employees actually perceived the current company bonus scheme 
as a proper reward for their efforts, they were given the following statement.  
 
Table 14: Reward applicability of company bonus 
Q Statement # Agree Disagree Mode Median Mean Std.Dev 
9 
The company bonus works well to reward 
my efforts 
659 36% 48% 2 4 3.72 1.92 
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Only 36 percent of the respondents believed the company bonus worked well to reward 
their efforts, while 48 percent disagreed. With a mode of 2 and a mean of 3.72, this 
underlines that the respondents feel that the current structure of the company bonus to 
not reward their efforts well. This can be interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that 
the employees believe the reward is based on targets that are only vaguely linked with 
their own work tasks or efforts. Therefore it is not perceived as a constructive reward. 
Another possibility is that the employees feel the size of the reward to be either too 
small or too high, given their efforts. Rooted in earlier analysis, a large number of the 
respondents felt that they both had limited ability to influence the company bonus, as 
well as they felt they deserved the bonus they received. This may imply that the general 
disagreement with the statement above could be rooted in a combination of the reward 
being too small and the link between work and reward to be too vague for the reward to 
work as constructive feedback. From the view of self-determination theory, the 
company bonus is thus unlikely to support competence. This was further mentioned by 
some of the informants who claimed both the corporate-wide and the company bonuses 
to be viewed as “Christmas gifts”. Achieving the personal goals did however leave most 
of the informants with a sense of mastery. Yet as none of the informants claimed to view 
the neither individual bonus to be important, it may seem as they neither enforce nor 
diminish the need for competence.  
 
Finally, it must be emphasized that none of the informants believed bonuses to be a 
supplement for traditional recognition and feedback. As one stated: 
“We [humans] are good at taking thing for granted. I am sure we can raise the bar 
and become better at recognition. This can be done independently from bonuses. 
Praising someone in plenum can have a strong motivational effect”. Informant #2 
3) Relatedness: 
Relatedness from the bonus system refers to how a potential reward facilitates 
ownership and connection to others (Deci, 1975). By adopting a general bonus system 
based on relative targets from external benchmarking, “Bank & Financial Corporation” is 
hoping that the bonus system in turn increases the employees’ relatedness to the 
company.  
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One way of increasing relatedness is through the facilitation of teamwork (Bogsnes, 
2009). When asked if the bonus system ensures this, one informant believed that the 
bonus system at least helped the employees to increase their business understanding 
and cooperation on a company level. Another informant argued that the effect of the 
bonus system was at best neutral. Two other informants however argued that it was not 
the bonus itself that increased cooperation among the employees: 
“It is the targets that give a stronger cohesion and cooperation within the 
departments, not the bonus tied to them.” Informant #4 
 
When it came to the new allocation of the corporate-wide bonus, most of the corporate 
managers believed this to have counterproductive effects for relatedness. As mentioned 
in section 6.1.3, the higher level managers believed the corporate-wide bonus scheme to 
possibly detriment team-work rather than facilitate in building a group culture. 
 
Another source of relatedness stems from ownership (Deci, 1975). This makes it 
important to understand whether or not the bonus system contributes in giving the 
informants any sense of ownership to the company. Of the six corporate managers 
interviewed, four informants believed that the general bonus structure did not facilitate 
any sense of ownership to “Bank & Financial Corporation” as an organization. The two 
remaining informants however argued that the bonus was built from a strategic point of 
view. They believed this would increase the awareness of what “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” is and what the group does on an operative level. The sense of ownership 
to the company stemming from the bonus system was therefore relatively unclear. 
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Conclusion self-determination theory 
Table 15: Conclusion on self determination 
Self-determination Corporate-wide Company Individual 
Autonomy   
Competence ?  
Relatedness   
None of the bonus schemes were believed to limit autonomy. In terms of competence, 
the company bonus seemed to be poorly viewed as a proper reward. As the new 
allocation still has to be made for the corporate-wide scheme, it is also questionable if 
this is able to reward better than the company bonus. The corporate managers seemed 
to be rather indifferent to the money aspect, making the bonus in itself a poor indicator 
of performance. The corporate-wide bonus was further questioned to be detrimental to 
team-behavior by the majority of the corporate-wide managers. For the company-bonus, 
this was not believed to reduce relatedness to the firm.  
5.3 Are there motivational differences based on the role of the employees? 
In this section we seek to analyze whether the company bonus has a different impact on 
the motivation for managers compared to non-managers.   
 
In order to test if the motivation differs between the two groups, we ran 11 independent 
t-tests on each of the statements from the survey. The null- and alternative hypothesis 
for all the tests were defined as following: 
 
H0: There are no differences in the responses between managers and non-managers. 
HA: There are differences in the responses between managers and non-managers.  
 
A summary of the test results are shown in table 16 below, while the full test 
transcriptions are provided in Appendix IV. 
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Table 16: Summary of results from t-tests (*indicates significant differences in responses) 
 
From the p-values we see that seven of the tests proved a significant difference in the 
mean responses between managers and non-managers, while four of the tests did not 
prove any difference between the two groups. However, we can use the 95% confidence 
intervals for each group to explore the sentiment expressed by the population mean for 
each group, to each of these four statements. And interestingly, it differs for the different 
statements.  
 
For statement 4, “The company bonus works well to reward my work effort”, although 
there is not much evidence of a difference between the two groups, there is evidence 
that each group’s population mean is less than 4. This means that on average, both 
groups disagree with the company bonus working well to reward their efforts. This is in 
line with what we saw in chapter 5.2, and is an indication that there is a weak link 
Statement N 
managers 
N 
non-managers 
Mean 
managers 
Mean non-
managers  
P-value 
(* of p<0.01) 
1. It is easy to understand what is needed to 
trigger the company bonus payout 
123 541 4.821 4.272 0.0015* 
2. I understand the parameters that constitute 
the company bonus well 
123 543 5.268 4.333 < 0.0001* 
3. I see how my work affects the company bonus 122 536 4.648 3.966 0.0002* 
4. The company bonus works well to reward my 
work effort 
 
121 538 3.645 3.732 0.6434 
5. The company bonus should be closer linked to 
the performance of my department, instead of 
individual or company performance. 
118 505 4.500 4.735 0.2026 
6. The company bonus motivates me to increase 
my work effort 
123 540 3.919 4.420 0.0084* 
7. I anticipate to get paid the company bonus 
every year 
120 533 3.283 4.135 < 0.0001* 
8 .The communication of the company bonus 
scheme has been clear 
121 539 4.165 3.929 0.1797 
9. I feel I deserve the company bonus I get paid 118 518 5.890 5.944 0.6711 
10. It is fair that the company bonus is reduced 
or left out if the company as a whole does not 
reach set targets. 
119 528 5.630 4.657 <0.0001* 
11. The feedback on how we are performing 
with respect to the targets of the company 
bonus is good. 
122 542 4.418 3.913 0.0038* 
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between effort and reward even on managerial level. Similarly, for both groups, the 95% 
confidence interval for the mean response to the statement “The communication of the 
company bonus scheme has been clear“ includes the ‘neutral’ response of 4.0. This 
suggests that opinions are fairly evenly split in each group on this statement, and the 
two groups on average do neither agree nor disagree that the communication of the 
company bonus scheme has been clear. This can be interpreted that the communication 
neither has been very good, nor very bad. 
 
The 95% confidence interval for the statement “The company bonus should be closer 
linked to the performance of my department, instead of individual or company 
performance” has a lower limit that is substantially above 4, indicating that both groups 
quite strongly agree with this statement on average. From the written responses in the 
survey, we saw that the most common criticism towards the company bonus scheme 
was that it was difficult for the employees to influence, and that they wanted a closer 
link to the department they worked in, or on individual performance. The fact that both 
groups agreed to this statement is therefore somewhat expected. With a vague link 
between reward and effort, this may make the employee feel less committed to the goal 
in line with Locke’s (1968) goal setting theory. These results also tie in well with the 
discussed statement above that both managers and non-mangers struggle to see the link 
between effort and the reward. This could lead the bonus system in to being perceived 
as unfair and frustrating, as the employees need to have self-efficacy that they are able 
to reach a target. According to the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan (1985), 
this may reduce an employee’s perceived competence and thus intrinsic motivation.  
 
Both groups also strongly agree to the statement, “I feel I deserve the company bonus I 
get paid”, with neither group agreeing significantly more nor less than the other. Given 
the results from the survey of the whole population, this was somewhat expected. These 
results can be interpreted that it indicates a feeling of the bonus being an entitlement, 
and that therefore everyone strongly agreeing that they deserve their bonus, since they 
see it as a natural component of their salary. This interpretation is in line with what we 
saw from the qualitative interviews, where the managers agreed that it was highly 
probable that there existed expectancies in the organization to get paid the company 
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bonus every year. The notion of expectancy is further strengthened when we interpret 
the seven tests that had a significant different response. 
 
For the statement “I anticipate to get paid the company bonus every year” the two groups 
disagree in their responses. The non-managers have a mean that is statistically 
significantly greater than 4, suggesting on average they agree with the statement, 
whereas the managers have a mean that is statistically significantly less than 4, 
suggesting that on average they disagree on expecting the company bonus every year. 
That the non-managers anticipate a company bonus confirms the notion that there 
indeed exists a feeling of anticipation and expectancy on the lower levels in the 
organization towards getting paid a company bonus every year. Even though the level of 
agreement is not very high, it might indicate that the employees see the company bonus 
as an entitlement, and a natural part of their salary.  
 
We also note that the managers disagree to the statement that they anticipate a 
company bonus. This might also be expected, and the explanation can be found by 
interpreting the test results for the three statements “It is easy to understand what is 
needed to trigger the company bonus payout”, “I understand the parameters that 
constitute the company bonus well” and ” It is fair that the company bonus is reduced or 
left out if the company as a whole does not reach set targets.” Here, both managers and 
non-managers have means that have 95% confidence intervals that are greater than 4. 
We therefore have strong evidence that both groups agree with these statements. 
However, for each of these statements, the managers have a statistically significantly 
larger mean than the non-managers and we can therefore conclude that although both 
groups agree with the statements on average, the managers believe more passionately 
in these statements. This can indicate that the managers have a better understanding of 
what constitutes the company bonus, as well as a better understanding of what it takes 
to trigger the bonus than the non-managers. According to the goal setting theory, the 
clarity of the goal is vital for it to be motivating (Whetten & Cameron, 2002). With a 
better insight into how the bonus scheme works, this could mean that the managers 
therefore have a better opportunity to evaluate what performances are deserving of 
different levels of bonus payouts, which in turn could lower their expectancy. A better 
overall understanding could also explain why the managers agree significantly more to 
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the statement regarding the fairness of the company bonus compared to the non-
managers.   
 
For the statements, “The feedback on how we are performing with respect to the targets of 
the company bonus is good” and “I see how my work affects the company bonus”, people 
who have a managerial role have means statistically significantly greater than 4, 
implying that on average they agree with the statement. The employees in a non-
managerial role do not have a mean statistically significantly different than 4, suggesting 
that on average they may be neutral on this statement. This indicates that the managers 
better see how their efforts contribute to the company bonus than the non-managers, 
which could be explained by their better understanding of the bonus system in general, 
and that they also agree to the statement that the feedback has been good. Good 
feedback is important to the understanding of the bonus structure in general, and is also 
important in communicating that the goals are achievable (Locke & Latham, 2006). As 
the non-managers responded neutrally to the statement regarding the feedback being 
good, this could be a contributing reason to their lesser understanding of the bonus 
system and what targets the company bonus consists of. All these aforementioned 
differences indicate that the managers should be more likely to be more motivated from 
the company bonus.   
 
However, when we test the overall statement “The company bonus motivates me to 
increase my work effort”, we see some interesting results. The non-managers have a 
mean suggesting that on average they agree with the statement, whereas the managers 
may feel neutral. The following paragraphs present possible arguments that can explain 
these results. 
 
By examining the results we first of all see that the average mean for the non-managers 
is only 4.420, meaning that they only somewhat agree with the statement of the 
company bonus. This can be interpreted that they see the bonus as a fairly weak 
motivational factor, and that there are other factors that motivates them more. From the 
managers, the average mean is 3.919, meaning that on average they slightly disagree 
with the statement. We have however no statistical evidence to say that the mean 
significantly differs from a neutral statement, and they therefore neither agree nor 
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disagree with the statement. This can be interpreted that managers do not see the bonus 
as a strong motivational factor, which is in accordance with the two-factor theory of 
Herzberg (1966) and what the managers from the qualitative interviews also said. 
Money is rather a hygienic factor, and not a motivational factor in itself. Stimulating a 
hygienic factor in itself will not lead to greater motivation, but the hygienic factors are 
rather supportive of staff motivation (Nelson and Quick, 2003). This is in line with the 
arguments of Pink (2009) where he urges organizations to pay their employees a base 
salary that is at a satisfactory and competitive market level, before disregarding money 
as a motivational tool by including it in any form of bonuses.    
 
Another reason for the difference could be explained from the difference in task 
complexity between the two groups. A fair assumption could be that the managers have 
more complex work than the lower-level employees, which involves more creativity and 
non-routine tasks. Accordingly, one can assume that the non-managers have a lower 
task complexity than the managers, working at lower levels in the organization. With 
more routine tasks, involving less creativity, this this could explain why the non-
managers were more motivated than the managers. This explanation is in accordance 
with the views of Pink (2009) and Bogsnes (2009), among others, that for more routine 
tasks, money could well work as a motivating factor.  
 
But there is one interesting factor not yet discussed. From the tests, we experience that 
the non-managers also have a significantly higher expectation of receiving the bonus 
every year than the managers, who in fact disagreed to the same statement of “I 
anticipate to get paid the company bonus every year”.  With the non-managers having a 
higher expectancy of receiving a bonus every year, there is reason to believe that the 
company bonus therefore might be perceived as an entitlement, and seen as a natural 
component of their salary.  
 
And by taking a viewpoint from traditional management control theories where 
financial incentives are believed to have a motivational effect, one explanation to the 
difference in motivation can be that the company bonus makes up a larger percentage of 
the non-managers’ total salary, compared to the managers. With the same reasoning as 
for the non-managers, the company bonus make up a smaller amount of the manager’s 
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total salary, so that the carrot of receiving some extra money is therefore relatively 
smaller for the managers than the non-managers.  
 
If indeed the bonus is being seen as an entitlement, there is also a possibility that the 
employees have over-reported the motivational factor of the company bonus when 
answering the survey. This may have been done to persuade the company into believing 
that the bonus indeed is motivating to ensure that the privilege is not taken away from 
them. If the employees view the bonus as an entitlement, and the bonus payment stops 
or is significantly lowered, this may have a large demotivating effect on the employees 
(Hope & Player, 2012), making an entitlement creep likely to be present in “Bank & 
Financial Corporation”.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions  
This chapter will conclude this thesis by applying the analysis from the previous chapter 
to answer the four research questions and the problem statement.  
In this report we have learnt that motivation is an essential factor for an organization to 
perform in a competitive industry (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2010). If an organization 
understands what motivates the employees, then it will be able to affect their behavior 
and motivate them. In this research report we analyze if bonus is a factor that motivates 
employees, and how organizations can affect the employees’ behavior and motivation 
through structuring bonus and incentive schemes.  
We have learnt that bonuses and financial incentives got a firm foothold in the business 
society in the first half of the nineteenth century, and despite vast criticism from 
behavioral scientists that argued that money was not a motivating factor for people, 
bonuses are still very much alive and kicking in today’s business society (Bogsnes, 
2009). The Beyond Budgeting philosophy has further challenged the use of traditional 
management control mechanisms and calls for an abandonment of budgets. Within this 
criticism of traditional management tools, the Beyond Budgeting philosophies have 
criticized the use of financial incentives, and argue they do more harm than good.   
The purpose of this research report has to provide insights into if bonuses do motivate 
employees, and how bonuses motivate. This has been done through assessing 
employees in a Beyond Budgeting inspired management model at “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” through the use of various process theories on motivation.  
This chapter will look to answer this study’s four defined research questions. Answering 
these four questions will in turn provide us with the insights and understanding to 
answer the overall problem statement:  
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
 
 
SNF Report No. 05/13 
110 
 
6.1 Answering the research questions  
6.1.1 What is Beyond Budgeting and why is it so critical of individual bonuses?  
As explained in the theoretical section; Beyond Budgeting is more than just about 
removing budgets. It is a mind-set rooted in the need for more innovative and adaptive 
management models, as organizations need to be agile and adaptive to respond to 
sudden changes in a highly complex business society. The philosophy revolves around 
12 guiding principles. These principles consist of six process and six leadership 
principles. Together, the principles create a holistic philosophy of how organizations can 
become more adaptive and decentralize decision-making processes without the use of 
traditional budgets (Hope and Fraser, 2003). The term budgets does not in the Beyond 
Budgeting philosophy just refer to the budget in itself, but more so the budgeting 
process, and how this process functions as a generic term for traditional management 
control systems built around command and control (BBRT, 2013).  
 
In a view to free oneself from these suffocating management control systems of the past, 
the Beyond Budgeting philosophy urges organizations to turn away from using financial 
incentives as motivators. Bogsnes (2009) questions organizations’ extensive use of 
individual bonuses as a motivational tool, and argue that they do more harm than good. 
The Beyond Budgeting philosophy’s criticism of using money as a motivator originates 
from Douglas McGregor’s (1959) theory Y, where McGregor argues that motivation is 
something intrinsic to people. By using extrinsic motivators like bonuses, Bogsnes 
argues that this will only reduce the intrinsic motivation that one gets from work, and 
bonuses will undermine some of the interest in the job itself (Bogsnes, 2009).  
 
According to Bogsnes (2009), in today’s highly complex and interlinked business 
society, where work largely is a team-based effort, it is nearly impossible to separate 
individuals’ performances from each other. Co-workers will always contribute to 
another individual’s success, and individual bonuses may therefore undermine 
teamwork and organizational performance. Through criticizing the use of individual 
bonuses, the Beyond Budgeting philosophy rather encourages organizations to base 
rewards on group performance, as it functions better as a reward mechanism. The best 
tools however, is to motivate through using intrinsic motivators like recognition and 
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positive feedback. Bogsnes (2009) argues that businesses today need to use such 
intrinsic motivators through leadership, instead of turning too quickly to money as the 
main motivational tool.  
 
6.1.2 What contextual factors within a dynamic management model influence motivation 
from a bonus system?  
Companies rely on management control systems to make sure that employees are doing 
entrusted tasks and strive towards overall targets (Bergstrand, 2009). Primarily 
implemented for the same reasons (Treanor et al., 2013), bonus systems make up one of 
many pieces in the puzzle of aligning behavior and motivating employees. To be able to 
study the motivational impact from bonus systems, they must consequently be seen in 
relation to other parts of the management control system (Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
These are categorized by Ax et al (2010) into three main instruments of control: Formal, 
organizational and informal.  
 
Being inspired by the philosophies of Beyond Budgeting, “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
has adopted a dynamic management model as their basis for management control. 
Within this model, they have implemented a bonus system comprising three different 
bonus schemes: One profit-sharing-, one group- and one individual scheme for 
corporate managers. As the motivational effects from these bonuses are likely to be 
highly contextual, it was necessary to investigate how other parts of the dynamic 
management model may influence the end result. 
 
Formal controls: “Bank & Financial Corporation” has a formal control system based on 
lean management, external benchmarking and rolling forecasts. By moving away from 
budgets, “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to promote a comparative mindset that 
permeates the group and facilitates for continuous planning in line with the principles of 
Beyond Budgeting (Bogsnes, 2009). By basing the bonus system on relative targets, the 
managers at “Bank & Financial Corporation” believe the formal controls to complement 
the motivational effects from the bonuses. 
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Organizational controls: Following the physical structure of the firm, the bonus systems 
at “Bank & Financial Corporation” mostly support motivation and cohesiveness coming 
from working in large teams (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). The new adoption of subjective 
allocation of the corporate-wide bonus is further supposed to balance out any 
differences in work input, to avoid free-riding. Yet half of the managers voiced out a 
concern that such an allocation might also create a competitive culture that undermines 
the team-work they are trying to support. This possible behavioral conflict was believed 
to be part of the reason why the average size of the corporate-wide bonus is relatively 
smaller than the pure group bonus from the company bonus scheme.  
 
Informal controls: Building a great company culture is considered to be the most 
important factor in motivating employees (Ax et al, 2002). By fostering a culture based 
on moderation, “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to provide employees with 
equality while also rewarding competence. In order to avoid extravagance, the bonus 
system is designed to make up a relatively small part of total salary. Yet most of the 
managers questioned whether the company culture truly complemented the 
motivational effects from the bonus system, which in their minds promotes inequality 
through individual allocations of corporate-wide bonuses and tailored bonuses for 
corporate managers. As another soft control, “Bank & Financial Corporation” wants to 
provide workers with more autonomy and interesting tasks to increase their 
empowerment (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2010).  Yet some managers questioned if the 
bonuses could contradict the motivational effects from having more interesting tasks. 
6.1.3 What factors within a bonus system motivate employees? 
Personal goal setting is believed to largely motivate the managers of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. This includes discussing reasonable parameters, setting clear and 
measurable stretch-targets and receiving constructive feedback along the way. This 
correlates well with the theories of Locke and Latham (2006). By being an active part in 
the design of the goals, the managers also perceive the goals as relevant for their work 
tasks and for the firm. This makes them commit more strongly to the set goals.  
 
Achievability was also found to be a key factor for goals to motivate. By setting realistic 
goals, the corporate managers were more determined to reach them and felt a sense of 
mastery at the point of achievement, as well as being recognized by their superior. For 
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the corporate-wide and company bonuses, some employees believed the bar to be too 
high to reach. By not receiving a higher bonus after performing well, these employees 
felt punished. This caused frustration and demotivation much like the research of 
Whetten and Cameron (2002) suggests. Yet, setting realistic stretch-targets was not 
viewed as an easy exercise by the managers. The research of Locke and Latham (2006) 
also proves that higher realistic targets facilitate better performances and motivation. 
This creates a difficult challenge for “Bank & Financial Corporation”.  
 
Clear communication was perceived to be essential in making the employees understand 
the bonus system (Locke & Latham, 2006). With three different bonus schemes, where 
the company bonus is based on several differently weighted parameters, a large part of 
the employees felt rather confused as to how the bonus system worked. Especially the 
company bonus scheme was not understood well. By not knowing how a bonus system 
works, it is unlikely that it directs behavior or stimulates the desired performance from 
the employees (Locke and Latham, 2006). Communication was also mentioned to help 
clarify the principles for allocating corporate-wide bonuses and ensure trust to the 
bonus system.  
 
Influence on goals was the most mentioned factor of motivation. According to Vroom 
(1964) the perceived ability to influence a performance is one of three necessary 
requirements for the facilitation of motivation. By having individual scorecards with 
personalized goals the corporate managers felt far more in control over the outcome 
than for the company and corporate-wide bonuses. This increased influence made the 
personal goals more motivating to achieve. For the company bonus, less than half of the 
employees saw the link between efforts, performance and outcome. This further 
manifested through a desire to turn the company bonus more toward department 
performance. A large number of the employees thought this would be more motivating. 
Yet breaking down the bonus to lower levels does present “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” with even further challenges in harmonizing departments horizontally.  
 
Uncontrollable factors were found to demotivate the employees of “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. Langeland (1999) mentions that even objective measures may be 
perceived unfairly if they are impacted by factors beyond personal control. When large 
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strategic decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions, affect the shared performances of 
the employees in a negative direction, this reduces the trust to the bonus system. 
Unexpected tax expenses seem to have had the same effect. This is perceived highly 
unfair by those who contributed to reach a certain level of team performance.  
 
Entitlement over bonuses is likely to be a factor of demotivation. “Bank & Financial 
Corporation” paid out relatively high total bonuses on average per employee in 2009 
and 2010. In combination with an unclear understanding of how the bonus system 
works, this seems to have caused an anticipation of receiving a certain amount of 
bonuses annually. With significantly lower average payouts per employee in recent 
years, this seems to have caused frustration for many employees who nearly thought of 
the bonuses as base salary. Hope and Player (2012) refer to this effect as an entitlement 
creep. When the rewards suddenly stop, they are believed to cause a negative feeling 
which likely is stronger than the positive effect by receiving it. Surprisingly, a large share 
of the employees still seems to anticipate annual bonuses. At the same time, the 
justification for receiving corporate-wide and company bonuses are quite high. This 
seems to increase the sense of entitlement from these rewards.  
 
The size of the bonuses was also mentioned as an important factor of motivation. 
Constituting a relatively small part of total salary, the bonuses were not regarded as 
large enough to significantly impact behavior.  
 
6.1.4 Do team bonuses impact motivation differently between managers and employees in 
non-managerial roles?  
Our quantitative research shows that non-managers at “Bank & Financial Corporation” 
are significantly more motivated than managers in a team bonus setting. However, even 
though there exists a significant difference, the non-managers were on average not 
highly motivated from this team bonus.  
Our research shows that the managers had a significant better understanding of the 
bonus system, a better understanding of what parameters the bonus was calculated 
from, as well as agreeing that the received feedback on goal achievement was better 
than the non-managers. According to a theoretical perspective, these results indicate 
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that the managers should be more likely to be motivated from the goals the bonus is tied 
to than the non-managers (Locke & Latham, 2006). In addition, the managers better saw 
how their work influenced their bonus payout than the non-managers. In line with the 
expectancy theory, this should make the managers more motivated, as a larger degree of 
control of what level of effort will result in a reward, will increase employees’ self-
efficacy that they are able to reach the goal (Vroom, 1964). But instead of seeing the 
managers being more motivated from this bonus, we see the opposite occur. Whereas 
this research report has largely answered if bonuses impact motivation differently 
between managers and non-managers, we can also speculate as to why this happens.  
The difference in motivation between non-managers and managers may be explained 
from a task complexity perspective. This perspective argues that non-managers feel a 
stronger motivational factor from the bonus due to their work being less creative as it 
involves more routine tasks. This may well be a contributing factor here, as a large share 
of the respondents in the survey were employees in one of the subsidiaries where much 
of the day-to-day business involves sales and more routine tasks. We cannot say this for 
certain, as we do not have any details about each respondent’s responsibilities and work 
tasks, but it is nevertheless a fair assumption.  
We have discovered that there exists an expectancy how being rewarded, which is 
significantly stronger for non-managers. According to Vroom (1964) the expectancy 
must be rooted in a good understanding of what level of effort triggers a bonus, as well 
as understanding the targets that a bonus is tied to well. We see that the managers 
understand the bonus structure better, and the expectancy from the non-managers may 
therefore be because they view the bonus as salary, and an entitlement, rather than a 
bonus dependent on effort. Another factor that may explain the difference in motivation 
is that for the non-managers the company bonus makes up a larger share of their base 
salary, and thus the bonus is more motivating. This assumption does however imply that 
money might be a motivator at lower levels in the organization. 
But to better explain why there is a difference in motivation between managers and 
non-managers in a team bonus setting at “Bank & Financial Corporation”, further studies 
that look to explore the processes that drive motivation for lower level employees 
should be done through a more qualitative research approach.  
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6.2 Answering the problem statement  
The purpose of this study has been to answer the following problem statement:  
‹‹(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?›› 
This research report has discovered that bonuses do impact motivation in a dynamic 
management level, albeit not very much. 
From our research we saw that corporate managers found very little motivation from the 
individual bonus scheme, and that it did little to affect behavior as the managers argued 
that money for them was purely a hygienic factor. It was rather the high task complexity 
and a creative and challenging work environment that motivated them. These answers 
are in line with Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory (1985), McGregor’s theory Y 
(1960) and Herzberg’s two-factor theory (1966), that financial incentives have no 
motivational effect. What the corporate manager’s however found motivating, were the 
goals that the bonuses was tied to. Taking part in setting challenging goals themselves 
was specifically motivating, which saw the corporate managers personally committing 
to the goals to a large extent. Overall, the corporate managers however did not perceive 
the bonus as motivating, as they all agreed that they would have performed the same 
way, had the goals not been tied to a financial reward.   
 
The company bonus at “Bank & Financial Corporation” is perceived as a bonus system 
that does not work well to reward effort. The employees struggle to see the link between 
their work effort and the goals the bonus is tied too. This may seem to stem from a lack 
of clear communication throughout the organization, and a general lack of feedback on 
how performance is progressing throughout the year. This has resulted in a large share 
of the employees fail to understand the bonus system well, and be able to influence their 
own bonus. The employees also viewed uncontrollable factors as demotivating. 
 
This report also shows that the company bonus had motivational differences between 
non-managers and managers at “Bank & Financial Corporation”, as non-managers were 
significantly more motivated than managers. This result may occur as a result of the 
lower level employees having more routine tasks than managers, which may increase 
motivation from a financial incentive. The difference might also be explained as the 
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bonus being a larger part of the total compensation package for the lower-level 
employees than for the managers. The company bonus is also seen as an entitlement 
among non-managers, which may be a large demotivating factor.  
All in all, our study found that “Bank & Financial Corporation’s” bonus system was 
viewed as a bonus structure that had a bad fit with the dynamic management model, as 
well as being very little motivating. There were also views at both top- and lower levels 
of the hierarchy of the bonus system being unfair, as corporate managers receiving large 
bonuses based on personal goals, while lower level employees have little to no 
perceived influence on their relative small bonus. Therefore, looking at the purpose of 
bonuses as a motivational tool alone, this research may indicate, in line with Bogsnes 
(2009) and Pink (2009), that organizations need to move beyond bonuses and rather 
focus on motivating employees through intrinsic motivators, where recognition and 
feedback is two keywords. Even though we see that the parts of the bonus scheme might 
have a small, but positive impact on some of the employees, the discontent that a large 
part of the employees show towards the system is likely to have a large demotivating 
effect, which may cause demotivated and disengaged workers which will have a negative 
result on productivity and organizational performance.  
6.3 Shortcomings and limitations  
As a case study, this research reports main shortcoming is the limited generalizability 
and applicability it has to other organizations. Even within an industry, organizations’ 
management control systems and bonus systems are highly contextual and situational 
dependent, which underlines the study’s limitation of generalizability and external 
validity. However, the research may still be found relevant for organizations that 
operate within a similar context as “Bank & Financial Corporation”. 
 
To ensure that the conclusions we draw from our analysis have internal validity, the 
respondents must be selected from a random population. Through the qualitative 
interviews we interviewed six managers. Three of these had participated in the 
implementation of the management model, as well as two of the informants had 
participated in the development and design of the bonus system. These informants may 
have provided biased responses which reduce the internal validity of the report. As we 
interviewed only six managers from a population of over 1000 employees, this also 
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limits the possibility to generalize the answers to the organization. This study also used 
a survey to increase the internal validity. With a response rate of 65%, the internal 
validity is strengthened. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of the respondents 
discussing the survey between themselves prior to completing it, which may have 
influenced the responses in either direction. 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
Several interesting topics for further research surfaced in the making of this paper. For 
instance did this study find significant differences in how managers and employees in 
non-managerial roles are motivated by team bonuses. These differences need to be 
further analyzed. One possibility is to conduct an in-depth study on the motivational 
effects from team bonuses on lower level employees. These results could either be 
studied independently or made use of in a comparative study. Another possible study 
could check for company specific differences in motivation within “Bank & Financial 
Corporation”. Gender differences or various levels of base salary could also be studied as 
potential sources for motivational dissimilarities in a group bonus setting. Another 
study could focus more on the motivational effects from the corporate-wide bonus 
scheme. As “Bank & Financial Corporation” has not yet tested the new allocation 
process, it could be interesting to research the motivational impact from this bonus 
scheme after it has been practiced. Another approach could be to study the 
implementation of the dynamic management Model in “Bank & Financial Corporation” in 
some years to see if it will align more or less with the leadership principles of Beyond 
Budgeting. 
 
As this study only involved one company in a very special context, it could also be 
interesting to see how bonuses motivate in other financial entities. If other firms make 
use of pure company bonuses, it could be possible to conduct a comparative study on 
the motivational impact from similar bonus schemes. Such research may also help to 
further indicate how similar bonus schemes may motivate differently based on 
contextual factors in the management control system. Another interesting study could 
investigate what the most commonly types of remuneration schemes are in the largest 
financial entities in Scandinavia.   
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Legal framework for bonuses and incentives  
In the wake of the economic recession of 2008, bonuses and remuneration policies 
within financial entities became highly debated in the Western world. This led several 
national authorities to introduce new regulations and guidelines to further restrict and 
control financial entities’ fixed and variable remuneration schemes (PwC, 2012). In the 
EU, this manifested through a third European Capital Requirements directive from 24 
November 2010 (Directive 2010/76/EU), also known as the CRD III directive or the 
Basel III directive, followed by specific guidelines provided by the Committee of 
European Banking Sectors’ (CEBS, 2010). Largely based on these two EU documents, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance launched its own directive for financial remunerations 
on 1 December 2010 named ‹‹Forskrift om godtgjørelse i finansinstitusjoner›› (2010).  
 
As stated in §1 (ibid.), the purpose of this new directive is to:  
«Establish remuneration policies and practices for the entirety of the company in 
order to promote and give incentives to well-behaved risk management and risk 
control, prevent excessive risk taking and to contribute to avoiding conflicts of 
interests.» 
 
The new remuneration directive took effect January 1, 2011. These regulations comprise 
all holding companies of financial corporations, banks, finance companies, insurance 
companies, pension funds, investment firms and holding companies of investment funds. 
All foreign branches of Norwegian based firms that may be classified in any of the earlier 
mentioned categories are also covered by this new directive (ibid.). 
 
As to the different types of salaries, the directive applies to all different forms of 
remunerations within financial firms as mentioned. It is also explicitly mentioned that 
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no variable pay is to be given «in a way that circumvents the firm’s policies for 
remuneration». It is in other words important that the practices of remunerations by the 
firm and not just its formal policies are aligned with the new directive. Each firm is 
independently responsible to comply with these rules (ibid.). 
 
Companies having more than 50 employees or more than 5 billion NOK in assets under 
management are further required to establish an independent unit in charge of firm 
remunerations, elected by the Board of Directors. For internal control purposes, it is 
mandatory to annually report on the remuneration practices within the firm. This 
process is to be assessed by an objective third-party at least once a year. If requested, 
the annual remuneration practices reports are to be immediately handed to the Ministry 
of Finance or made public (ibid). 
 
One clear distinction from previous remuneration rules lies within the definition of risk-
takers. In §2 (ibid.) it is specified that all employees and officials with the equivalent 
remuneration as the top managers and other «risk-takers» are also subject to the new 
rules. Other «risk-takers» here includes employees and officials with responsibilities 
that are of great significance to the company’s exposure to risks, as well as for 
employees and officials with tasks related to risk control. 
 
Highlighted in §4 (ibid.) under remunerations for top executives, these are the main 
considerations: 
 Total remuneration must be balanced. The salary (fixed remuneration) must be 
significantly large so bonuses (variable remuneration) can be discarded. 
 A top executive of a bank, including the CEO, cannot receive bonuses that surpass 
50 percent of his or her salary. 
 Guaranteed bonuses can only be given to new recruits and only for their first 
year of employment. 
 Bonuses are to be determined based on a complete evaluation of results and 
performance. Firm risks and costs associated to the need for certain results and 
liquid assets must be considered in this evaluation. The time horizon evaluated 
on can be no less than two years. The performance and results of an employee is 
to be evaluated by: 
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o The employee’s individual performance and results 
o The business unit’s result 
o The firm’s result 
 Not more than half of the bonus payment can be given in cash. The other half 
must be paid either 1) in shares or other instruments related to the firm’s equity 
(such as equity certificates) in the company itself or in another company in the 
group or 2) as conditional capital (for instance cash) reflecting the change in the 
firm’s market value. Neither of the two alternatives is to be “exercised freely” by 
the receiving employee at once. Instead, the bonus is to be evenly spread out over 
a period totaling at least three years, where the binding period must consider the 
“underlying business cycles and risks” of the firm. The bonus is to be reduced if 
“the result’s development or the following results entail so”. 
 Top executives cannot have any forms of insurance agreements that protect them 
from reduced or discarded bonuses. 
 Total variable remuneration cannot limit the institution’s ability to strengthen 
the bank’s or insurance company’s reserve. 
 For severance pay, there are other specific rules that apply. 
For employees and officials with responsibilities that are of great significance to the 
company’s exposure to risks and employees and officials with tasks related to risk 
control, all of the abovementioned regulations apply, with the exception of the second 
constraint. As a final note, officials and those in charge of risk control are not be 
evaluated based on their business unit’s results (ibid.). 
In the corresponding press release following the launch of the new directive, Sigbjørn 
Johnsen, the Norwegian Minister of Finance gave his remarks: 
“Facilitating financial stability is a task of great importance to national 
authorities. Excessive risk taking is assumed to largely contribute to financial 
uncertainty. (…) Traditionally, remuneration policies in the financial sector have 
been structured in a way that generates too strong incentives for risk taking on 
behalf of the firm and its clients’ resources. Therefore I believe it is essential to 
formulate rules that promote well-behaved risk management and financial 
stability, which deters excessive risk taking and does not give incentives to short 
term profits” (Ministry of Finance, 2010)  
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Appendix II: Interview guide – Qualitative interviews with managers 
Interview guide – Managers at “Bank & Financial Corporation”: 
 
This interview guide was used as a guideline during the interviews, but the interviews also 
included follow up questions and other areas of discussion as the interviews progressed.  
 
Introduction: 
1. Presentation of the interviewer and the intent and purpose of the case study 
2. Information regarding anonymity and other formalities. 
3. Presentation of interviewee. Role in the organization, number of years working 
for the organization. 
 
I. DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT: 
a. Have you personally participated in structuring and implementing the new and 
dynamic management model? 
 In what way? 
 Have you participated in the development of the new bonus system? 
b. What do you know about dynamic management and Beyond Budgeting?  
What is your level of insight? 
c. How has the new dynamic management model affected your daily work?  
What are your thoughts on the implementation process?  
Has it been done well? 
d. Does the dynamic management model provide a better fit with the organization’s 
strategy than the previous model? 
 
II. BONUS SYSTEMS 
e. Why does “Bank & Financial Corporation” operate with a bonus system?  
What do you think is the purpose behind it? 
f. How does the system fit with dynamic management and Beyond Budgeting?  
g. Is the bonus system in line with the corporate culture? 
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III. BONUS SYSTEMS AND PROCESS THEORIES: 
GOAL SETTING THEORY 
h. Can you detail the bonus structure you have today? 
 What parameters is it built on?  
 What is your individual bonus tied to? 
i. Do you normally reach the goals that your individual bonus is tied to? 
Are the goals realistic? 
Are the goals specific/tangible? 
Are they typically short-term or long-term? 
Are they easy to manipulate? 
j. How often do you get feedback on how you perform in the league tables?  
 Do you work actively towards those goals in the league tables? 
k. To what extent do you perceive the bonus parameters as reasonable?  
 Company/corporate wide/individual? 
 
EQUITY THEORY 
l. Do you find the differentiation in bonuses between leaders and staff fair? 
 Why do you think it is that way? 
 Is it a paradox that leaders need a higher bonus? 
m. To what extent do you feel you deserve the bonus you receive? 
Company/corporate wide/individual? 
More or less? 
n. How do you feel about the profit-sharing scheme now being allocated based on 
individual behavior? 
 Is it fair? 
o. Do you think the new allocation system may lead to a more competitive work culture? 
  
EXPECTANCY THEORY 
p. How would you react if there were no bonuses for a year? 
q. Do you expect to get paid a bonus every year? 
 Company/corporate wide/individual? 
r. Do you feel your sub-ordinates expect to get paid a bonus every year? 
 Company/corporate wide? 
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s. How do you value the bonus?  
 Is it desirable? 
t. Are the bonuses at “Bank & Financial Corporation” a good reward for you work effort? 
 
SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY 
u. Does the bonus give you a notion of working towards a mutual goal? 
 How? 
v. Does it facilitate teamwork? 
 In what way? 
w. Does the bonus system contribute to a sense of ownership to the organization? 
x. What is the largest motivational factor for your employees? 
 Why? 
y. In what way does your leader motivate you?   
 
IV: BONUS SYSTEMS AND CONTENT THEORIES: 
z. What motivates you to come to work every day? 
aa. To what extent does money or a higher salary motivate you? 
ab. Is bonus a good motivational tool to motivate your sub-ordinates? 
Do they need to be motivated with money? 
 What other tools do you use to motivate them? 
 
V: GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE BONUS STRUCTURE: 
ac. Are you satisfied with the current bonus system?? 
 Why/why not? 
ad. Do you find the system complicated?  
Why/why not?  
 How would you design the system? 
What criteria do you feel one should be evaluated on? 
ae. Are you more motivated by group or individual rewards? 
af. Have you or anyone in your team shown any dissatisfaction towards the system? 
ag. Does the current bonus structure motivate you to increase your effort? 
If so, in what way? 
Do you need the bonus to do your work? 
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Would you have performed as good without a bonus? 
ah. Does “Bank & Financial Corporation” need a bonus system? 
Appendix III: Quantitative survey  
Introduction: 
This questionnaire is part of the research for a joint master thesis at the Norwegian 
School of Economics (NHH) and Louvain School of Management (LSM). The results from 
the questionnaire will also constitute part of the annual evaluation of the company 
bonus scheme in “Bank & Financial Corporation”. To make the evaluation as good as 
possible, we ask you to take your time to answer all the questions in an honest manner. 
All answers will be treated anonymously. The survey takes 4-5 minutes to complete. 
 
Page 1: Introductory questions 
 
1. Which company are you a part of? 
 “Bank & Financial Corporation” Finance 
 “Bank & Financial Corporation” Holding Company 
 “Bank & Financial Corporation” Debt Collection 
 “Bank & Financial Corporation” Insurance 
 “Bank & Financial Corporation” Card Services 
 
2. What is your gender?  
 Male 
 Female 
 
3. Do you have a managerial responsibility?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
4. How many years have you been employed in “Bank & Financial Corporation”? 
 0-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-20 years 
 20 years or more 
 
5. What is the level of your base salary? 
 300-400,000 
 401-500,000 
 501-600,000 
 601,000 or more  
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Page 2: Statements 
Please rate to which extent you agree with the following statement from 1 (fully 
disagree) to 7 (fully agree), where 4 refers to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the 
given statement. If you do not know the answer, you can always check for I do not know.  
 
6. It is easy to understand what is needed to trigger the company bonus 
 1-7 or I do not know 
7. I understand the measures that constitute the company bonus well 
 1-7 or I do not know 
8. I see how my work contributes to the company bonus 
 1-7 or I do not know 
9. The company bonus works well to reward my efforts 
 1-7 or I do not know 
10. The company bonus should be linked closer to the performance of my department, 
rather than individual or company performance. 
 1-7 or I do not know 
11. The company bonus motivates me to increase performance 
 1-7 or I do not know 
12. I anticipate to get paid the company bonus every year 
 1-7 or I do not know 
13. The communication of the company bonus scheme has been clear 
 1-7 or I do not know 
14. I feel I deserve the company bonus I am granted 
 1-7 or I do not know 
15. It is fair that the company bonus is reduced or left out for a year if the company as a 
whole does not reach set targets. 
 1-7 or I do not know 
16. The feedback on how we are performing with respect to the targets of the company 
bonus is good. 
 1-7 or I do not know 
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Page 3: Voluntary, open-ended questions 
17. What do you see as the biggest weakness with the current company bonus scheme? 
 
18. What do you see as the biggest weakness with the current corporate-wide bonus 
scheme? 
 
19. If you could have improved anything with the current bonus system, what would you 
have changed? 
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Appendix IV: Test results from survey 
Table A provides summaries of the test demographics.  By subsidiary, 58 percent of the 
respondents were from “Bank & Financial Corporation” Insurance. Nearly 25 percent 
were from the holding company of “Bank & Financial Corporation”. Nearly 12 percent 
were from Debt Collection and about 4 percent were from Finance. Less than 1 percent 
was from “Bank & Financial Corporation” Card Services. The gender of respondents was 
fairly evenly split, with 48.95 percent females and 51.05 percent males. As one might 
expect, only 18 percent of the sample were managers, with the balance of 82 percent 
reporting no managerial responsibility. The mode for years employed is the 0-5 year 
category (43.41 percent), with the balance roughly equally split between 11-20 years 
and more than 20 years. The mode for the distribution of wage levels is the highest 
category, greater than 600,000, with 38 percent of the respondents, second highest was 
the 401-500,000 category with about 31 percent. In total, response rate was 65 percent, 
as 671 responded from a population of 1037. From a total of 145 managers, 123 
responded to the survey, giving a response rate for the managers at 85 percent. 
 
Table A. Frequency counts, percentages, and cumulative percentages for demographic var. 
Variables Values Frequency Percent Cumulative 
percentage 
Subsidiary     
 Card Services 6 0.9 0.9 
 Debt Collection 80 11.98 12.87 
 Holding company 166 24.85 37.72 
 Finance 28 4.19 41.92 
 Insurance 388 58.08 100 
 Total 668 100  
Gender     
 Female 327 48.95 48.95 
 Male 341 51.05 100 
 Total 668 100  
Are you a manager?     
 No 545 81.59 81.59 
 Yes 123 18.41 100 
 Total 668 100  
Years employed     
 0-5 years 290 43.41 43.41 
 11-20 years 101 15.12 58.53 
 6-10 years 160 23.95 82.49 
 More than 20years 117 17.51 100 
 Total 668 100  
Wage level (NOK)     
 300-400,000 75 11.23 11.23 
 401-500,000 207 30.99 42.22 
 501-600,000 127 19.01 61.23 
 Above 600,000 259 38.77 100 
 Total 668 100  
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Table B summarizes the results of the t tests for all eleven statements on the survey, 
statement by statement.  The contents of the table are explained line by line for 
statement 1 of the questionnaire. 
 
For statement 1, “It is easy to understand what is needed to trigger the company bonus”, 
the first line under the header contains statistics for the group of non-managers. The 
first numerical column contains the number of non-zero responses, 541, followed by the 
average of these responses, 4.272. This is followed by the standard error of the average, 
0.074, which is just the standard deviation of the sample.1 “Standard deviation” is the 
estimated population standard deviation. The last two columns have the 95% Lower 
Confidence Limit (LCL) and 95% Upper Confidence Limit (UCL) that are the endpoints of 
a 95% confidence interval for the population mean. The second line of the table provides 
the same information for the group of respondents that were managers. The third line of 
the table provides statistics for the difference between the means for the two groups, 
including the mean, standard error, and the Lower and Upper Confidence Limits for a 
95% confidence interval. The fourth line of the table provides the t statistic, given by the 
mean of Difference divided by standard error of Difference (i.e., 0.549/0.173), its 
degrees of freedom (d.f.), which assuming the population variances are the same for 
each group, is just the total sample size minus two, and the p-value for that t-statistic for 
a two-tailed alternative hypothesis. For the two-tailed alternative hypothesis, the p-
value is interpreted as the probability of observing a t-statistic as large or larger in 
absolute value as the one observed, if the null hypothesis that the population means are 
the same is true. Thus small values of the p-value, for instance p<0.01, represent 
evidence against the null hypothesis because one would be unlikely to obtain a p-value 
this small (i.e., a 1 in 100 chance) if the null hypothesis were true. Table B can be seen on 
the next page. 
  
                                                        
1 That is, the sample variance is the estimated population variance divided by the sample size which is 
541 here. The standard deviation of the sample, alternatively referred to as the standard error of the 
sample, is the square root of the sample variance, or equivalently, it is the estimated population standard 
deviation divided by the square root of the sample size, 1.726 divided by the square root of 541.  
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Table B. t tests by statement (* if p value is less than 0.01) 
Statement 1: It is easy to understand what is needed to trigger the company bonus 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 541 4.272 0.074 1.726 4.126 4.417 
Manager 123 4.821 0.157 1.742 4.510 5.132 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.549 
 
0.173 
  
0.210 
 
0.889 
t = 3.181, d.f. = 662, p-value = 
0.0015* 
      
 
Statement 2: I understand the measures that constitute the company bonus well 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 543 4.333 0.072 1.687 4.191 4.476 
Manager 123 5.268 0.141 1.563 4.989 5.547 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.935 
 
0.166 
  
0.608 
 
1.261 
t = 5.623, d.f. = 664, p-value < 
0.0001* 
      
 
Statement 3: I see how my work contributes to the company bonus 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 536 3.966 0.079 1.838 3.810 4.122 
Manager 122 4.648 0.157 1.739 4.336 4.959 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.681 
 
0.183 
  
0.323 
 
1.040 
t = 3.731, d.f. = 656, p-value = 
0.0002* 
      
 
Statement 4: The company bonus works well to reward my efforts 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 538 3.732 0.082 1.894 3.572 3.893 
Manager 121 3.645 0.166 1.830 3.315 3.974 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
-0.088 
 
0.189 
  
-0.460 
 
0.284 
t = -0.463, d.f. = 657, p-value = 0.6434       
 
Statement 5: The company bonus should be linked closer to the performance of my 
department, rather than individual or company performance. 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 505 4.735 0.078 1.761 4.581 4.889 
Manager 118 4.500 0.180 1.956 4.143 4.857 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
-0.235 
 
0.184 
  
-0.596 
 
0.127 
t = -1.276, d.f. = 621, p-value = 0. 
2026 
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Statement 6: The company bonus motivates me to increase performance 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 540 4.420 0.081 1.879 4.262 4.579 
Manager 123 3.919 0.179 1.986 3.564 4.273 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager  
  
-0.501 
 
0.190 
  
-0.874 
 
-0.129 
t = -2.644 d.f. = 661, p-value = 
0.0084* 
      
 
Statement 7: I anticipate to get paid the company bonus every year 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 533 4.135 0.080 1.851 3.978 4.293 
Manager 120 3.283 0.162 1.778 2.962 3.605 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
-0.852 
 
0.186 
  
-1.216 
 
-0.487 
t = -4.587, d.f. = 651, p-value < 
0.0001* 
      
 
Statement 8: The communication of the company bonus scheme has been clear 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 539 3.929 0.074 1.719 3.784 4.075 
Manager 121 4.165 0.169 1.859 3.831 4.500 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.236 
 
0.176 
  
0.109 
 
0.581 
t = 1.343, d.f. = 658, p-value = 0.1797       
 
Statement 9: I feel I deserve the company bonus I am granted 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 518 5.944 0.055 1.259 5.835 6.053 
Manager 118 5.890 0.111 1.211 5.669 6.111 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
-0.054 
 
0.128 
  
-0.305 
 
0.196 
t = -0.4249, d.f. = 634, p-value = 
0.6711 
      
 
Statement 10: It is fair that the company bonus is reduced or left out for a year if the 
company as a whole does not reach set targets. 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 528 4.657 0.077 1.770 4.506 4.809 
Manager 119 5.630 0.153 1.667 5.328 5.933 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.973 
 
0.178 
  
0.624 
 
1.322 
t = 5.4748, d.f. = 645, p-value < 
0.0001* 
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Statement 11: The feedback on how we are performing with respect to the targets of the 
company bonus is good. 
Group N Mean Std. 
Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% 
LCL 
95% 
UCL 
Non-manager 542 3.913 0.074 1.723 3.768 4.059 
Manager 122 4.418 0.160 1.771 4.101 4.736 
Difference, 
Manager-Non-manager 
  
0.505 
 
0.174 
  
0.164 
 
0.846 
t = 2.9047, d.f. = 662, p-value = 
0.0038* 
      
 
Finally, one should be careful not to confuse “average sentiment” as expressed by the 
average response with what one would obtain as a response by randomly sampling. For 
example, from a “population” of three people who respond 3, 4, and 7, the average is 
quite strong agreement, 4.66, but a random sample of one person from this population is 
equally likely to be someone who agrees, someone who disagrees or someone who is 
neutral. Table 3 provides the quartiles of the distribution for each question broken out 
by whether the respondent is a manager or not. 
 
Table C and D. Quartiles of response to survey question, by type of respondent, managerial 
role or non-managerial role. Q2 responds to the median. 
 
i) Non-managerial role 
 
Statement: 
Number of 
non-zero 
responses 
 
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
It is easy to understand what is needed to trigger the company 
bonus. 
541 3 4 6 
I understand the measures that constitute the company bonus. 543 3 4 6 
I see how my work contributes to the company bonus. 536 2 4 5 
The company bonus works well to reward my efforts. 538 2 4 5 
The company bonus should be linked closer to the performance of 
my department, rather than individual or company performance. 
505 4 5 6 
The company bonus motivates me to increase performance. 540 3 5 6 
I expect to get paid the company bonus every year. 533 3 4 6 
The communication of the company bonus scheme has been clear. 539 3 4 5 
I feel I deserve the company bonus I am granted 518 5 6 7 
It is fair that the company bonus is reduced or left out for a year if 
the company as a whole does not reach set targets. 
528 3 5 6 
The feedback on how we are performing with respect to the 
targets of the company bonus is good. 
542 3 4 5 
Table C: Quartiles of response to survey question, non-managerial role 
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ii) Managerial role 
Statement: Non-zero 
responses 
 
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
It is easy to understand what is needed to trigger the company 
bonus. 
123 3 5 6 
I understand the measures that constitute the company bonus. 123 5 6 6 
I see how my work contributes to the company bonus. 122 3 5 6 
The company bonus works well to reward my efforts. 121 2 3 5 
The company bonus should be linked closer to the performance of 
my department, rather than individual or company performance. 
118 3 5 6 
The company bonus motivates me to increase performance. 123 2 4 6 
I expect to get paid the company bonus every year. 120 2 3 4.5 
The communication of the company bonus scheme has been clear. 121 3 4 6 
I feel I deserve the company bonus I am granted 118 5 6 7 
It is fair that the company bonus is reduced or left out for a year if 
the company as a whole does not reach set targets. 
119 5 6 7 
The feedback on how we are performing with respect to the 
targets of the company bonus is good. 
122 3 5 6 
Table D: Quartiles of response to survey question, managerial role 
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Appendix V: Historical average payments general bonuses by subsidiary*.  
 
*By general bonuses it is implied both corporate-wide and company bonuses. There are no historical data 
for Debt Collection and Card Services. Insurance A and Insurance B were merged to form Insurance in 
2013. 
 
Subsidiary Per employee (NOK) Total bonus payout (NOK) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Insurance A 46,000 46,000 21,000 25,500 11.6M 11.3M 7.4M 6.8M 
Insurance B 50,000 50,000 28,000 14,200 19.6M 19.6M 12.2M 5.9M 
Finance 32,000 32,000 24,000 12,000 3.3M 6.3M 4.6M 2.3M 
Holding Company 48,000 48,000 27,000 24,400 10.8M 11.0M 6.2M 6.9M 
Total average 46,000 45,000 26,000 18,800 45M 48.2M 30.4M 21.9M 
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The purpose of this research report is to explore the link between bonuses and moti-
vation in a Beyond Budgeting setting. This has been done through conducting a case 
study of one of the leading finance corporations in the Nordic countries through defin-
ing the following problem statement: 
(How) do bonuses impact motivation in a dynamic management model?
Through the use of qualitative interviews as well as a quantitative survey, the research 
report takes a holistic view of analyzing the motivational impact of three different bonus 
schemes on employees across the whole organization, as well exploring if a team-based 
bonus scheme has a different motivational impact on managers compared to non-man-
agers in the organization.
